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Latvia: Gorbunov Leaves Central Committee

90UN1822B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
25 Apr 90 p 3

[Statement by CPSU member A. Gorbunov to A. Rubiks, first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee; reprinted from CINA, 24 April]

[Text] At several of the latest plenums of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee prior to the 25th Congress, I advocated radical changes in the Program and Rules of the Communist Party of Latvia in order to bring closer together the points of view in the party on the state sovereignty of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. Unfortunately, a majority of the delegates of the 25th Communist Party of Latvia Congress rejected a concept proposed by the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee which, in my opinion, could have brought about mutual understanding. It was exactly this majority of delegates that formed the new Central Committee and adopted the resolution of the congress.

Due to this I, unfortunately, cannot support the composition of the newly elected Central Committee and the resolutions adopted because in this case I would be forced to betray my convictions. I already expressed this position publicly when I learned about the results of the congress while on a business trip abroad.

In view of the above, I consider myself not to be bound by the responsibilities of a member of the Latvian CP Central Committee which were entrusted to me during my absence and without my personal consent.

I ask that you consider this letter an official document on the withdrawal of my candidacy.

Gorbunov on Latvian Independence Tactics

90UN1822A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
25 Apr 90 pp 1, 3

[Speech by A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Latvian SSR, at a general meeting of Latvian SSR people's deputies]

[Text] At the outset of our activities as deputies, it was meant for us to respond with specific deeds to the most important question for Latvia—the question of Latvian independence. We have to respond today, here, at this meeting, as well as at the first session, by setting forth a thought-through and balanced tactic and strategy which a majority of the people of Latvia will understand and support.

You know what the developments were in Moscow concerning us. You know what conditions the USSR president is setting in conjunction with Latvia's striving for independence.

In all honesty, if I were Gorbachev I would be ashamed to suggest that Latvia leave the USSR in keeping with a law which absolutely does not provide for a real opportunity to leave the USSR. This law was adopted with

complete disregard for any equality of the republics altogether. As a result, the secession arrangement contains not a shred of equal rights. Actually, it is the deputies of the Russian Federation who decide everything because they constitute an absolute majority.

Apparently, the thinking of the president of the country allows for this action too. His goes to stress yet again that we should not by any means abandon the restoration of Latvia's state independence under which Latvia could develop as a subject of international law, on an equal footing with other peoples and states.

However, I believe that it would be unreasonable to negate the need for a period of transition. The government should set forth proposals for a period of transition to the complete restoration of sovereignty, and the new parliament should adopt this program without hesitation, but also without undue haste. I do not doubt that the road on which we have embarked will take Latvia to the restoration of its state independence if we act in keeping with this principle.

By what specific actions are we going to create civil and ethnic accord in Latvia—this is the second, no less important question, which we should answer. Otherwise, all of our goals will become unattainable, and our labor will become senseless. Personally, I consider civil and political accord in Latvia to be primary, even in a hopeless situation.

The programs which we, the deputies gathered here, set forth have been supported by the populace, as shown by the elections. However, do the reforms promised by us have a social base of support, say, such as that of the Mazowiecki government in Poland? As prices increased rapidly and production declined the people nonetheless believed and still believe the Government of Poland because the well-being of the people is its ultimate goal. Let us begin by telling the people the truth once again—life which is worthy of man and which many peoples of the world have achieved, demands quality work. Quality labor means not only an intensity of work to which we are not accustomed but also entirely different principles. We should immediately give up the obstinate idealization of public ownership and switch to a regulated market economy, including private property. There is no other alternative. The practice of the world has shown this.

We should begin with a political choice, and at present this is impossible to deny. However, the politicians' opportunities, which are actually nothing but assertions by the functionaries of various parties, are quite limited. If we now fail to nominate professionals, economic managers, and knowledgeable specialists to key positions with a view to actual reinvigoration we will repeat the mistakes of the Communist Party in the period of stagnation. The People's Front has now assumed the place of a political leader, and it should realize the responsibilities of its qualitatively new position.

As I perceive it, the implementation of civil rights is associated not only with the freedom of choice and the responsibility of all for their choices but, on the whole, with the standard of living which this choice can ensure.

The first thing which we should resolve is that taxes must give incentives for production. On the other hand, we need to create a system of indexation or, in other words, provide benefits not only for those who will have low incomes but primarily for the social strata which cannot have high incomes at all, that is, retirees and students. This needs to be done, and only this will expand the notion of our society concerning the veracity of our objectives. Let us start working on situations associated with the unavoidable difficulties of the period of transition right now rather than deliberate. Let us calculate as earnestly as possible, many times over, what price increases, reduced amounts of production, unemployment, and a universal drop in the standard of living mean for us. It depends on us, on our feeling of reality whether the people can rally in the face of such difficulties and whether they give up our program. Finally, can the weakness of Latvia, its ethnic composition, become the strength of Latvia? This also depends on us to a great degree. Let us not say hypocritically that only one side has sown discord. It would be more correct to set forth an initiative for both sides, mainly the Latvians and the Russians, to apologize to each other for the wrongs which have given rise to these disagreements in Latvia over the last 50 years.

It is necessary to begin by implementing the principle of equal rights. There are not going to be equal rights for languages until we ensure equal opportunities to study Latvian and Russian. This is the case with all problems, with all issues.

If I were asked about which issues I would like to see first on the agenda of the first session of the new parliament, I would answer: We should not procrastinate with proclaiming official guarantees for the residents of Latvia of other nationalities, and we should say to the entire world clearly that the citizens of the USSR and their descendants who came to the republic after World War II should have no doubts about their future and that of their children even after Latvia restores its statehood. This needs to be done in order to leave no room for uncertainty and hostility, for speculations and intimidation. That is, at the current, intellectual, stage Latvians should prove that democracy is and will remain the philosophy of the Government of Latvia and our deputies at all levels. We should prove that we are not going to eliminate the Stalinism of 1940 through the methods of a new tyranny, that we are not going to be guided by revenge in our actions, but will only act in the interest of historical justice. We should prove that the rights of the citizens of Latvia—regardless of nationality—to social security, protection of the person, and the right to maintain one's national and ethnic identity, that is, to freely use their native language, be educated in it, perfect their cultural autonomy, express religious views, build

churches, celebrate national holidays, maintain contacts with their Motherland outside the boundaries of Latvia, and so on, will be ensured.

In a word, we need to confirm that we are going to live in a constitutional rule-of-law state without barbed wire on its borders. After all, we are not going to erect a Berlin Wall along the border between Latvia and Russia! On a voluntary basis, any permanent resident of the republic may become a citizen of the Republic of Latvia. In turn, those who do not want to do it will also be guaranteed all democratic and internationally acknowledged human rights. Representatives of other nationalities will not have to swear their allegiance to the Latvians, but mutual respect will need to be confirmed.

If we had to take an oath right now, it seems to me that this would need to be done by all of us together. We should swear our loyalty to the people of Latvia and the land of Latvia, proving it by our labor on every farmstead, in every village, township, and city of our motherland.

Independent Latvian CP Congress Report

90UN1796A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
18 Apr 90 p 2

[LETA "Information Report" published under the rubric: "Independent Latvian Communist Party Supporters Congress"]

[Text] A congress of supporters of the Independent Latvian Communist Party was held on 14 April in Riga, in the large assembly hall of the University of Latvia.

The congress was opened on behalf of the organizing committee by A. Chepanis.

A six-man presidium of the congress was elected. Following the election of the secretariat and the credentials and auditing commissions, the following agenda was approved:

1. Situation in the Latvian Communist Party.
2. Interpretation of the historical path of the Latvian Communist Party.
3. Basic principles of the activity of the Independent Latvian Communist Party.
4. Independent Latvian Communist Party Rules.
5. Election of central authorities of the Independent Latvian Communist Party.
6. Other business.

The decision to conduct the debate following the hearing of the reports of the first four items on the agenda was adopted.

Papers were delivered by M. Rukmane, first secretary of Riga's Kirovskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee]; I.

Gore, senior scientific associate of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute; J. Rozenvalds, dean of the University of Latvia History and Philosophy Faculty; and K. Podnieks, head of a laboratory of the University of Latvia Mathematics and Information Science Institute.

The following took part in the debate: M. Naglis, secretary of the party committee of Orskiy Rayon's "Lachplesis" Agro-Company; A. Ozers, head of a department of the "Teploelektroprojekt" Institute; V. Krumins, director of the Nature Museum; R. Miller, director of Tsodskaya High School; V. Kononovs, chief of Rezekne Road Repair and Construction Administration No. 6; I. Veinbergs, instructor of the Dobelskiy Raykom; A. Baumanis, chairman of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Journalists Union; L. Zile, director of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute; USSR People's Deputy E. Grinovskis; A. Varslavan, veterinarian of Valmiyerskiy Rayon's "Burtniyeiki" Sovkhoz [State Farm]; D. Znatnays, chairman of the Latvian SSR State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport; M. Malkiel, chief physician of the "Yaunkemeri" Sanatorium; USSR People's Deputy I. Kezbers; V. Bresis, chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers; and K. Sondor, senior lecturer of the Riga Medical Institute.

The delegates heard and approved the report of the credentials commission delivered by its chairman A. Ciscakovs, first secretary of the Rizhskiy Raykom.

The Independent Latvian Communist Party Congress deemed the work of the previous Latvian Communist Party Central Committee since the last congress satisfactory.

The party rules and a number of decisions, resolutions, and other documents, which will be published, were adopted.

The decision to hold a referendum on the name of the party was adopted.

I. Kezbers was elected chairman of the Independent Latvian Communist Party.

It was decided to elect a 77-man Independent Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. Some 41 Central Committee members were elected at the congress, 36 will be delegated by rayon and city party organizations.

M. Rukmane and D. Skulte were elected members of the Board and secretaries of the Central Committee of the Independent Latvian Communist Party.

V. Blinovs, J. Goldmanis, V. Kononovs, A. Ozers, H. Plauks, J. Rozenvalds, A. Cepanis, and A. Endzins were elected members of the board. A further seven members of the board will be elected later.

The Independent Latvian Communist Party Control Commission and its chairman, V. Kokalis, were approved.

The participants in the congress laid flowers on the monument to Ya. Raynis and the Freedom Monument.

Latvian Communist Party Decrees Depolitization Decree

90UN1822C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
25 Apr 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Buro "On the Issue of Depoliticizing the Apparatuses of State Government Organs"]

[Text] The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Buro notes that the decision "On the Operation of Political Parties and Other Socio-Political Organizations in the Organs of State Government of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]" adopted on 9 April 1990 by the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers contravenes Articles 6, 7, and 49 of the Latvian SSR Constitution.

The unilateral non-recognition by the Council of Ministers of assignments given by public organizations to the organs of state government and economic organs of the republic is absurd because they were adopted by joint resolutions of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee and the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers which set forth ways to solve the most significant socio-economic problems.

These actions of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers cannot be justified in the absence of the Law on Parties and Public Organizations.

The Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee Buro resolves:

To recognize the need to develop and submit for consideration to the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet a draft law "On Parties and Public Organizations of the Latvian SSR" in exercise of legislative initiative. To consider resolving the issues of depolitization of the apparatuses of state government organs impossible until the law is adopted.

To charge the Central Committee Secretariat with setting up a working group to prepare a pertinent draft law.

To recommend to CPSU members employed in the apparatuses of the organs of state government of the republic not to adopt resolutions on dissolving party organizations.

Concept on Formulation of Latvian Statehood

90UN1826B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 1

["Concept of the Latvian Communist Party Platform on the Question 'The Form of Statehood of the Latvian SSR'"]

[Text] 1. The Latvian Communist Party advocates full recognition of the right of nations to self-determination

right up to the formation of an independent state and secession from the USSR for each people, including the Latvian people.

2. Giving due consideration to the perestroika taking place in the country, the renewal of the life of society, and the democratization of state power in the USSR, the Latvian Communist Party deems it premature to raise the question of immediate secession from the USSR.

3. The Latvian Communist Party advocates the fastest possible real renewal of the Soviet federation and work on and the signing of a new union treaty that guarantees real sovereignty for Latvia and an upsurge in its economy and a guarantee of a normal material, social, and cultural standard of living for the population.

4. If remaining in the renewed federation does not guarantee the interests of the people of Latvia, the Latvian Communist Party advocates a resolution in stages of the question of secession from the union:

—in the first stage, life in a federation that is being or has been renewed with full use of the opportunities created by economic independence and a new union treaty;

—in the second stage, on the basis of scientific analysis and the working out of a program-prediction for the republic's existence outside the USSR, given a favorable prediction in both the socioeconomic and political fields, to move on to resolve the question of secession from the USSR on a constitutional basis.

Latvian CP Congress on Media Responsibility

90UN1826D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 1

[“Resolution of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress ‘On the Mass Media’”]

[Text] The Latvian Communist Party congress believes that under the conditions of a multiparty system and glasnost the republic's mass media should be true spokesmen for public opinion and help in consolidating the peoples of Latvia on the path of creating a humane, democratic society.

The congress advocates the fastest possible adoption of a law on the press, extension of the financial independence of the mass media, and their further democratization with simultaneous enhancement of the responsibility of editors and founders of publications for observance of the law and journalistic ethics, and for the propaganda line of newspapers and broadcasts, which under present conditions can lead both to complication of the political situation in society and also to the replacement of one ideological diktat with another.

The Latvian Communist Party regards its own information organs as an important means for realizing its own policy and ideology, for organizational and ideological indoctrination work aimed at radical change in the party,

and for finding solutions to problems in the economic, social, and spiritual spheres and in interethnic relations in the republic.

The congress assigns the Central Committee Buro the task of setting up its own party editorial office for republic television and radio.

The congress obliges the Central Committee to halt the publication of press organs and other publications of public and sociopolitical organizations that hold antisocialist positions in the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Publishing House.

The congress informs the CPSU Central Committee that the central newspapers and television and radio are giving inadequate attention on their pages and in their broadcasts to the events and processes taking place in the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic.]

Rubiks Defends Latvian Communist Party to Rural Members

90UN1822D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
26 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by LETA correspondent N. Ivanova: “Alfreds Rubiks: ‘We Are Going to Fight’”]

[Text] During the proceedings of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of Latvia, 23 out of 26 rural-rayon delegations of Communists left the auditorium and joined the independents. These were rural Communists. These people made their choice in keeping with their convictions. However, there are also those who were taken aback in a difficult situation and are now at a crossroads. Many peasants, including those from Balvi, are thinking: “If we are going to split along political lines, will this not entail ‘a divorce’ along economic lines too? After all, our sponsors are employees of the industrial enterprises of Riga; most of them are against dividing the Communist Party...” Besides, there is too much talk on the radio and TV about the current first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia. Some people, and there are quite a few of them, have this attitude: “I do not want to be in Rubiks’ party, and I am not going to pay dues to him.” These doubts, the uneasiness, and primarily the desire to become better acquainted with rural Communists, to tell them about himself, his views and the position of the Communist Party and its adherents, prompted the first secretary of the Central Committee to come to Balvi—all the more so because, in the words of A. Rubiks, leaders of the parties do not grace this area with their visits too often.

A meeting between A. Rubiks and the party aktiv of the rayon and heads of farms was broadcast on the local radio. Questions could be asked over the phone. This is why questions did not come from the floor alone.

In his speech, A. Rubiks said: “All political parties are created in order to fight for power. The Communist Party of Latvia, a party which recognizes ideological and

organizational unity with the CPSU, will also fight to secure the right to form a government in a democratic manner. At present, there are 107 CPSU members in the parliament of the republic, but not all of them subscribe to the party position. Such is reality. Well, we've got to get used to being in the minority, in opposition. Unfortunately, there are few peasants and workers in the government. Who is going to defend their interests? As I see it, the government also needs the peasants and their lucid and clear thinking. We have left seats on the Central Committee for the rural residents who, having made their choice, would want to come and work with us."

A. Rubiks said: "It is a pity that a split has occurred in the Communist Party. However, at the same time I am satisfied that this has happened: Let there be a different party, a different position. The people will decide themselves who to join. In our time, we learned to think and talk in a straight forward manner. However, we still have not learned to live under pluralism. At present, the leaders of the parties are trying to work against each other. As a result, they are not fighting ideas but those who voice other ideas. Getting personal is not the best method of arguing that one is right."

A. Rubiks went on to say: "All of us want a better life. Some see an opportunity to secure it only after seceding from the USSR, others—within a renewed federation. We are accused of being against the sovereignty of Latvia. However, this is not so. The right of nations to self-determination is proclaimed in all programs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, it needs to be understood that at present we are not prepared for secession, for a completely independent life. The Lithuanian option is not suitable for us. Besides, favorable conditions for normal life are now being created in the USSR; very good resolutions and documents are being adopted. We should live in a renewed federation some; after all, we haven't even tried. After that, we should leave if we do not like it, and only in keeping with the law."

...The meeting lasted more than two hours. There were very many questions both from the floor and over the phone.

"Is consolidation of the Communist Party of Latvia and the independent Communist Party possible?"

"Consolidation is impossible. Our program goals are absolutely different. This is why separation occurred. However, this does not at all mean that cooperation is impossible."

"The interests of what class does your party protect?"

"The interests of workers and peasants, of the entire people."

"Why did Rubiks expel Kezbers and Rukmane from the party?"

"They expelled themselves by joining a different party."

"When will draftees from Latvia be left to serve in the republic only?"

"According to my data, for now about 40 percent of our guys are left to serve here, in the Baltic area; others serve in other places. This should be understood correctly. Who is going to serve in the Far East, in the north? Everyone has got to go into the service. If we sort out why this so-called alternative service is required, it is, as I see it, in order to retain locally, just in case, some forces with which rapid-action detachments may be formed."

I repeat that there were quite a few questions. Of course, the subway, the presence of A. Rubiks at singing festivals, his attitude toward the migrants, and so on were addressed. To be sure, it is impossible to figure out all problems in the course of one meeting. Besides, this was not the intention. In our difficult time, people need to have clear opinions, positions, and goals so that everyone can make his choice. One has to fight for his adherents. This is why Alfreds Rubiks, first secretary of the Communist Party of Latvia Central Committee, intends to continue such meetings and trips; he intends to fight on.

Latvian CP Congress Appeals for Unity

90UN1826A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 1

[“Appeal of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress to the Communists of Soviet Latvia”]

[Text] Today, when our party finds itself at a complex and very crucial stage along its path, when within the republic political tension is growing sharply, we are increasingly hearing calls to the people of Latvia to break ties with the USSR and to split the Latvian Communist Party.

Some 263 delegates walked out of a session of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress and the congress lays the full responsibility for the split that occurred and its consequences at the feet of the sponsors and organizers and those providing ideological encouragement to form an independent Latvian Communist Party.

A considerable proportion of the deputies who walked out of the hall were communists representing the rural areas of Latvia. The 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress does not consider this to be proof of the unambiguous will of all rural communists.

The Latvian Communist Party congress recognizes and underscores the special importance of the agrarian reform for the life and fate of the farmers and it firmly advocates priority development of the republic's rural areas, strengthening their material-technical base, and making efficient use of all forms of farming.

The congress delegates reject attempts to split the city and the countryside as being in contradiction of communist party social policy.

The congress expresses the hope that the delegates who interrupted the work of the congress and the communists who support the creation of an independent Latvian Communist Party will once again give comprehensive and careful consideration to their actions and their effect on the further fate of the party.

We believe that in making such an important decision they should not be prey to emotions and the sympathies of the moment. Yes, today it is difficult for us and that is why we appeal to like-minded people:

- let us rally together ideologically and organizationally in order to renew the party and critically assess the level of our responsibility as communists, and let us consider the fate of the Latvian Communist Party;
- let us carefully guard and perfect the international traditions of the party and develop work more broadly in the labor collectives and at places of residence, and attract new comrades to our ranks;
- let us galvanize our activity in the soviets of peoples' deputies at all levels for the soonest possible creation of a state governed by the rule of law, and let us energetically prevent the adoption of anticonstitutional laws that infringe on human rights.

We are convinced that the newly elected Latvian Communist Party Central Committee will direct its efforts toward renewal of the ideological activity of party organizations and preserve unity with the CPSU, and organize constructive cooperation with other public and sociopolitical movements and all progressive forces and thus act to deal with the economic and political crisis in the republic.

We are convinced that an economically and politically sovereign Latvia as part of a renewed federation of the USSR will acquire broad opportunities to insure a better life, material well-being, a spiritual improvement for all the people and for each individual.

We are the members of one party and we hope and believe that henceforth, too, we shall be united. We must all work together in a strong and friendly manner in the interests of Latvia and all its inhabitants.

Latvian CP Congress Supports Armed Forces

90UN1826C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 1

["Resolution of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress 'On Relations With the USSR Armed Forces'"]

[Text] Recognizing the objective necessity for the existence of the USSR Armed Forces, the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress emphasizes that their activity insures the security of the USSR and the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and is in the interests of all inhabitants of the republic.

Notwithstanding, destructive forces are foisting on the population negative attitudes toward servicemen. Unjustified attacks are being permitted on the Soviet Army and calls are heard from a number of sociopolitical organizations and movements to restrict the lawful rights of servicemen and the members of their families and for young men to refuse to do their military service.

The congress decisively condemns such actions, which increase tension in society, and it advocates unity between the army and the people.

The congress supports the processes of perestroika that have been initiated in the army and navy and the radical military reform, and it expresses the conviction that army communists will henceforth be active participants in the sociopolitical life of the republic.

New Latvian CP Paper Published in Riga

90UN2018C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
16 May 90 p 3

[V. Dmitriyev report: "New Newspaper"]

[Text] Yesterday inhabitants of the Latvian capital were able to purchase the first issue of RIZHSKIYE NOVOSTI—the new newspaper of the Riga city party organization of the Latvian Communist Party. This publication will appear three times a week in Latvian and Russian—on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. RIZHSKIYE NOVOSTI ("Rigas Zinyas") is a morning paper. Initially it will only be on retail sale, but subscriptions are also planned in the future.

The program of the new publication is clearly outlined on its front page. Its motto is: for perestroika and democratization. "The material which is published will not represent the truth in the last instance, but will provide food for thought," a short address to the readers says. "The situation is such that there are things to think about and things to call in question. If some people forget about policy, they will be reminded by the People, on whose behalf they speak. All people are born free and equal. No individual can be happy at the expense of another, no nation at the expense of another."

"We will strive for the maximum pluralism of opinions, adopting neither extreme left nor extreme right positions," Kh. Grimms, editor of the new paper, said. "We intend offering for the verdict of the readers the most diverse views of all current political forces and movements in the city. The main thing is truthfully reflecting the whole palette of opinions. And each will draw the conclusions for himself."

The first issue of the newspaper appeared in a total print run as yet of 32,000 copies in the two languages. It is half the size of RIGAS BALSS. So to believe that the new publication has been born to the detriment of the paper stocks of the evening paper, as some people do, is unconvincing, to say the least. The subsequent print run will be determined by reader demand. It should be noted

that both RIGAS ZINYAS and RIZHSKIYE NOVOSTI sold briskly yesterday at the "Soyuzpechat" stands.

Daugavpils Deputies Oppose Declaration

90UN2018B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
16 May 90 p 1

[“Decision of the Daugavpils City Soviet of People’s Deputies Fourth Session: Attitude Toward the Latvian SSR Declaration ‘On Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia’”]

[Text] The declaration “On Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia” adopted by the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet on 4 May 1990 at the proposal of the Latvian People’s Front faction is an expression of the wishes of part of the people of Latvia, signifies a flagrant violation of the constitutional provisions of the USSR and the Latvian SSR, and will lead to a severance of state relations with the USSR and a restoration of the bourgeois system.

The declaration contains appreciable contradictions and distortions of historical reality, and the 1939-1940 events in Latvia are viewed one-sidedly and out of the context of the all-European processes of that time.

The consequences of the step which has been taken threaten devastation of the economy, a further exacerbation of interethnic relations and the virtual abandonment of the main goals of perestroika. As a result the people, whose destiny has been disposed of so irresponsibly, will suffer.

The consequences of the adoption of the declaration could be reflected particularly keenly in our city, to whose development the republic government has in recent decades paid too little attention. Some 27,000 persons work at the city’s industrial enterprises currently, more than three-fifths of them at enterprises of union jurisdiction. A severance of economic relations with the USSR would entail a reprofiling or the closure of many of them, which would inevitably lead to the appearance of a large number of unemployed and would exacerbate the already complex situation not only in the city, but throughout Latvia.

Proceeding from what has been said and recognizing its responsibility to its electorate, the city soviet of people’s deputies has resolved:

1. To consider the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet declaration of 4 May 1990 “On Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia” invalid on the territory of the city.

To place the entire responsibility for the possible economic and political consequences connected with the adoption of this declaration on the deputies who voted for its adoption.

2. To demand of the republic Supreme Soviet restoration of the status of the Latvian SSR which existed prior to 4

May 1990. The holding of a referendum, and in the event of the people wishing to acquire independence outside of the Soviet Union, this to be effected precisely in accordance with the USSR law “On Procedure of the Solution of Questions Concerning the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR”.

3. To reserve for itself the right to suspend on the territory of the city all laws and decisions of the republic Supreme Soviet and government contrary to the USSR Constitution and the Constitution of the Latvian SSR and infringing the constitutional rights and liberties of the inhabitants of Daugavpils, ensuring here on the territory of the city legal, economic, and social guarantees for all inhabitants, regardless of nationality and political and religious beliefs.

4. To instruct the Standing Deputies’ Commission for Problems of the Economy and the Workers Committee in conjunction with the city soviet executive committee to draw up an appeal (letter) to the USSR Council of Ministers and allied subcontractor enterprises in the union republics which sets forth the city’s position and attitude toward the events in the Latvian SSR and solicits their support in provisions and supplies for the normal functioning of the city’s economic mechanism. The letter to be published in the all-union press.

5. In the event of the republic Supreme Soviet First Session refusing to restore the status of the Latvian SSR which existed prior to 4 May, the Daugavpils City Soviet reserves the right in accordance with the USSR law “On Procedure of the Solution of Questions of the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR” to conduct a constitutional referendum in the city on the form of Latvian sovereignty. The results of the referendum would be the basis of the city soviet’s activity.

6. To recommend that the city’s work force support the decision of the Latvian SSR United Council of Labor Collectives Presidium on the staging of a one-hour political strike, which would not here entail a disruption of production targets.

7. That the chairman of the city soviet of people’s deputies participate in the creation of a coordinating council of an association of soviets of Baltic cities and rayons which support the idea of strengthening the federation.

8. To instruct V.P. Sobolevs, people’s deputy of the USSR from Daugavpils National-Territorial Electoral District 301, to take to the USSR Supreme Soviet session a deputy’s inquiry concerning the situation in Latvia and the position of the Daugavpils City Soviet of People’s Deputies and demand the adoption of specific measures to protect the constitutional rights of the city’s inhabitants.

Lithuanian Offer To Suspend Legislation

90UN1996B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
18 May 90 p 1

["Declaration of the Supreme Council and Government of the Republic of Lithuania"]

[Text] The Supreme Council and Government of the Republic of Lithuania, being invariably loyal to the principles of democracy and state independence of the Republic of Lithuania, and taking into consideration the practical situation which has arisen and to avoid an escalation of tensions and negative social and political consequences, is prepared to temporarily suspend the unilateral implementation of those rulings of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council which proceed from the acts on the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state and the implementation of which may become the subject of negotiations. Lithuania is prepared to discuss the issue of declaring a transition period leading to the full implementation of state independence. During this period there is a need for guarantees of the independence and integrity of the Lithuanian state and the functioning of its competent state power.

In the first instance it is proposed:

1. With the goal of consolidating international security and maintaining political stability and with regard for the balance of powers taking shape in Europe and specifically in the Baltic region, to discuss Lithuania's participation in a system for realizing coordinated defense interests, including issues of the defense and protection of the Republic of Lithuania's western border and the maintenance of ties with Kaliningrad Oblast, as well as other questions of mutual interest and mutual understanding.
2. To find a solution for eliminating the contradiction between Lithuania's wish to guarantee the citizens' right to free self-determination regarding military service and a means for guaranteeing the defense interests of the Soviet Union.
3. To regulate economic and property relations on a mutually agreeable basis, preserving and renewing economic ties, including transport ties, with partners in the USSR.
4. To decide the question of Lithuania's establishing unobstructed ties with other states and economic partners.
5. To establish guarantees of the social and property rights of USSR citizens residing on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania.

V. Landsbergis, chairman,
Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council.

K. Prunskiene, prime minister,
Republic of Lithuania.
Vilnius, 16 May 1990.

Lithuanian Appeal to RSFSR Congress

90UN1996A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
18 May 90 pp 1, 3

["Appeal of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council to the First Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic"]

[Text] The Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council offers its heartfelt congratulations to the democratically elected representatives of the peoples of Russia who are assembled at their first congress. The ties between the peoples of Lithuania and Russia have deep historical roots and friendly relations bring them together. The Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council expresses its confidence that the process of rebuilding state and economic structures, the wide development of democracy, and the desire of nations for self-determination will create all the conditions for the maintenance and development of neighborly relations, political and cultural ties, and economic cooperation between the Republic of Lithuania and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

The Supreme Council of Lithuania notifies the first Congress of People's Deputies of Russia that our enterprises and organizations wish not only to maintain existing economic ties with the enterprises of the RSFSR, but to broaden them on a contractual basis as well. We are counting on the fulfillment of contractual provisions concerning the delivery of products on the part of the enterprises of Russia as well, especially in our current difficulties concerning the restrictions on supplies for the economy and population of Lithuania.

The Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, entertaining like all the Lithuanian people an affection for the peoples of Russia who aspire to democratic transformations, wish the first Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation fruitful and successful work.

Chairman V. Landsbergis,
in the name of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme
Council.
Vilnius, 16 May 1990.

Lithuanian 'Economic Recklessness' Hit

904A0377A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN
in Russian No 21, May 90 p 5

[Article by EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN special correspondents M. Panova, P. Korotkov, and V. Maleyev: "The Traps of Political Adventurism"]

[Text] Vilnius, Moscow—The situation in Lithuania is alarming and very uncertain. The state commission for preparing and carrying out so-called counter-blockade measures is feverishly at work. Opportunities are sought to save fuel and raw-material resources; a collection of charitable contributions is being organized in the republic and abroad. The regimented distribution of consumer staples to the populace by ration cards has been introduced.

In essence, the "steadfastness" of the republic leadership in standing by the hastily made unconstitutional decisions on independence is taking the republic further and further down an economic dead end. The political decisions made did not originally proceed from economic realities. Could it be that a stockade of still new legislative acts is being hastily erected in order conceal the unsteadiness of the initial positions of the Lithuanian leaders?

The number of laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the republic since the day of the declaration of independence has already exceeded 100 (!). However, the number is not the issue. The content of some of the laws adopted is noteworthy.

There is, for example, the Provisional Main Law of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 46 of the law says that assets belonging to the Republic of Lithuania as state property may be transferred at a fee or at no charge through the procedures set forth in the laws of Lithuania to be owned by citizens and their groups (collectives). However, as we have already written in a previous issue of our newspaper, all state enterprises, offices, and organizations reporting to the Union and to the Union and the Republic have been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Republic, according to a resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania dated 13 March. Meanwhile, more than 100 large enterprises owned by the USSR are situated on the territory of Lithuania. Does the Government of the Republic have a legal right to decide their fate unilaterally? To be sure, the effect of this law was suspended by another law, "On Temporary Measures Under the Conditions of an Economic Blockade Applied by the USSR." As we can see, law-creation replaces a constructive search for a way out of the existing situation.

The conviction that everybody should, for some reason, unquestioningly accept the unconstitutional, unlawful actions of the Lithuanian leadership as proper is striking. The leadership of Lithuania was convinced that if there was to be a change in economic relations with Lithuania after such decisions it would only be in favor of the Republic.

Let us look at the issue of supplies. The situation is as follows: In 1988, the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] shipped out products worth almost R6 billion (an overwhelming share of them to the domestic market), and imported R7.5 billion-worth. Refinery products and gas, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, many types of chemical products, machinery and equipment dominated the structure of goods shipped in.

What did the Lithuanian leadership count on when it made its decision on independence? That the republic would continue to make a profit due to differences between domestic-market and world-market prices for raw materials and fuel and energy resources? There is a substantial difference. In domestic prices, the oil received by Lithuania in 1988 cost R399 million and gas

R118 million. In world- market prices, this is correspondingly 1,319 million and 253 million, however, in foreign-currency rubles. Could it be that they counted on a generous influx of international financial aid which every corner of the globe will fall all over themselves to provide to the republic? However, aid from the outside still has not materialized, despite repeated trips abroad by the prime minister.

We learned from conversations with specialists that there is a special program which the government of K. Prunskiene adopted as early as mid-March. This program set forth the position of the Republic on the issues of trade with the Soviet Union.

What was meant to be proposed and taken into account?

First of all, the fact that Lithuanian enterprises work with raw and other materials which are shipped in, and products manufactured in Lithuania go mainly to the domestic union market. It was expected that enterprises which are transferred to the complete jurisdiction of the Republic of Lithuania will make deliveries on the basis of joint agreements between the USSR and the Republic of Lithuania. It was also meant to create joint Soviet-Lithuanian enterprises on a contractual basis, with each side assuming a certain share of various expenses.

At what prices was merchandise trade envisaged? Here, they believed that the deliveries of material resources from the Soviet Union should be divided into three groups. The first group should consist of raw and other materials for manufacturing products delivered to the Soviet Union. As the Lithuanian specialists believed, prices for these resources need to be coordinated with prices for the products manufactured from them; they should be no higher than prices in the domestic union market.

In addition, it was expected that raw and other materials for manufacturing products to be delivered to the domestic market of the Republic would be supplied at all-union or contract prices. Only raw and other materials for manufacturing products exported by Lithuania may supposedly be purchased from the Soviet Union at world-market prices and may be settled for in hard currency.

Of course, anything that is to one's liking may be expected and proposed. However, what was the foundation for the hope that all Lithuanian claims would be accepted and that the interests of other participants in economic contacts could be disregarded?

These are not at all rhetorical questions. Our reality is such that the USSR Government is developing a set of measures for an accelerated transition to a market economy. This will substantially change the system of economic relations in the country, and will make profits the cornerstone of enterprise operations.

Finally, politics and economics are closely intertwined. Economic decisions are always made taking political

actions into account. Other union republics asked a legitimate question: Why should they continue to deliver products to Lithuania at the expense of their needs and at prices which are too low compared to those in the world market at a time when its leading organs are carrying on their unconstitutional actions and disregarding the interests of the unified complex of the national economy and the citizens of the country? However, the center, which is supposedly responsible for "the economic blockade," is blamed for everything.

The discontinuation of oil deliveries and reductions in the deliveries of natural gas are causing work stoppages at industrial and transportation enterprises. However, political ambitions are still preventing a realistic assessment of the situation, and actions taken within the framework of "counter-blockade measures" are merely making the impasse worse.

The issue of refugees has become more acute. For example, hundreds of residents of Lithuania have already requested political asylum in Belorussia. Who is going to compensate them for the expense? Has the Lithuanian Government taken the need for such compensation into account?

Plans to create the Republic's own currency announced by its government also caused concern among the populace. By the end of the year, the lit should replace the ruble. We have already reported a real "boom" among the depositors. Many people strive to withdraw money from their passbook accounts and spend it in order to purchase goods or transfer it to other republics. As a result, a serious disruption occurs in currency circulation in other regions of the country. This affects the interests of the entire Soviet Union.

During our meetings in Lithuania, we were frequently told that Lithuania can survive on its own, based on the exports of agricultural products. We also heard pathetic statements that "it is better to be hungry but free!" However, let us take a sober look.

Lithuanian Minister of Agriculture V. Knasys said straightforwardly in an interview with a Lithuanian newspaper: "A year is necessary in order to grow a crop of grain, and many years are needed to grow a herd. Much depends on our relations with the Soviet Union. Foodstuffs will remain the merchandise for which we purchase raw materials from our neighbors. A lot of time is necessary if we want to both use it as a currency and fill the shelves of stores with it... Mastering progressive technologies in order to process agricultural products to Western standards will also take a lot of time."

Let us look at the Sigma Enterprise which produces computer equipment. Can it enter the international market swiftly and victoriously with its obsolete products? As S. Rimeikis, who was recently elected director of the leading enterprise of Sigma, observed correctly, considerable funds, including hard currency, equipment, and materials are necessary in order to change and

radically renew products and win some ground from competitors in the world market.

That is, time and considerable efforts are also required. By now, it is apparent what the Lithuanian working people have to sacrifice as a result of the adventurism of the political leaders who pushed them into the trap of economic recklessness.

Finally, regarding one more law adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania on 22 March: the Law on the Republic of Lithuania Government. It ends in a provision saying that organizations of parties and social movements cannot be created and operate within the apparatus of the government. It appears that in this manner they are trying to impress upon everyone the idea that government decisions are utterly objective. However, giving up political organizations in the government apparatus does not at all mean giving up particular ideological affinities, political convictions, and interests. It does not happen that way. This truth is once again confirmed by the events in Lithuania.

The ideology of Sajudis is clearly visible, and is implemented in the actions of the government. It is a great pity that a beautiful and proud idea of national renaissance and national statehood is degenerating into political adventurism and economic recklessness.

Brazauskas Appeals to USSR Communists

90UN1894A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
8 May 90 p 1

[A. Brazauskas: "Open Letter to Communists of the USSR"]

[Text] The lines of this letter are dictated by confidence that the conscience of each honest individual cannot remain silent in the sight of the perpetration of injustice, and the present economic blockade of Lithuania is just such a perpetration. No good result can be achieved by methods which bring new ordeals for the peoples. The more so when this is frequently being done by Communists. Once again, as has been the case repeatedly, difficulties in the search for political solutions are resulting in adversities for hundreds of thousands of people.

Our appeal is to you whose notion of the ideal is service to one's people. To understand and wholeheartedly perceive people's hopes, aspirations, and endeavors and to share them. Are there many among you who disagree with this? So where does the chill of misunderstanding between us now, when the independent Lithuanian Communist Party has fully resolved to share the fate of its people, come from? Not from declarations and mass meetings but by specific steps, which, believe me, are at times being achieved with great difficulty and not without mistakes, but which are being taken one after the other as perseveringly as they are sincere. So flickering is the people's faith in us as yet, so solidified over the decades is the prejudice, not to say, hostility. A sorry, but

natural result. The Lithuanian Communist Party was in fact a subdivision of the CPSU. Instructions from the center substituted for the will and deep-lying requirements of the people, which should constitute the program of a truly progressive party (but there was no independent program at all). The most that the leaders of the Lithuanian Communists of those times could permit themselves were attempts to ease, to at least some extent, the foreign nature of the recommendations from on high. The result was not adequate to the efforts, and we failed to protect our people from suffering. And today, when we are finally actually recognizing the will of our compatriots as the high authority, we must worthily take the path of repentance, acquire new strength in the ordeals which we are experiencing together, and earn the trust of all those who live on Lithuanian soil.

Yes, the bulk of them are currently united by the aspiration to establish the independence of their state—the Republic of Lithuania. Yes, not all share this aspiration. And this is natural, as is also our hope of ultimately finding a common language and coming to understand one another. Yes, our actions may be viewed ambivalently. But, please answer, if only to yourself, are the economic blockade measures adopted in respect of the Republic of Lithuania worthy of a civilized state? Is it responsible to believe that they can alter the situation in Lithuania? Why is the harm which the blockade is inflicting on the working people of all of the Soviet Union being forgotten? It is not only a question of economic losses. Thought has to be given to the moral losses and in what the knowing or unwitting training of people to solve complex problems by power methods could result for them.

A free personality, a free democratic state.... How is devotion to these values common to all mankind and a readiness to move toward humane socialism proven?

Let us calmly, as befits sensible people, recall certain steps of the Lithuanian Communist Party which have evoked so much emotion. Support for the decision concerning recognition of Lithuanian as the official language. We were the first to renounce the position of privileged party enshrined in Article 6 of the constitution.... The emotions and impulsiveness passed, and the political processes which objectively existed remained. Debate and the decisions adopted in various parts of the Soviet Union testify to the similarity of the problems disturbing us and the aspiration to democratic transformations of the CPSU capable of being a truly logical continuation of the process of perestroika which it began.

The path of a power solution is without prospects. More precisely, it has just one prospect—loss of faith in the irreversibility of perestroika. And not only in Lithuania or in the land of soviets. The boundaries could be far wider. So the present situation in Neman land is a test not only for us. It is to the same extent a test of the humanity of each member of the CPSU. Do not turn your backs in anger on this thought. Try to think. Try not

to immediately stifle in your hearts the benevolence so natural to man.... What would follow this? An aspiration, we believe, to persuade those who make the decisions to take the path of diplomacy and political compromise.

As can be seen, the road to humanitarian ideals is more difficult than imagined. But this does not mean that we have to stop half-way, turn back even less. Let us be worthy of our goal.

On behalf of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Buro, A. BRAZAUSKAS

Landsbergis 2 May Supreme Council Report

90UN1893A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
4 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Report by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, to the 2 May meeting of the First Session of the Supreme Council of the Lithuanian Republic, First Convocation: "On the Political Situation"]

[Text] Lithuania finds itself at the vortex of international political events. We find ourselves, our Homeland, and our country in the intensive interaction of the interests of East and West more than at any time ever before. I believe that by understanding this we also determine our own views and the appropriate political choice. Our views should not demonstrate one-sidedness and we should not suppose that an answer or a decision will only come from one party or another. These decisions affect the interaction of many forces. We could use a metaphor and call it a life which is taking place with our participation. As a result, not just one-sided attitudes but a split among the Supreme Council's deputies or the separation of society into supporters of the East and of the West is undesirable. I believe you understand what I am talking about.

In this vortex Lithuania is not a chip or a wave-tossed boat in which we are trying to maintain ourselves, trying to steer with the rudder and row at the same time. Lithuania is a participant in the process, and we understand that better every day. We feared that Lithuania would only be an object of barter and negotiations between great powers. Now we must recognize—and, I believe, we are recognizing—that Lithuania has become an actor in international politics, the various manifestations of which we see and in which we participate thanks to our active policy. An important, perhaps even the most important event, whose echo sounds even now, was 11 March. We must continue and intensify an active policy affirming the legal preconditions for Lithuanian independence not only in Lithuania but much more broadly.

I believe that the world is observing the changes occurring in the Soviet Union very attentively and with both hope and fear. Obviously it is frightening to some—what will come of it? And from that fear comes a wish: Perhaps it would be better if there were no changes. But

life cannot stand still! Our participation in it is our contribution to the changes. We took part in the democratic process of Eastern Europe sooner, more clearly, and more strongly than those countries which were still in depression and stagnation. Taking part in this process of Eastern Europe and intensifying it, we affirmed ourselves at the same time—as a movement of Baltic states, Baltic lands, and Balts—and we reminded everyone that we are a part of Europe.

Together with Latvia and Estonia we have considered ourselves an engine for perestroika in the Soviet Union, a laboratory for Mikhail Gorbachev. And we continue to do this today, proclaiming and affirming independence and remaining very closely tied to all the processes occurring there, because the processes have not come to a halt. Peoples and republics demand their rights and seek them out. We see that perestroika in the Soviet Union has already taken on a hypocritical aspect because the very initiators of perestroika have turned into the people slowing it down. The very clearly expressed centrist tendency—to hurriedly consolidate the central authority—is losing because life is not on its side. Lithuania's example inspires and encourages many people: Proof of this are the democratic movements and the common desire for democratic perestroika to the east of us. Moldavia, at least according to the chairman of its Supreme Soviet, declares that it is going to seek full economic and political independence. The Ukraine, at least the Western Ukraine, is proclaiming new state holidays—the days of its own historical independence, although they were few. The People's Front of Georgia calls upon the people not to lag behind the Baltic region but to go together with it and, in that way, to support it. We see the endurance of the Estonians, who have defied orders not to aid Lithuania, accentuating its aid, refusing under any circumstances to give in to the same ultimatums that Lithuania has received. And there is Latvia, which tomorrow or the day after will adopt its own ruling and will make its choice. It has the opportunity to learn from the small but important experience of Lithuania's and Estonia's previous month and, apparently, it is perhaps profiting from it by having chosen some sort of interim formula, its own variant in method, but having nonetheless expressed the goal of going where we are going. We await Latvia: It is already coming, uniting, and we will go onward together! Great achievements are taking place in Russia—in Moscow, Leningrad, Siberia, and in the huge territories, which have also become aware that they are being exploited just as the small union republics are. It is possible that you have had the opportunity to hear the evaluation of G. Popov, chairman of the Moscow Soviet and one of the leaders of the Interregional Group, to the effect that the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet no longer reflect those political forces which exist today in the Soviet Union, all the more because both bodies still represent such organizations as the CPSU and the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth

League], which are falling apart before our very eyes. He says that this parliament can no longer fulfill its functions in Moscow.

In this, perhaps, is one of the new aspects of our problem. They continually reiterate in Moscow that one can only act according to the USSR Constitution, although it was imposed on Lithuania before and is no longer valid in Lithuania since 11 March. This formula—of subordinating oneself to the USSR Constitution—was adopted at the third congress by USSR people's deputies in an atmosphere of great resentment, which our bitter enemies from the Interfronts especially promoted. From this was born that constant, unshakable ultimatum to Lithuania. But we have learned to live in an atmosphere of ultimatums, an atmosphere which is going to change depending on the changes in Russia.

We see that in the West the urgency of the Lithuanian problem is not growing weaker but is perhaps increasing. It is perceived as a gauge of political, moral, and other intentions: Who is who? And who is in favor of what? Even experienced pragmatic politicians cannot get away from it. Today one sees Europe or Europe's great politicians clearly expressing their attention, a sort of change in the center of gravity and perhaps a distribution of functions. We see that even the United States of America does not shrink from an active policy with regard to Lithuania. Proof of this is President Bush's White House reception of Kazimiera Prunskiene, scheduled for tomorrow. Among others, Doctor Vitautas Belyauskas, chairman of the World Association of Lithuanians, will participate in it. The reception of Kazimiera Prunskiene emphasizes that she is a deputy of a democratically elected Lithuanian parliament which represents the people. I believe that this proves that our Supreme Council acted correctly in finding a compromise solution and not depriving deputies of such ministerial positions. In the meantime, the entire world community of Lithuanians has opened an account to aid Lithuania, and over several days it has grown by tens of thousands of dollars, contributed by Lithuanians living in various countries. We also know about other accounts opened or aid organizations created in Sweden, France, and the United Kingdom. And this is not just material aid—it also has great political significance. In many ways the aid focuses attention on our borders. Will they be ours and will we be a country which not only wishes to be but can be open to the world, or will it be artificially closed off by a new iron curtain? When proposing to help us—and these are people who are famous abroad, influential political figures—they all request a list of the most urgent items. And although our Council of Ministers and the antiblockade commission have put together such a list, it should be more specific. It should be what we are in need of this month so that we can fight the main threat that the economic blockade has created, that is to say artificial unemployment. On the other hand, the help that we receive should also include—and we stress this—normal international trade and normal state ties. In this fashion we would break not only the blockade but also the attempt to impose political isolation on us.

The current European initiative is embodied by the letter of French President F. Mitterrand and FRG Chancellor H. Kohl. I will read it aloud. The Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers do not have their own newspapers, and the newspapers of the political groups decide what to publish for them and what not to publish, including the documents of the Supreme Council. Or they edit them and print accounts of them. So it was with this letter. TASS tried to give an account of the letter in such a fashion that it would seem to favor the policy of the Soviet Union, and some of our newspapers followed suit. The letter is addressed to the chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, dated 26 April in Paris, and signed by the heads of both states: "We are both equally troubled by the development of the situation in Lithuania. We would like to communicate this to you. The Lithuanian people have clearly expressed their will to realize their right to independence. There is nothing reprehensible in this, but history has created a complicated situation which is related to numerous political, internal, and economic bonds. Untying them will require time and patience, and the classic route of dialogue must be used. We also express the wish that conversations between you and the Soviet leadership begin as quickly as possible so that the current crisis may be resolved in a way that is acceptable for both sides. Undoubtedly the beginning of such negotiations would be eased by a temporary suspension of the effects of your parliament's decrees, which would in no way lose their meaning because they are based on a generally accepted principle—the principle of self-determination of peoples. We salute you"—and so forth.

We responded immediately with a declaration in the press, but because TASS interpreted the letter differently, as I have already said, France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an additional declaration on 27 April. "The letter of the president of the republic (F. Mitterrand—Editor) and Chancellor H. Kohl to President Landsbergis does not contain any demand for Lithuania to renounce independence. On the contrary, this letter mentions the unshakeable choice of the Lithuanian people and emphasizes the 'generally accepted' principle of self-determination of peoples on which the declaration of independence is founded. What is being suggested is a 'suspension of the effects' of the measures which have been undertaken so that negotiations might begin. The Vilnius leadership, with which our diplomatic services maintain a constant connection, have not made a mistake in this respect."

This letter and its elucidation have evoked a great number of commentaries. We too have been compelled to comment more than once: It is possible to discuss suspension of the follow-up documents. But here we need to be specific. Neither the formation of the Republic Government nor its work may be suspended. And all of this is a consequence of the 11 March decrees as well. Other decrees which, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, might touch upon its interests or the interests of its citizens may undoubtedly be commented upon, discussed, corrected, or suspended for that period which is

necessary to begin concrete negotiations—of course if such a period were to be designated. Our answer is in approximately this spirit. The Supreme Council Presidium prepared the response. The political intention of this response is to accept everything that is acceptable and to accept an initiative of the major European states to participate in resolving our problems with the understanding that this is not simply a gesture from two figures which can be disregarded. It is possible to discern in their letter a desire to take part in the future as well.

The main task is not to split up and not to lose our heads. Many things trouble us, we ask ourselves questions, we ponder, we work, and we search. What should be done in the face of blockade and threat? One person says that we should change our line, but no one proposes anything specific. I do not want us to continue such games. Soon we are assembling to discuss the political situation, and there we will need concrete suggestions. I do not believe that anyone has suggested that we renounce the 11 March decree, which Moscow, that is to say the Kremlin, constantly demands. I am speaking of a political maneuver. We are genuinely doing a lot, and I believe that we are doing what we can. Our maneuvers are being done against a concrete wall. We can maneuver up to the wall, and we are doing that. But when they suggest or demand that we return to a legal cage that is even worse than before, and only then, they say, can conversations begin, when and under what conditions they deign to set us—then that is, of course unacceptable. I believe that the people who are suggesting this also know it well. Therefore the word "compromise," which some pronounce as though with anguish and others with impatience, must also be understood well and defined. More than once I have already answered this question: Compromise is something that is possible, and an impossible compromise is no longer a compromise. It is capitulation. And when we have discussed these questions in groups and commissions, and when we will discuss them in the Supreme Council, I would like to mention what is, apparently, the main point: What is working against us, and where is our strength? Irritation, ambition, resentment, and sometimes even black hatred are working against us. And we are strong when we affirm and create, overcoming group ambition and distrust—because it exists among us—and when we progress, relying upon humanity and a common goal. This goal should be immeasurably higher than anything else.

Prunskiene 27 April Press Conference

90UN1863C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
29 Apr 90 p 3

[Report by unnamed ELTA correspondent: "Press Conference in the Council of Ministers"]

[Text] A press conference took place on 27 April in the Council of Ministers for Lithuanian and foreign journalists. The participants included: Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas, and Juozas Olekas, minister of public health.

Reporting on the government's measures to counteract the economic blockade, Kazimiera Prunskiene asked Romualdas Ozolas to evaluate the situation from the point of view of a noneconomist.

He noted that a new economic system and a Lithuanian economic capacity is forming before our eyes. We have already sensed that we have become masters, and we govern and dispose of what we have. Today we are already considering how we can develop that little bit that we have firmly at our disposal with regard to all the political changes, even in the furthest countries of the world. We must come out of the blockade in clear possession of the levers for financing our economic capacities, and we must have the opportunity to control these mechanisms of our economy through our own political arrangements. It is also difficult to foster these things in a people coming out of a situation in which they had absolutely no civil, legal, and political rights. An orientation toward self-management is necessary so that we can balance the junctures of the economies of East and West in Lithuania in such a form that it is acceptable for both the West and the East and, most importantly, for us as well. Romualdas Ozolas said that the means by which we will be able to make the transition to relations of this character has already been found. It is the establishment of horizontal ties with enterprises or with the economic system of the Soviet Union. Leningrad, Lvov, Kaliningrad, and Moscow are interested in maintaining direct contacts with us, contacts which are only possible in the form of treaties. Lithuania is beginning to create an economy which plays an important role in making decisions—the need for this has already been mentioned at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, in the Presidential Council, and in other quite respected organs of state power of the Soviet Union. For the present not too much has been done in this direction. But for now the main thing is that the free will of the Soviet Union's economic subjects has been put into action. They are beginning to express their will, and this is the basis of a new economic jurisdiction and economic structure.

I believe that the epic of the economic blockade will end successfully not only for Lithuania but for the Soviet Union as well. And apparently we will once more take part in shaping a new stage of perestroika, not formally but fundamentally.

Juozas Olekas informed journalists about the condition of public health during the economic blockade. Hospitalization quotas in medical institutions are somewhat low, but this does not mean that sick people are being turned away from hospitals on a regular basis. Patients are being hospitalized with the exception of those who can wait a week or two while we prepare ourselves better for work under blockade conditions. A shortage of medical supplies and equipment is being felt, but that was also the situation before the blockade. There is a shortage of antibiotics and hormonal compounds, especially insulin, but the situation is not critical.

Direct contacts were recently established with pharmaceutical enterprises in Leningrad which can supply the medical supplies which are in greatest demand. We are already receiving medicines from abroad. We have managed to negotiate deliveries from Switzerland and Italy, and we hope to receive them from the United States, Canada, and wherever Lithuanian representatives have gone. At the same time, the minister of public health reported that his ministry and the Ministry of Social Protection are resolving the problem of sending people to work in medical institutions.

Romualdas Ozolas had good news for the journalists. It turns out that Lithuania is in a condition to provide the press with all the paper it needs. The first batch of Lithuanian paper for newspapers will be produced at the beginning of next week. It is possible that it will not be very good paper because there is a shortage of bleaching agents, but that guarantees that newspapers will come out. Publishing houses will not suffer either: The paper needed for printing books will also be produced in Lithuania. It is supposed that production of almost all the printing materials can be managed over two to three months except for especially scarce materials, and, as Kazimiera Prunskiene noted, our merchants are traveling to the East and the West to purchase these materials.

There was also a question about the work of the mass media, and the opinion was stated that it is necessary to "inform both ourselves and others" better than is done today.

Answering the question, Romualdas Ozolas stressed that we do not have much of what we need, including a new, efficient information system, the creation of which is important for breaking the blockade. Currently we do not have the information that both the East and the West need. And for the time being our information does not reflect the total of the processes occurring in Lithuania. And if we speak about information for the East, then it is necessary to note that for the present we are blocking ourselves when we believe that this is not even one of our responsibilities. This is a mistake.

The journalists asked how the letter from France's President Francois Mitterrand and the FRG's Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania is being evaluated. Kazimiera Prunskiene noted that their statement is being interpreted in different ways abroad. We understand it as a proposal to temporarily suspend the documents of 11 March without repealing them. And that would not be a repudiation of their value, because the leaders of France and the FRG acknowledge the right of peoples to self-determination. Consequently this is one of the compromises subject to discussion in the sense of an upper limit. As for how close to that the Lithuanian parliament can come, that is its affair. The prime minister does not believe that these states have hostile attitudes toward Lithuania.

Expressing her opinion about the Republic's government in the sphere of economics, Kazimiera Prunskiene noted that we are finally beginning to function according to market methods. The ministers, the leaders of enterprises, and businessmen are beginning to work as they should in a normal state where the market is functioning. In this manner a situation has arisen where a transition to market relations is being carried out under circumstances imposed by the blockade.

The prime minister was asked what our attitude should be now toward enterprises subordinate to the Union. In her view Moscow has left collectives of enterprises to the mercy of fate because by blockading Lithuania the USSR also blockades them at the same time. However, in essence these enterprises are under the protection of Lithuania, and as a result the workers should be given a hand. This is not only a question of political relations between Lithuania and the Soviet Union. It is a question of human relations and it should be clear that one must be above ambitions and vengeance.

Answers to other questions were also given at the conference, which was conducted by Česlovas Yurshenas, representative of the republic's administration for information.

Vilnius News Conference on Talks with West

90UN1893B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
4 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Article by ELTA correspondents I. Bagdanskis and R. Chesna: "Press Conference in the Supreme Council"]

[Text] **More than 20 economic laws before the parliament's vacation. Models for supplying Lithuania with gas are discussed. Is the position of the United States changing? At an international symposium in West Berlin.**

The traditional press conference took place in the Republic's Supreme Council. The following took part: Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council; Bronislovas Kuzmickas, deputy chairman; Emanuelis Zingeris, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission; and Aleksandras Abisalas, assistant chairman of the Supreme Council.

Reporting on the parliament's agenda for the current week, Aleksandras Abisalas noted that parliament has begun to discuss a package of laws which are supposed to change the economy of Lithuania. It is expected that more than 20 such laws will be passed before the parliamentary vacation.

The correspondents of the newspaper TIYESA asked the chairman of the Supreme Council about Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene's trip to Canada and the United States.

She talked with the specialists of one of Canada's firms for extracting, processing, and trading oil, noted Vytautas Landsbergis, and they discussed providing Lithuania with oil and petroleum products. They discussed five

models for such cooperation beginning with various forms of purchasing the products and ending with processing the oil in Lithuania, as well as issues of extraction and use of Lithuanian oil. There were also detailed talks about Lithuania's political problems. Apparently the Government of Canada has its own ideas on the issue which are in the stage of maturation. Soon the prime minister will be in Washington. In addition to her speech as a witness before the Helsinki Commission of the Congress and her participation in other undertakings, she is scheduled to meet there with President George Bush. We will await information.

What do we expect from the prime minister's meeting with the President of the United States—U.S. pressure on the leadership of the USSR, and will there be a request for economic aid? Did K. Prunskiene say something during a press conference on this trip about possibly freezing the 11 March act of the Republic of Lithuania parliament? A journalist from Japan asked these questions.

We hope, said V. Landsbergis, that mutual understanding between the Government of Lithuania and the administration of the United States will improve significantly after the White House meeting. Of course no agreements are concluded at such meetings. But it is very important for us to have more direct contacts. As far as I know, the U.S. Senate made a very important decision not to approve the granting of most favored nation status in trade to the Soviet Union until it settles matters with Lithuania. There are signs that the position of the United States is not as indifferent and passive as it seemed at the time when President George Bush declared that he would not impose sanctions against the Soviet Union.

As for the aforementioned statement by K. Prunskiene, Vytautas Landsbergis declared that her observation on the possible freezing of Lithuania's declaration of independence was communicated incorrectly by journalists. The positions of the chairman of the Supreme Council and the prime minister are identical on this issue.

The chairman of the Supreme Council was also asked which acts of the Republic of Lithuania parliament could be the subject of negotiations with the USSR—has the Kremlin been asked which acts are the least acceptable to it? Or will our parliament take the initiative by suspending several of them? And in that event how does the beginning of negotiations with the leadership of the USSR present itself?

Vytautas Landsbergis expressed the opinion that this should be cleared up in the course of contacts with Moscow officials and that he does not support a unilateral initiative to blindly introduce corrections or suspend something as a concession to the Kremlin. These are very serious things for such actions.

When asked his opinion of the events at the May Day Parade in Moscow, Vytautas Landsbergis answered that even earlier there had been manifestations of solidarity with Lithuania in Russia, in the other union republics,

and in Moscow. As a result the manifestation of this solidarity at the parade was not unexpected. However its scale was unexpected as was the accent on the significance of Lithuania for Russian democracy. And the end of the parade was completely unexpected.

Vytautas Landsbergis was asked about restoring a railway line between Kaunas and Warsaw. The chairman of the Supreme Council answered that the question of restoring this line is being discussed and measures will be taken to put it into action. The line's reconstruction or the construction of lines with additional rails of another gauge on the Lithuanian side is desirable, but it will not be done soon.

At the request of the journalists, Emanuelis Zingeris, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission, gave a report on the international conference which took place recently in Berlin. He emphasized that a statement in support of Lithuania and an appeal calling upon the world's democratic forces to recognize the independence of the Republic of Lithuania were adopted at that conference. Two Lithuanian parliamentarians have been invited to an international symposium which will be held in West Berlin in May.

A representative of the press of the Soviet Union asked if there was a law restoring the rights of persons repressed for opposing occupying regimes being passed in connection with the approaching Victory Day of the Soviet people. Vytautas Landsbergis stated that not a single document being passed by the new parliament has ever been specially timed for any day. That is not in the traditions of our country or of democratic countries in general.

Emanuelis Zingeris added that the document indicates that it does not apply to persons who have participated in acts of mass genocide and that it is applicable only to persons connected with the opposition. The document has nothing to do with people who have committed crimes before humanity and humanism. Aleksandras Abishalas emphasized that this document also restores the rights of those citizens of Lithuania who have suffered or were repressed for opposition to German fascism.

Commenting, at the journalists' request, on the letter from French President F. Mitterrand and FRG Chancellor H. Kohl, Vytautas Landsbergis stressed that this initiative is a new element in the positioning of political forces on the question of Lithuania. And therefore, aside from simply responding to the letter, we also believe that the participation of such political forces is a positive indication and that it gives more possibilities for political contacts than just the events in Vilnius and Moscow. We are not counting on a miracle, but we believe that the situation will improve because of this, he said.

Continuing the same thought, Bronislovas Kuzmickas noted that for a long time the problem of Lithuania has been a problem of Eastern Europe and a problem of international significance. The intervention of such

states as the FRG and France shows that the restoration of Lithuanian independence is meeting with the world's understanding and is considered a legal act, and that we can hope for still more attention on the Lithuanian problem from the world's political circles and in the context of the world's political opinion.

Answering a question about the current political situation in Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis noted that it is dynamic. Of course our political situation is not improving, but it too is changing because a search is being carried out for a certain economic perestroika and reorientation. This may be useful in the future after we withstand the blockade. And in a political sense the situation of Lithuania is improving.

Relations with the Government of the Soviet Union are not changing because it has taken an unconstructive policy. But he said that we are making progress with the Soviet Union's other political forces and in the spheres of purely economic contacts and definition of interests.

Answers were also given to other questions from the journalists at the press conference, which was conducted by Povilas Pauparas, head of the Supreme Council's Department of Information.

Lithuanian CP Appeal on Economic Blockade

90UN1871A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
5 May 90 p 1

[Appeal of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Buro "To the Primary and Territorial Organs of the Lithuanian Communist Party on Urgent Actions for the Party Organizations"]

[text] The Lithuanian Republic is living through a complex period. The economic blockade has complicated in an extraordinary way the people's determination to create an independent state. In the complex situation that has taken shape in the republic various political forces are becoming increasingly loud in their accusations directed against the Lithuanian Communist Party. Many of the primary party organizations have appealed to the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, asking it to express in a clear-cut manner the party position in this matter.

The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Buro once again confirms that in the political and economic situation that has taken shape the position of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party is unified and unwavering—to undeviatingly strive to achieve a strengthening of independence for the Lithuanian state and the creation of a democratic society. The Lithuanian Communist Party is an integral part of Lithuania's political system and it is and will be with the people and all the inhabitants of the republic.

Many of the primary and territorial party organizations are working actively to rally the Communists, and together with the labor collectives are seeking ways to

overcome the difficulties resulting from the economic blockade. But the fact that some party members have not yet finally defined their own positions on participation in the activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party causes concern. And in some schools, hospitals, communications services, kolkhozes [collective farms], editorial offices and other organizations the Lithuanian Communist Party primary organizations are even ceasing activity and people are quitting the party collectively, motivated by this seeming depoliticization. Meanwhile, depoliticization is not destruction of the structures of political parties or organizations, since this would undermine the foundations of the democratization that has been initiated in public life. The more so since today in practice depoliticization is aimed only against the independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party. The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau expresses its confidence that today there is no need for depoliticization of the collectives, but interference by party primary organizations and public movements in the collectives to resolve problems through the use of any kind of ideology should cease.

Proceeding from the provisions of the Lithuanian Communist Party Statute that the foundation of the party is the primary organization, the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau calls on everyone, without waiting for the usual instructions, to act vigorously in any political or other initiative and to submit proposals to the committees of territorial organizations and to the Central Committee for specific measures to stabilize the political and economic situation and defend and strengthen the independence of Lithuania. We thus appeal for consolidation of the primary organizations, faster exchange of members' party cards, and a search for new forms and methods of activity. This could also be served by the creation of a new type of primary organization on the territorial and professional principle, or on the principle of clubs or places of residence.

We also appeal to Communists in the countryside, asking them to be actively involved in political life and be more cohesive in resolving the urgent problems of today's countryside, and tactfully combine the interests of the collective farms with the interests of individual peasants. We appeal to them to preserve the Lithuanian Communist Party primary organizations in the countryside and not to be hasty in setting up new political structures, and to make skillful and active use of the experience gained by the party organizations to express the social and political aspirations of those who live in rural areas.

The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau calls on all party members to concentrate themselves, maintain calm, and provide a principled assessment of actions that are hostile to the interests of Lithuania. We recommend the following.

1. That party organizations discuss the thrust of their organizational and political activity, and also the situation that has been created by the economic blockade.

That they search for optimal ways to deal with it and submit specific proposals to the leaders of collectives and to the deputies of local self-management and of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council and the Republic Government. That they define the contribution of each organization in the matter of helping people whose interests may be infringed upon. That they actively support the anti-blockade fund.

2. That the Lithuanian Communist Party primary organizations not cease activity in labor collectives before appropriate laws have been passed for the Republic, because forces hostile to the strengthening of democracy and the independence of Lithuania are trying to take advantage of the breakup of the primary organizations.

That the true goals of the propagandists of so-called depoliticization be unmasked and that the primary organizations unambiguously declare their position in this matter.

3. That an analysis be made of the results of the elections of deputies for local self-management, and that specific assistance be given to Communist deputies and self-management deputies in preparing proposals for the further socioeconomic development of the territory, and in other urgent matters.

4. That the Lithuanian Communist Party territorial organizations and the members of their elected organs, and all Communists strengthen their ties with labor collectives and cooperate constructively with other democratic political forces, and that they analyze the needs and mood of the people and explain party policy and its goals. Our task today is not declarative but specific concern for the interests and well-being both of Lithuania as a whole and of each worker individually.

5. That the Lithuanian Communist Party territorial organs shape their activity giving due consideration to the new place of the party in the life of the Republic. That they abandon the forms of work typical of the state institution and replace them with others. To this end extensive use should be made of various kinds of debate, meetings, and organization clubs.

Lithuanian Decree on Alleviating Blockade

90UN1863A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
29 Apr 90 p 1

["In the Government of the Republic of Lithuania"]

[Text] On 28 April the Government of the Republic of Lithuania adopted a decree on measures to stabilize the activity of the Republic of Lithuania economy and to supply the population under conditions of economic blockade.

The government decrees:

1. To commission the Ministry of Material Resources and the Ministry of Trade to take measures, along with interested ministries and departments, to establish direct

barter with neighboring countries, republics, cities, and oblasts of the USSR, first and foremost with Leningrad and Moscow and with Tyumen and Lvov Oblasts; and to organize and rationally use state reserves of products and other goods produced in Lithuania to purchase basic types of raw materials and foods. The Ministry of Railways is obliged to concern itself with the transportation of these goods.

2. Lithuanian Customs, the Ministry of Material Resources, and the Ministry of Trade must tighten control over the export of products and take measures to avoid damaging the functioning of the republic's economy under conditions of economic blockade.

3. With regard to the economic sanctions introduced by the USSR Council of Ministers, to free until further notice and beginning in April 1990, the republic's enterprises and organizations from payment of fines for nonfulfillment of contractual obligations; and not to apply, with respect to enterprises and organizations receiving and dispatching goods by railway, sanctions for excessive idling of wagons and containers for loading and for non-utilization of wagons and containers for removal of products. Specialized banks and other banks of Lithuania must guarantee that institutions within their jurisdiction will not accept payment documents from the clients of the Republic and the USSR with claims concerning penalties for nonfulfillment of contractual obligations.

4. To authorize enterprises and organizations, under conditions of a reduction in the volume of production (work) or of interruptions in production as a result of a shortage of materials, raw materials, or energy, to pay workers not less than two-thirds of tariff wages in the established category (for not more than three months) if there is no opportunity to use established procedure to transfer them to other work. At the end of this period, to grant workers unpaid leave for a period of up to three months with their consent. And, during the leave, to apply to them all the social guarantees, maintaining for them the same or a similar working position.

In the event of a shortage of money from salary and maintenance (payment for labor) funds, to use money from the social development fund for payment of the compensation that is stipulated by this item.

To authorize the ministries and associations to redistribute money from the financial incentives (payment for labor) fund and the social development fund.

5. To establish that enterprises and organizations are obligated to register open working positions for workers of all categories at city and rayon centers for labor (bureaus).

The republic labor center must, through agreements with enterprises and organizations, organize training and requalification of workers temporarily deprived of work.

Expenses related to training of workers will be borne by the enterprises, institutions, and organizations which have concluded an agreement with the republic's labor center.

6. The organs for local self-management along with enterprises, institutions, organizations, and citizens must organize, if resources permit, public works in which persons without employment may work temporarily.

7. In a matter of weeks the Ministry of Trade along with the Lithuanian Union of Consumers' Societies and organs of local self-management must introduce standardized distribution of basic food and nonfood goods.

8. For the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Timber Management to put into practice measures to substantially increase use of existing resources and timber and to make up the volume that is not being delivered from the USSR.

9. The ministries, departments, enterprises, institutions, and organizations are obliged to guarantee the most economical use of material resources and to conduct a search for internal resources for their use.

Landsbergis Appeal to Soviet Academicians Cited

90UN1862C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
28 Apr 90 p 2

[ELTA report: "Appeal to USSR Scholars"]

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, has sent a telegram to a general meeting of the members of the USSR Academy of Sciences with regard to the economic blockade against Lithuania begun by the Soviet Union and evaluating its ruinous effects. Refuting the fabrications which have been disseminated about Lithuania, he points out that supplies of gasoline have been completely cut off and natural gas is almost completely cut off for our republic, and that as a result it has been necessary to halt industrial enterprises, including pharmacological enterprises, and that there is not enough fuel for "first aid" services or oxygen for hospitals. Unemployed people have appeared. Not without reason do the people make comparisons with the Leningrad blockade during the war years. Despite the material and moral damage which the Soviet Union is experiencing as well, the minister of railways of the USSR has given orders to blockade shipments of goods designated for Lithuania. This is a clear and present violation of human rights by the Soviet Union.

The telegram also notes that Lithuania is continually appealing to the leadership of the USSR to begin a dialogue on issues touching the interests of both parties. But the responses which have been received consist of deliberately impracticable demands. Military, legal, and economic force which has been carried out against

Lithuania has created a political impasse, and the tactic of starvation which they have chosen is the cause of increasing human suffering.

Addressing himself to the scholars and to representatives of the humanitarian conscience of Russia and the USSR, the chairman of the Supreme Council asks them to take an appropriate position with regard to the blockade of Lithuania and to the problem of independence as a whole which could contribute to a way out of the present crisis and to maintaining the traditional good relations between our peoples in the future.

Landsbergis 18 April Letter to Gorbachev

90UN1730A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 1

[Letter "To M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, and N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council read and studied with close attention your address containing a warning about possible economic sanctions, and it has prepared an answer with the proposals that were outlined earlier. Unfortunately, after receiving specific reports of the upcoming sanctions, there is little for us to add to the 16 April 1990 declaration of the Republic of Lithuania Council of Ministers, and we can only express our regret at the methods and positions of the USSR. As before, we are prepared to discuss any questions which takes into account any of the legal interests of the USSR such as its citizens and its strategic interests.

During the period of preliminary parliamentary consultations, in the event that they are begun, we are prepared not to pass new political legislative acts before 1 May 1990.

For such consultations we are creating a delegation of deputies which will arrive in Moscow in the immediate future with the hope of meeting with your authorized agents.

V. LANDSBERGIS, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council

EKHO LITVY Appeal to Ethnic Russians

90UN1729A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
14 Apr 90 p 1

[EKHO LITVY editorial board appeal to readers]

[Text] Esteemed readers!

Today, offering you an article by M. Mileska published in TIESA (see page 2) in which our history and the conflict which has now developed between the two communist parties are reflected, we, the editorial board of the newspaper and the entire collective, take advantage of this occasion to appeal to you with our words of gratitude and thankfulness for remaining with us, continuing to be our readers, friends, and advisers, and writing to us in the current difficult situation which

frequently brings about roughness and conflicts in mutual relations. To be sure, recently your telephone and written appeals addressed to us have become more critical, one might even say angry.

First of all, you frequently rebuke us for allocating a lot of space to official materials associated with the proceedings of the republic Supreme Council and paying insufficient attention to issues topical for the Russian-speaking populace. Indeed, we agree that documents and other materials on the operation of the parliament of the republic take up a lot of space on the pages of the newspaper. In many cases, the editorial office itself is not in a position to regulate this because the status of a parliamentary and government newspaper obligates us to publish this. At the same time, we think that it is very important and necessary for you, our esteemed readers, to receive information directly, as they say, to hear it from the horse's mouth. To be sure, one may agree or disagree with particular speeches or resolutions adopted by the Supreme Council. However, you would agree that one needs to know them. Our newspaper is an open forum for you. You can always share your ideas in its pages. This would promote the development of public opinion and would allow the leadership of the republic to get a clearer and more complete picture of the situation and attitudes of various groups of the population of Lithuania.

We cannot ignore one more aspect. Esteemed readers, you accuse us of having changed the title of our newspaper without consulting you. We consider it our duty to explain to you that the decision to rename our newspaper was not made on our initiative. This was done by the Supreme Council Presidium in its capacity as our publisher. The editorial collective has approached the Presidium with a request to reconsider this issue. We think that the wishes of the readers will still be taken into account.

We believe that the content of the newspaper, its direction, and topical scope are the main point. Let us assure you that in this regard we remain the same as before, and will strive to be your source of information, adviser, your friend and protector with regard to all issues and difficulties that will develop in your life. We believe that you will also remain our friends—will read our newspaper, write to us, and thus promote the resolution of issues that may arise for the Russian-speaking population of the republic.

Editorial board of the newspaper EKHO LITVY.

Lithuanian CP Criticizes CPSU Loyalists

90UN1730D Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 2

["To the Congress of the CPSU Organization in Lithuania"]

[Text] Tomorrow the organization of the CPSU in Lithuania begins its legislative enactment—the 21st

Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. This is not its first attempt to cloak itself in the name of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Therefore we declare:

1. The CPSU organization in Lithuania acts antidemocratically—it does not acknowledge the right of nations to self-determination; it denies the restoration of Lithuania's independence, attempting to return Lithuania to the Soviet Union and anchor it there. For these reasons alone the aforementioned organization cannot call itself the party of Lithuania, and the congress cannot be called the 21st Lithuanian Communist Party Congress.

2. On the pretext of defending the rights of the citizens of the USSR in Lithuania, the interests of USSR citizens are set against the interests of the people of Lithuania. In reality society is splitting along national lines, and people of various nationalities are opposing one another.

3. In achieving its goals, the leaders of the CPSU organization in Lithuania used the army and as a result have decisively discredited themselves as politicians. Receiving financing from and coordinating their actions with the leadership of the CPSU, by their activities they are provoking an economic blockade and trying to destabilize the political situation in Lithuania.

4. By such activities the CPSU organization in Lithuania emphasizes the fundamental difference between the Lithuanian Communist Party and the subunit of the CPSU in Lithuania—the contrary evaluation of the Act on the Restoration of the Republic of Lithuania of 11 March 1990.

Thus, will you show bravery and can your congress answer the following questions:

What attitude does the CPSU organization in Lithuania have toward Lithuanian statehood?

Does this party have the moral right to call itself the party of Lithuania?

What is the legal status of an organization of the CPSU in the Republic of Lithuania?

How does that party represent the interests of the majority of the people of Lithuania if it does not recognize the Republic of Lithuania and its citizenry and comes to the defense only of the rights of the citizens of the USSR?

How does the CPSU organization in Lithuania justify the use of military force and economic blockade to realize its goals?

The Commission for Political Analysis and Party Strategy under the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee

Lithuanian Decree on Dialogue with USSR

90UN1730B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Apr 90 p 1

[Decree of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council "On the Development of Relations Between the Republic of Lithuania and the USSR"]

[Text] Affirming its adherence to the acts of 11 March 1990 and consequently attempting to consolidate the Republic of Lithuania's independence, and being convinced that a search for decisions acceptable to the Soviet Union and Lithuania is possible only by way of dialogue, the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council decrees:

1. During the period of preliminary parliamentary consultations between Lithuania and the USSR, in the event that they are begun, to pass no new political legislative acts before 1 May 1990.

2. To urge the Soviet Union to renounce the use of any force against the Republic of Lithuania and its citizens, including economic force.

3. To propose that the Soviet Union join consultations concerning negotiations with the authorized delegation of the Republic of Lithuania.

4. To send an authorized delegation of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, headed by Brunius Kuzmichkas, deputy chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, to the Soviet Union for consultations regarding the conditions of negotiations.

5. To warn the economic organizations and citizens of Lithuania to make immediate preparations to economize strictly on all resources and to maintain spiritual fortitude.

V. LANDSBERGIS, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council.

Moldavian First Secretary on Party Reforms

90UN2019A Kishinev KOMMUNIST MOLDAVII
in Russian No 5, May 90 (signed to press 24 Apr 90)
pp 5-14

[Interview with P.K. Luchinskiy, first secretary, Moldavian CP Central Committee by B.M. Stratulat, KOMUNISTUL MOLDOVEY editor in chief: "What We Take to the 17th Congress"; date, place not specified]

[Text] [Correspondent] Our conversation is on the threshold of a most important event in the life of the republic party organization—its 17th Congress. The discussion unfolding everywhere on the new image of the CPSU, and hence, that of the Moldavian Communist Party, its organizational structure, the democratization of intraparty life has pulled into its orbit not only communists, but non-party members as well. There is no counting the issues that trouble our people: What goals must the renewed party set for itself? What are its place

and role under modern conditions? What mutual relations with state structures, public organizations, and movements must be built?

It should be assumed that no one has ready answers on this score. They should be sought collectively, creatively, as they say, by all together. It seems that both the pre-congress discussions, and the talk at the upcoming congress will be more constructive, and the decisions made will be more productive if we do not leave on the sidelines a single one of the components that form a simple yet capacious formula: the party under new conditions. That is the pivot around which I would like to construct our discussion.

[Luchinskiy] Let us consider the proposal adopted.

[Correspondent] Then permit me the first question, Petr Kirillovich. Your viewpoint on the central political problem—a problem of the party and power, a delineation of authoritative functions?

[Luchinskiy] If you have in mind the chance of erosion of power, which is now much discussed and disputed, then I will answer thus. Under our current conditions, erosion of power can be prevented solely by means of a comprehensive increase of the party's influence in all spheres of society's life. The question is posed by many: What will happen now, when Article 6 of the Constitution, which proclaimed that the CPSU is the leading and guiding force of Soviet society, has lost its effect?

It will be normal if we achieve a condition in which the role and place of the party has been transformed from having been formally declared to being a political reality. That is the program for the work of every communist, of every primary party organization, every party committee. This program need only be filled with concrete substance, well-grounded content, and to act independently, creatively, unfettered, freed from a false understanding of its role as only an executor of the decisions of superior organs.

I foresee a second question in the context of what has been said—that of the problem of a multiparty system. During the 3rd Congress of People's Deputies, a TsT [Central Television] correspondent carefully addressed to me a question on how I regarded this problem. I replied: I regard it calmly. But surely, a multiparty system is political opposition? Of course it is opposition. It will be grabbing for power? Naturally, it has the right to claim power or a portion of power. But only on a legal basis. And I see nothing terrible in this. It is more terrifying when there is a grab for power at any price. More terrifying because in the final analysis, it is the simple people, all society who are going to suffer. We know history well and must be very attentive to the events that are occurring. As one publicist accurately noted, in the given situation it is necessary to install different thinking into the system of political institutions, to understand that the monopoly of any party has a negative effect on that party itself first and foremost.

Yet something else should be understood as well. Rejection of a monopoly creates a completely new situation within the party itself. Let us be frank: Its position as the leading force in society has led to the political indifference of many communists, to passivity in action. Why is this? The answer seems clear. It is founded in the elementary laws of dialectics. It had no need to struggle for power in society, for power was guaranteed, fixed in the Constitution.

Yet in the meantime, struggle, and I have in mind an honest political fight, comprises the foundation of any party's viability and survivability. It is this kind of struggle that impels toward the activation of a political dialogue, and elicits the necessity of searching for supporters, and the timely evolution of forms and methods of work. As a result, the party is becoming more flexible, dynamic, and free from dogmatism.

The new conditions persistently demand a rejection of the substitution of political leadership with administration. The apparatus dictatorship led to the cadres' incapability to play the role of the authoritative political leader, the ideological warrior with initiative. But surely it was these qualities that were demanded by perestroika. And apparently it is no coincidence that over the last 5 years, 65 first secretaries have been replaced in 49 of the republic's raykoms and gorkoms.

The apparatus dictatorship is especially vividly manifested in the many fallacious stereotypes; it is particularly confirmed in the practice of the work of the party committees, for example, in all sorts of "airing of issues." They substitute this sort of airing for concrete actions, and the decisions made while doing so merely create the appearance of work, and defend them against verification "from above." For example, in the Moldavian CP Central Committee, on the average, on an annual basis, there were up to 200 disparate resolutions being monitored, sometimes duplicating one another. It is possible to ensure effective control in such a situation? And is it necessary to maintain all these documents under the control of the Central Committee? Upon sorting it out, the Central Committee Buro removed the majority of these resolutions from their control, and those that were adopted jointly were sent to the republic Council of Ministers.

The struggle against bureaucratism also demands the eradication of the structures generated by the phenomenon itself, extremely difficult structures to administer at that. This is most intrinsically linked to the activity of the party under the new conditions. Let us say, some fine initiative, a bright thought has ripened at the "bottom," among the Central Committee instructors. On the path to the Central Committee secretary, it is filtered through department heads, sector heads, their deputies, and at times is simply lost. Isn't it better for Central Committee secretaries to have a group of consultants, of creative collectives formed, possibly, as needed for the resolution of any sort of concrete problems?

As you know, definite steps in this sense have already been undertaken. Groups of specialists, scientists, representatives of creative unions, and social movements are being formed in the Central Committee; their task is to assist in working out problems of a strategic nature. In other words, the most competent people in their field are being drawn into the orbit of party work. And this is extraordinarily important, for it must be confessed that until the present, a great deal has been done here by dilettantes or by people proclaiming ideas while incapable of realizing them.

[Correspondent] Apparently, the issues of improving the structure of the party apparatus during the course of the discussion of the draft Platform, the CPSU Charter, and the programs for the renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party occupied a special position by all rights. The discussions continue still, but after all, definite intentions are being realized even today. What constitutes the foundation of the actions, what is their essence?

[Luchinskiy] The essence is the need to intensify the party's political influence, to delimit the functions, to elevate the genuinely scientific, comprehensively interpreted level of the decisions adopted in an attempt not to be trailing events, but to work on anticipating them.

An example of this is the first steps of the special group recently created under the Central Committee for the analysis of the political situation in the republic, for forecasting the possible situations. The Moldavian CP Central Committee Buro recently adopted a resolution specifying the creation of new structural subdivisions (within the boundaries of the existing staffs)—the department of interethnic relations, and a group for the expedient analysis and monitoring of the realization of citizens' proposals. In consideration of the acute need for the scientific provision of perestroika, the activity of the party organizations, and the forecasting of the processes of social development taking place, the Institute of Party History under the Moldavian CP Central Committee has been transformed into the Institute of Sociopolitical Research of the Moldavian CP Central Committee.

For the purpose of the further delimitation of the functions of party, soviet, and economic organs and the deepening of the process of democratization in the formation of body of cadres, the Central Committee Buro confirmed a new nomenklatura of positions of the Central Committee, with their quantity reduced by a factor of almost five.

Concrete actions aimed at the reorganization of the apparatus are being undertaken in a number of party raykoms. In doing so, the reorganization is viewed here not as a goal in and of itself, but as a means of fortifying first and foremost the lower echelons of the party, elevating their role in the perestroika processes.

Yet nevertheless, the reorganization of the Central Committee apparatus and party committees being implemented cannot, for the time being, be called optimal. Life goes on. The sociopolitical situation changes and

therefore, in my view, the structure of the party apparatus, and the functions of their subdivisions will continue to change form.

Bearing this in mind, the Central Committee Buro made a decision on granting financial independence to the city and rayon party committees; they have been given the right to determine for themselves the structure and numerical strength of the party apparatus, the positional pay scales of the staffers. I assume that the measures undertaken will serve as a stimulus for a concerned search and introduction to the practice of the most optimal versions, the most effective forms and methods of work. We must also think about having a certain portion of the apparatus formed from members of the elected organs. I think that we shall take this up in a more detailed fashion after the 17th Moldavian CP Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress.

[Correspondent] Can you illustrate what you have said with concrete examples in which the party committees are already realizing the acquired rights?

[Luchinskiy] Of course. For example, at its party conference, the Dnestrovskiy Rayon party committee discussed and confirmed a fairly unique apparatus structure. The diagram looks like this: three secretaries, inventory and information sectors, two consultants, six party organizers; total, not including support personnel, 16 people.

The Yalovenskiy Rayon party committee recently considered and confirmed at its plenum a different apparatus structure. It eliminated the many levels, and linked the raykom directly to the primary party organizations. The party organizers (these are leading figures in the raykom) are now strengthened on the territorial principle, allowing them to resolve all issues with initiative and independently in the provinces.

This structure is interesting, for in its formation, the raykom was guided not by the need to cut personnel, so much as the selection of the priority trends of activity at the given stage of social development. Hence too its orientation. Of the eleven responsible organizers stipulated by the staff, today eight are concerned with the organization of party work directly in the provinces, with coordination and communications with social formations.

Naturally, all of this is the first steps. They need study, approbation, our support. In view of this, I would like to emphasize the role of the press in the interpretation and the propaganda of the experiment being born. The republic newspapers and magazines, distracted by "sensationalistic crumbs," have somehow missed the fact that even in our difficult times there are positive movements as well, and extremely useful undertakings in the provinces, in the party organizations. Today, they require a special approach, attention, analysis, and generalization.

But let us return to the party apparatus. There is probably no need to persuade the readers that the apparatus is necessary to the elected party organ. As you know, V.I. Lenin assigned great significance to the creation of an organization of professionals for whom party work had to become a fundamental and day-to-day cause.

The issue lies elsewhere—what is the party apparatus, the released party staffer to be like? It is my firm conviction that the apparatus must occupy its *own* position in the structure of the party leadership. This is not staff for the production of papers and directives, not an organ for the pressuring of subordinate party echelons, but a generator of new ideas, capable of assisting the elected organ, accountable to it in the resolution of the day-to-day organizational-political and indoctrinational problems. The main principle of activity for the party staffers has been and remains the topical Leninist thesis—to go to the masses as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators, as organizers. And in my opinion, these are indeed the main priorities in the style and method of the work of the party apparatus, rather than the narrow specialization of party staffers which, in effect, we have today.

Another thing must be taken into consideration—the situation that has come into being surrounding the party workers. People's negative opinions on the party apparatus have sharply intensified, up to accusing them of conscious hindrance of perestroika. Of course, there are also in the party organs no small number of people with no idea of how they should be working today. Some of them still have a poor mastery of the area of "working with people," of the foundations of the science of administration and political methods. This is the case.

But once and for all, the general criticism is far from objective. Sometimes there is defamation of party cadres. The approach here must be simple: The apparatus should not be considered in general. In each case, an evaluation should be made of a concrete staffer in a concrete situation.

A cardinal improvement in the composition of the party cadres, overcoming their unpopularity among the population we associate with the destruction of the closed office nature of their selection until now, the eradication of "appointmentship," and the expansion of the practice of alternative elections and nominations on a competitive basis. There is no other way here.

[Correspondent] In connection with this, Petr Kirillovich, I would like to touch upon the problem of collegiality, for, you will agree, this is the guarantee of precise decisions, the correctness of actions undertaken, and their adequacy regarding vital realities.

[Luchinskiy] I share this viewpoint. Collegiality is indeed a fundamental principle in the activity of a political party, capable of fully ensuring the party's potential opportunities, of working based upon its authority, and to my mind, this is particularly important,

returning to every communist the sense of his own dignity, his personal participation in the resolution of all tasks, of inner freedom.

As you understand, one of the factors in democratic centralism is proclaimed to be the "collegiality in the work of all organizations and leading party organs." But surely this aspect, in many cases, simply "did not work." Hence the alienation of the basic mass of communists from collective creation in the development of party decisions. Hence that deformation of relations between the primary party organizations and the leading organs which we are now persistently trying to eliminate.

In a word, if we renew somewhat the interpretation of the concept of "collegiality" as applied to intraparty life today, it must be understood to be above all the participation of communists in the formation of party policy. In my opinion, in order to fortify this principle, the exclusive right of the elected organ to above all develop strategy must be steadfastly observed.

Now, on certain measures we have undertaken to ensure genuine collegiality in work. Here I would cite first and foremost the Moldavian CP Central Committee commissions recently formed, the party raykoms and gorkoms. It can already be said today that their activity is positively influencing, for example, the depth, the balanced consideration, the direction of the decisions being worked out. To be fair, it should be noted that the potential of these commissions has not been opened to a full degree, yet it should be assumed that the proposed changes in the principle of their formation will in the long term have a positive influence on their efficacy.

And one more comment. If we speak of collegiality in the broad sense, and not in a narrowly party meaning, then the use of this principle of administration in the processes of political democratization under way in the republic is dictated by life itself. The realization of the idea of constructive cooperation, of a multilateral dialogue of the Moldavian CP and social movements is impossible without collective efforts, without collective sense.

[Correspondent] You touched upon the problem of cadre selection. In connection with this, I cannot but note that the case of the appearance in the republic of the first non-party minister has caused a certain reaction.

[Luchinskiy] A positive one, I hope? It should be assumed that in time, such cases will not be counted as extraordinary. The party is renewing itself; its cadre policy is renewing itself. On the approach is the creation of new parties. The times themselves require that the real leaders come to the leading positions; energetic, capable workers of the new perestroika formation, able to lead people. Of course, there are such potential leaders among communists as well as among non-party members. However, harsh administration, monopolization and excessive centralization of the selection and distribution of cadres on the part of the party committees practically excluded the opportunity for non-party members to hold

positions of leadership. This is also bespoken by the fact that in the nomenklatura of city and rayon party committees, this category of cadres has been represented literally by single cases; in 1989, they comprised 5.9 percent. There were practically no non-party members in the cadre nomenklatura of the Moldavian CP Central Committee. The stereotypes of old thinking in this area are functioning even now, as evidenced by the sociological research being conducted in the republic. Is there a mechanism to break through such a stereotype? There is. It is the democratization of cadre work, its decentralization.

The past election to the parliament and local soviets of the republic actually demonstrated the possibility of this mechanism. There was neither pressure from the party committees, nor dictatorship in the sense of the composition of future deputies. Yet neither the party nor the elections themselves suffered from this. Despite certain glitches and disruptions, they took place in an atmosphere of genuine democracy.

[Correspondent] I agree. Yet the subject of the elections generates still other questions. I would like to pause on one of them. As you know, almost 83 percent of the communists received a vote of confidence. In your evaluation, however (I have in mind the interview in *MOLDOVE SOCHIALISTE* and *SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA*), from one-third to one-half the elected communists were supported by one or another social formation, meaning that they shared their platforms, which in a number of cases did not coincide in all things with the position of the party. How can this situation be correlated with our aspiration to strengthen the unity of the party?

[Luchinskiy] In other words, is it possible to ensure party unity under the free formation of factions and platforms?

I have already had to answer that question, which until recently would have shocked every one of us. And this is understandable—we are all rooted in the importance of preserving our party. Democratization of intraparty life has caused the appearance of new forms of unification of communists—clubs, horizontal structures in which disparate versions of platforms are born. Incidentally, the presence of political movements with various platforms is also clearly visible in the speeches of the participants of the February CPSU Central Committee. It would be undemocratic, and, moreover, harmful for the development of socialism to exclude on principle the opportunity for a choice of paths different from those proposed in the CPSU Draft Platform. Diversity of thought is fairly broad, but necessary: In making a choice, it is necessary to have something to choose from. And if there are, let us say, two positions leading to a common goal on one or another issue of party policy, then they must be taken into consideration.

[Correspondent] And further on?

[Luchinskiy] And further on, to experiment, to verify how the proposed platform is justifying itself. In posing the question thus, it is obvious that party unity is a process of constant agreement of various positions and opinions. This position has also found its reflection in the program for the renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party, which we shall introduce at the 17th Congress.

[Correspondent] Petr Kirillovich, I would like to touch upon one other factor of unity—the unity of the CPSU in the context of the independence of the parties of the union republics. It is no secret that even today, this thought frankly scares some people...

[Luchinskiy] It scares them because logic is not taken into consideration. Independence is as necessary as the air to the Communist Parties of the union republics. I emphasize this with full conviction. And I spoke about this at the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum. By the way, it seems that I was not quite understood correctly here in Moldavia, either. There were even rebukes: They said I was almost against the unity of the CPSU. It is all a matter of what is understood by unity. I am against that unity whose synonym is rigid centralization. If we are going toward a union of free independent states, then the republic Communist Parties must also unite within a qualitatively new principle—that of an ideological communality of goals and tasks, fixed in the common Program and Charter. Why can't the Moldavian Communist Party have its own program, in addition to that one? Moreover, it must have it; after all, a number of problems are specific precisely to Moldavia.

Is it unnatural that in the course of the renewal of the republic Communist Party there emerges a problem such as national interests? After all, there they are, and they are in no way contradictory to common human interests. But naturally, they can and must be harmonized, but not to the detriment of national minorities and human rights.

It seems that this will not be reflected in the consolidation of our efforts, in the resolution of political, social, and other problems, and in the final analysis, in the unity of the CPSU. Yet with all of this, naturally, there should be a precise determination of the issues of the prerogatives of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the union republics, their mutual relations.

[Correspondent] A most important event of late, and I have in mind the February and March CPSU Central Committee Plenums, our plenum examining the Program of Renewal of the Communist Party, and an entire range of radical transformations associated with the activity of the party—all of this has conditioned definite positive changes and forward movement.

However, the wave of harsh criticism of the party has not abated. Ideas of the historical groundlessness of Marxism-Leninism are intensely exaggerated; voices on the crisis of ideology, the crisis in the party are heard more

loudly. We shall be frank; faith in our ideals has been shaken for a fair number of communists. In your opinion, what should be undertaken in order to preserve and strengthen the ideological solidarity of the party ranks?

[Luchinskiy] Indeed, the voices on the theoretical collapse of Marxism-Leninism, the failure of the theory and practice of socialism have been heard all the more frequently of late, and at a very high pitch at that. Yet we will not turn into a drama the fact that individual theses of the teachings of the classics of Marxism-Leninism on socialism have become obsolete today. Neither Marx nor Lenin looked upon their theory as dogma. In their works, they outlined with great reserve the contours of the future socialist society, reckoning that in all the details, the forms of this structure must be found in the historical process itself. It is another matter that after the death of V.I. Lenin, Stalin managed to voluntarily reconstruct a number of theses, and in a number of cases, to simply pervert them. The Short Course of the History of the VKP(b) was proclaimed to be the summit of the development of Marxism, not subject to further building up. And the party of Lenin was turned into a party of like-minded people, based in the unity of convictions, into a party of coreligionists.

That is why, in my opinion, a modern reading of Marxism is absolutely necessary. Reborn Leninism in all its authenticity must become the core of party ideology.

So what kind of ideology do we need today? Above all, one free from having blinders, from dogmatism, from intolerance of new views and ideas; an ideology which, as Lenin said, proclaims common human values to be above class values.

In connection with this, we are faced with forming a principally new type and style of ideological work, openly addressed toward the people, based upon a reliable feedback mechanism, upon a dialogue with all the healthy forces of society and consideration for diverse opinions, views, and interests. Ideology will become a factor in forging decisions by convincing people of their necessity. We will thoroughly review its general concept at the foundation of the program for the renewal of the party at the 17th Moldavian CP Congress.

This is how, in general terms, purely diagrammatically, I would formulate an answer to the first part of the question. I understand that you represent a theoretical, political organ, and that you would like to reflect a bit upon world view problems on a broader level. I do not object, but it seems that this is a special topic meriting a thorough discussion.

Now on the crisis in the party. Here above all we should understand what comprises the concept of "crisis." In my view, such a formulation regarding the situation that has come to pass in the Moldavian Communist Party belongs to the category of extreme definitions, and is thus not quite accurate.

Of course there are problems and difficulties which the party organs run into during such complex times. And the problems are quite complicated.

Perestroika processes have not only touched upon but penetrated the very core of party activity, of all its organizational structures.

Life has placed us before a fact—on the wave of democratic transformations and glasnost, in a number of republic party organizations, processes are taking place whose development and content are hardly conducive to CPSU internal unity.

However, we will be realists. It is one thing in Lithuania, and another here. The activity of the Moldavian Communist Party has its own specifics, based upon its own history and the multi-tenored life of the people whom it represents and serves.

The republic party organization is hardly attempting to refuse to resolve the multitude of complex problems we inherited from the period of stagnation. On the contrary, in following the planned course, it has become actively involved in the realization of the program of renewal, the disclosure and filling of the "blank spots" in the history of the Communist Party and the Moldavian people, the affirmation of the democratic norms of our life, including party life, the resolution of problems of inter-ethnic relations, and tasks in the area of the economy and the social sphere.

It seems to me that the Moldavian CP Central Committee Plenum that took place in early March introduced certainty to many of these problems. Yet nevertheless, talk of the state of affairs in the republic and in its Communist Party will, of course, receive their logical continuation at our 17th Congress.

The fate of the party troubles us all today. We cannot be indifferent toward the massive assault on its authority, to the attempts to discredit it.

Yet the party's authority is not only the authority of its ideals. This is also the authority of its every member. And if there resound anti-party voices alien in their tonality and far from harmless in their content, then such phenomena must be resisted. By what means? There are no fast recipes here; both persistence and initiative must be displayed. In my speech at the March Moldavian CP Central Committee Plenum, I cited the example of a wise decision of the communists of the Republic Clinical Hospital. They gathered the collective together and said: We are not going to approach criticism of the party indiscriminately. The party consists of its individual members. Let us figure it out; we will make our claims against each, the way each one works, the way each one behaves, in other words, is he really a communist or just kept on the list. And how did it come out? With little exception, all collective members who were party members were "recommended" very highly; in the opinion of their colleagues, they were a worthy basis for comparison.

I am convinced that the authors of the anti-party slogans do not quite have a clear idea of the essence of party activity, and the errors and extremes of the past, individual communists, and party organizations are transferred to the entire party, to all those who both in the past and the present are honestly and conscientiously fulfilling their party and official duties.

Now, the processes of reinterpretation of the path covered, the reevaluation of actions, self-purging, and renewal are gaining strength in every lower party echelon. These are correct processes which can only be heartening, as they say.

However, even these processes bring absolute terror to some. Sometimes they speak of communists who have turned in their party cards in half-whispers, of the supposed mass exodus from the ranks of the CPSU that has begun.

But is this the case? Let us turn to the statistics and analyze the causes. After the 16th Moldavian CP Congress more than 1,800 people voluntarily left the ranks of the republic party organization.

Who are they, these former communists? Why did they leave the party? Some for advanced age. Others cannot reconcile themselves to the loss of the ideals for which they practically gave their lives. Others still simply lack firm convictions, and built their relation with the party on a consumeristic, prognosticating basis—what can the party do for me. To illustrate, some interesting data. Over the last 4 years, 296 people left the party without even giving a reason; 100 CPSU members openly stated that they could not shoulder the growing demands upon communists during the period of the radical renewal of society; almost 90 percent of those who left the party refused to attend the party meeting at which their announcements were discussed; in effect, they declined a frank talk with their party comrades.

Last year, in Sorokskiy Rayon 15 communists turned in their party cards. Among them were N.P. Lemeshkina, a dispatcher at a sewing plant, a delegate to the 13th Moldavian CP Congress, and L.G. Blazhen, a former republic Supreme Soviet deputy and tobacco grower from the "Path of Lenin" kolkhoz. It was explained that in their day, they joined the party exclusively out of mercenary motives.

But unfortunately, there are among the departed more than a few honest, sincere people who were simply lost, who came under the influence of various types of demagogues, agitators, those who do nothing themselves to improve the situation, yet who tirelessly criticize and edify others.

To generalize the main reasons for communists leaving the party, I would distinguish two of them. The first is the practice imbedded over the years of putting together the party ranks not according to convictions, but according to resumes, so to say, in order to maintain social balance. As a result, we have despoiled the party ranks with

careerists, people without ideological resistance. It is they who in this complex, breakthrough period of the party's life have begun to defame all and everything, to make violent attacks on the party, to demonstratively abandon it with great show. In the current situation, we must fix our boundaries with such people, purge the party ranks of them. The second reason. At the stage of the exacerbation of the problems within the CPSU, the efficacy of the primary party organizations fell sharply; there was a withdrawal from the resolution of urgent life issues, a sense of loss, an incapability to advocate their positions. Here is an interesting example. Workers of the "Moldavgidromash" scientific production association O.D.Dzhanshibayev, Yu.M. Vasilyev, and A.I. Graur announced their departure from the party at the expiration of their candidacy term. They all had the same motive: "I do not wish to join such a party organization; it is not our vanguard." Alas, there are more than a few such examples.

And nevertheless, the situation should not be dramatized; the incidents of leaving the CPSU should not be reduced to its destruction, its death. Nor should they be underestimated. A genuine, natural process of party renewal, of purging its party ranks is under way.

The main thing is seen elsewhere—in the further strengthening of the party ranks, in concern for the health of their complement. And there must be much more optimism here. There is cause for this. In the past year alone, 4,800 people were accepted as CPSU members. New perestroika warriors, they come to the party at a difficult time, they come conscientiously, prepared to fight for its authority. Isn't this a good sign? Does this really fit in with the concept of a crisis?

So, let us sum up. I think that it is correct to say that a far from simple, in many ways contradictory situation has been created in the republic Communist Party; there is undoubtedly a way out of it. And we will discuss the concrete paths in detail at the congress.

[Correspondent] Petr Kirillovich, my final question was suggested by your speech at the February CPSU Central Committee Plenum, its problems, and general concepts. You spoke (I remind you of this in the interests of our readers) of the need for political resolutions such as would be capable of successfully dealing with not only today's, but tomorrow's problems. In other words, political foresight, the ability to work in anticipation is placed at the apex. This was also the subject of your speech at the plenum in March. What stipulates the priority of such an approach?

[Luchinskiy] The need to exclude the possibility of egregious errors committed in the past. I suppose that in beginning these or those broad-scale transformations, we far from always predicted their consequences. Apparently, it is not a productive matter to move on, forward, by the trial and error method. It is necessary to outpace the events both in forecasting and in actions. That is the first thing.

Secondly, the profound sense of perestroyka, the revolutionary drive of action is not only for today, but for the long term.

In order to realize this, it is necessary for the entire party to work consistently, harmoniously, and with initiative.

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Moldavian Party Audit Commission Report

90UN2040A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 19 May 90 p 2

[Report by V.S. Pushkash, chairman of the Auditing Commission of the Communist Party of Moldavia, to the 17th Communist Party of Moldavia Congress]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade delegates!

The 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress will have to apportion ways of renewing the social and political life in the republic. The nature of the political orientation of our future life will depend to a considerable degree on its results.

As I submit for the congress approval the report on the work done by the Auditing Commission of the Moldavian Communist Party, I consider it necessary to report that it has conducted all of its activity in keeping with party regulations and provisions concerning auditing commissions and has arranged this work taking into account the perestroyka processes taking place in the party and the state. We have striven to change the approaches toward planning and to coordinate our actions more with the auditing commissions of city and rayon party organizations, and we have also selected priority problems for study and discussion. We decided that primary among these were monitoring the implementation of the budget, observance of staff and financial discipline in party organs and party institutions, ensuring correct payment of party dues by Communists, the procedure for going through and considering letters and applications from workers, observance of the established procedure for the discharge of business in party committees, and other issues of life inside the party.

The materials from the inspections were regularly sent for the consideration of the Central Committee Secretariat, the party gorkoms [city committees] and raykoms [rayon committees], and auditing commissions of city and rayon party organizations for the adoption of measures to eliminate and prevent violations of the norms of party life.

Permit me to report on the implementation of the budget by the republic party organization. First of all on the revenue part. It is formed from receipts of party membership fees and deductions from the profit from publishing activity, and is overfulfilled from year to year. In 1989 we received R14 million in party membership fees. Their proportion in the party budget was equal to 76 percent of the overall sum of incomes. Deductions from

profits of the Central Committee Publishing House amounted to R4.5 million or 102 percent of the plan.

The expenditure of funds from the party budget both in the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee and in the party gorkoms and raykoms was carried out in keeping with their purposes and within the limits of the estimated allocations. The overall sum of expenditures was 95.6 percent of the amount approved. We spent R9.3 million on maintaining the party organs during 1989, and 40 percent of this was for supporting the activity of the local party organizations. Party propaganda cost R0.6 million and business expenditures amounted to R2.2 million.

The savings on the wage fund in the amount of R326,000 and business expenditures of R45,000 were reserved for use in 1990. From these funds this year we transferred R200,000 to children's homes and about R10,000 to the charity fund. These funds were also used for awarding valuable gifts to war veterans—Heroes of the Soviet Union and individuals awarded Orders of Glory of the three degrees—for the monument to M. Yeminesku, and for other purposes. At the same time R381,000 were allotted from the money in the party budget for the needs of local party organizations in 1989 and a total of about R50,000 was rendered in assistance to Communist pensioners.

Measures are being taken to reduce expenditures this year as well. Thus by consolidating the apparatus of the republic party organs we have released one-fourth of the area in the buildings of the party committees where 118 other organizations and institutions are housed. This work is continuing. This has made it possible not only to improve the conditions for the labor of the workers of the branches but also to reduce expenditure on maintaining buildings and to obtain a certain amount of income from the rent. The number of vehicles maintained at the expense of the party budget has been reduced by 58, including five personal ones. Some of these were turned over to the national economy and others were placed under the system of economic accountability.

At the same time there are also shortcomings in the activity of the party Central Committee, gorkoms, and raykoms for thrifty use of the allocations that have been allotted. Certain party committees, particularly the Kakhulskiy, Kamenskiy, and Leovskiy, have allowed overexpenditure of funds for certain items of the estimate.

In the opinion of the commission, which at its meeting discussed questions of the effectiveness of the utilization of funds allotted for maintaining party institutions and mass political work, there is a need to combine the House of Political Education, the University of Marxism-Leninism, and permanent courses for increasing the qualifications of party and soviet workers into one training center. This will help not only to reduce expenditures but also to avoid duplication and parallelism in

work and considerably raise the level of personnel training. We assume that congress delegates will express their opinions regarding this problem.

In spite of the measures taken by the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee for stepping up the activity of the party gorkoms and raykoms, local party organizations, and auditing commissions of all units of the republic party organization to strengthen discipline and order with respect to the payment of party dues, there are unfortunately still a considerable number of violations in this area. Thus the underpayment of dues was concealed from the inspection commissions in every fourth local party organization that was inspected. Over four years the sum amounted to R84,200. In 1989 it was revealed that 5,900 Communists were guilty of these violations (three percent of the overall number). The largest number of Communists who concealed their earnings and other remunerations were found in the Kompatskiy, Kriulenskiy, and Yalovenskiy rayon party organizations—9.5, 7, and 5.6 percent of the number of Communists inspected, respectively.

An egregious case of appropriation of party membership fees in the amount of R4,000 was allowed by the former secretary of the shop party organization of the dying and finishing production of the silk combine, V.V. Goncharenko. It should be noted that this party organization did not escape the attention of party workers. Gorkom workers visited it 18 times in 1987 alone. It was also visited by [several words omitted; line missing due to printing error] of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee. Not all of them showed an interest in the payment of dues, although it was their job to do so.

Another example. Instead of stepping up organizational and educational work for strengthening the norms of life within the party, certain raykoms make their own decisions on issues of paying dues which contradict the existing CPSU Regulations. Thus the Buro of the Leninskiy Raykom of the Moldavian Communist Party established a new procedure for paying dues for pensioners—10 kopecks per month—regardless of the amount of their pension. A similar decision was made at the plenum of the Dnestrovskiy Party Raykom. The party committee of the Signal production association determined the amount of dues from pensioners at two kopecks. The desire for independence and the adoption of non-standard decisions can be understood. Possibly these questions too are subject to revision in the CPSU Central Committee. But there is such a thing as party discipline and procedure and there are party requirements that are mandatory for every party organization. The decisions made by the aforementioned party organizations, in addition to the fact that they introduced disorder into the business of collecting and accounting for membership fees, also led to the loss of financial funds for the Moldavian Communist Party as a whole, had a negative effect on the observance of regulation provisions by Communists of these rayons, and became widespread in other places as well.

Trying to resolve so-called "political issues" through economic sanctions, individual party organizations of the cities of Tiraspol, Bendery, Rybnitsa, and Sibozyskiy Rayon during a certain period decided to transfer party membership fees to the account not of the Moldavian Communist Party but of the CPSU Central Committee.

Experience has rejected these unjustified attempts. As of 1 January 1990 the number of Communists with debts increased by a factor of four and amounted to 2,600 or 1.3 percent of the overall number of members of the republic party organization.

In the first quarter of 1990 the number of Communists who had not paid their dues increased to 6,600 or 3.4 percent (for the Leovskiy party organization—eight, Dnestrovskiy, Rybnitskiy, and Sovetskiy—six, and Orkheyskiy and Teleneshetskiy—five percent).

The state of affairs with the payment of party dues shows that not all Communists are fulfilling the requirements of the party regulations. Regular and correct payment of dues by Communists not only means material support for the party but also has great moral-political significance. The fulfillment of this obligation by the Communist contributes to strengthening his ties with the party and develops discipline and organization in him. Based on this, party committees should take a more demanding approach to Communists who do not observe party discipline.

In 1989 for the first time local party organizations were given the opportunity to dispose of party money independently, although the amount was small, and to spend it at their discretion. But some of the organizations have not taken advantage of this right and have assimilated only 72.4 percent of the allocations. Other organizations, instead of using these allocations for political work and training newly elected secretaries and party aktiv, have used it for material assistance and incentives for the party aktiv and for philanthropic purposes. This impulse is understandable, as many problems and unresolved issues have accumulated in society and the party. But now that the draft regulations have earmarked a change-over to self-financing and granting local party organizations the right to spend up to 50 percent of the fees, under the conditions of the formation of a multiparty system it is necessary to revise the forms of relations among party organizations and the enterprises at which they were created.

Even today there is a real question of increasing expenditures on leasing premises and property and other expenditures of the local party organizations. Therefore the budget must be worked out in detail at the level of each raykom, gorkom, and local party organization from below to above, taking into account expenditures on maintaining the staff and the material and technical base and on conducting political work.

It is necessary to form a reserve of funds for the subsidizing of small local party organizations and those at

Housing Operation Sections for rendering aid to Communist pensioners, and reserve funds for work under the conditions of a market economy. This should be taken into account when determining the normative for deductions from the collected dues for each local party organization. Budget questions deserve to be discussed at plenums of party committees and all Communists should be subsequently informed of this.

In order to successfully cope with tasks of attracting nontraditional sources for augmenting the revenue part of the budget, it would be expedient for the Central Committee administration of affairs, taking into account the increased volume of economic work, to introduce into the general staffs positions of deputy manager for economics or chief of the financial sector, two consultants, and officials in charge of these issues in the gorkoms and raykoms.

I wish to touch upon one more aspect of this subject. Today there are many disputes about the position of the budget of the Moldavian Communist Party and the role of the CPSU budget in the vital activity of the republic party organization. An analysis of the totality of financial and economic relations between the CPSU and the Moldavian Communist Party makes it possible to understand that without a subsidy from the CPSU budget we would not have been able to create such a material and technical base for the party organs (the fixed capital is valued at 38 million), to outfit the printing plant of the Central Committee Publishing House with modern imported equipment, or, finally, to spend R20 million on housing in the last two decades alone. Therefore the requirements for turning the buildings and property of the Moldavian Communist Party over to other organizations and institutions, justified by the notion that they were supposed to have been constructed and formed with dues alone, are groundless. It should be kept in mind that if the Moldavian Communist Party does not spend a single ruble for its needs, under the new conditions it will be able to return what it borrowed from the CPSU budget in approximately eight to 10 years. Such are the facts and such is the reality.

During the period between congresses the Moldavian Communist Party Auditing Commission regularly provides for monitoring work on letters and applications from citizens in divisions of the Central Committee, editorial offices of newspapers, and city and rayon party committees.

In four years the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party has handled more than 47,000 written complaints, applications, and proposals, or 13,000 more than during the four preceding years. Upon examination, every third letter was recognized as justified and measures were taken to satisfy the requests made in them, to restore the violated rights of the authors, or to hold liable parties guilty of the violations. The appropriate explanations were given for the remaining letters.

During the report period the party gorkoms and raykoms received and considered about 49,000 letters and applications. A considerable number of them came in to the editorial offices of republic, city, and rayon newspapers and magazines. The majority were published and used in newspaper articles on individual problems.

The information contained in letters from workers of the republic is constantly being generalized, analyzed, and used in the work of collective organs of the Central Committee oblast committee and collections have been prepared for Central Committee plenums, "Republic Workers Think, Suggest, and Advise."

During the report period seven issues arising from communications from the workers were considered at meetings of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Buro and Secretariat. The tasks for the further development and improvement of the work with citizens' letters were discussed in the majority of party gorkoms and raykoms and in several local party organizations.

At the same time during the report period serious shortcomings were revealed in the work with letters and petitions of workers in the Grigoriopolskiy, Nisporesnkiy, Komratskiy, Oknitskiy, Streshenskiy, and Chadyr-Lungskiy Party Raykoms. Here there were cases of an indifferent and inattentive approach to letters from the workers and to their needs and demands. Frequently, instead of considering the issues raised in the letters certain leaders limited themselves to formal replies that do not reflect the real state of affairs.

The organization of the reception of citizens in the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party has improved somewhat. Over four years the Central Committee has received 15,098 people. The reception of citizens has been organized in all the party gorkoms and raykoms, in which more than 69,000 visitors were received during the given period. During the report period there were 17 meetings of the Auditing Commission, including two joint meetings with the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party. At these we discussed questions of the financial and economic activity of the administration of affairs of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party and the work with letters and petitions from workers in divisions of the Central Committee and party gorkoms and raykoms. Each member of the commission had concrete instructions, repeatedly visited local areas, and rendered practical assistance to the auditing commissions of city and rayon party organizations.

But, comparing the level of auditing activity with actual results, one might say that in the republic party organization much is still proceeding along old lines and the Auditing Commission has been in a rut. For various reasons the possibilities for improving work and bringing it into line with the requirements of the present day are still not being fully utilized. There is not always

enough adherence to party principles in the evaluation of various phenomena or the ability to professionally come to the point of discussing matters. We cannot get rid of our outdated idea of our work as articulating and registering and not actively influencing the state of affairs.

Of greatest significance for the restoration of Leninist principles of improving control and audit work—and their essence amounts to the fact that not a single party organization and not a single worker in the party should be beyond supervision or beyond criticism—will be the formation of a unified control organ—the Control and Auditing Commission of the Moldavian Communist Party and the corresponding commissions elected at party conferences. Their activity will serve to provide reliable guarantees against subjectivism and arbitrariness, to strengthen party and state discipline, and to deepen democratism in life within the party.

Esteemed Comrade delegates! We are all following with great interest the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress, which will adopt the most important partywide documents. There is no doubt that the Communists of Soviet Moldavia will support and make a weighty contribution to their implementation.

Mutalibov Azerbaijan Plenum Speech on Ethnic Unrest, Party Renewal

90US0815A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIIY in Russian
1 Apr 90 pp 1-4

[Speech by A.N. Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, at the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Plenum on 31 March 1990: "On the Tasks of the Party Organizations with Respect to the Normalization of the Socio-Political Situation in the Republic"]

[Text] Comrades!

The Central Committee Plenum has assembled in an alarming situation. The Central Committee Bureau regards it as necessary to inform you about the latest events that have again aggravated the situation in the region, and about the measures that have been taken by the leadership.

As you know, beginning on 23 March, a series of terrorist attacks on the settlements of the republic was perpetrated by armed detachments of Armenian extremists in the regions bordering on Armenia.

The gangster groupings committed cruel acts of force and vandalism and fired on villages of the Nakhichevan ASSR, and Kazakhskiy, Tauzkiy, Kedabekskiy, Lachinskii, and Kubatlinskii regions. You know from the press reports about the victims among the peaceful population, the ravages, and the enormous material losses.

The internal affairs organs and military details have taken operational measures to defend the population, to put a stop to the attacks of the terrorists. A special scheme has been developed and is being implemented to

strengthen the sectors of the common border. To this end and to render harmless the members of the revolutionary fighting groups, additional subdivisions of the internal troops, the militia, and KGB staff members have been sent into the border regions of the republic. A number of other organizational and practical measures have been carried out, which have made it possible to repulse the provocateurs.

Under guard are 11 "bearded men", captured with weapons in their hands during the attack on the village of Alibeyli of Tauzskiy Rayon, 8 terrorists who were armed in the Kazakhskiy Rayon, and others. An investigation is being conducted, and no one among the gangsters will escape the deserved punishment.

What we have here, comrades, is undisguised aggression against a sovereign republic, the violation of a union treaty on which the relations in the Soviet federation are based. This is a challenge not only to the republic. This is a challenge to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is obligated to guarantee the security of Azerbaijan. This is a challenge also to presidential power, which is called on to guard the Constitution and which for this has been provided with all the powers.

I consider it necessary to report to the participants of the plenum that already on 22 March of this year, the leadership of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee informed the President of the USSR of the large provocation on the part of Armenia that was in preparation. After the armed attack, we sent a telegram to the country's leadership about the necessity of the immediate adoption, by the government, of a complex of measures to guarantee the security of the republic and to protect the life and property of the inhabitants of the border regions. As a result of our appeal, comrade V. Shatalin, first USSR deputy minister of internal affairs and chief of the Main Administration of Internal Troops of the country's Ministry of Internal Affairs, came to the place of the events. The leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR KGB was systematically informed about the course and development of the events.

In the declaration of the USSR people's deputies from Azerbaijan presented to the President of the country, M. S. Gorbachev, the deep resentment and indignation of the republic's workers about the provocative attacks were expressed and the restraint of the high-handed extremists was demanded.

On behalf of the deputy corps of the republic, questions were put to the minister of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, comrade V. Bakatin, and to the chairman of the USSR KGB, comrade V. Kryuchkov, at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet taking place in Moscow.

I would like to inform the participants of the plenum: A telegram has been sent to the provinces from comrade V. Bakatin, member of the USSR Presidential Council and

minister of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the order to introduce the state of emergency in 11 rayons of Armenia.

The recurrent outbreak of aggressive actions on the part of Armenia has the character of a well-organized provocation. There is no doubt that their purpose is to again explode the situation in our republic, to prevent the restoration of the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).

Without a doubt, this is the goal also of the—in terms of synchronicity—attempts of the separatist forces to again aggravate the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh through the illegal holding of a session of the oblast soviet, whose operation was stopped already a year ago. The provocative trouble these days has also been started in Shaumyanovskiy (rural) Rayon, whose leadership is pursuing a policy of separation in accordance with the scheme dashed off in the NKAO. In this connection, I would like to underscore that the republic has enough possibilities at its disposal in order not to permit the appearance of yet another breeding ground of tension. We will inform you about the measures that have been taken.

Comrades, the situation is extremely complicated. We do not want to conceal anything from the members of the Central Committee or to underestimate the danger.

The leadership of the Central Committee believes that the measures to guarantee the security of the republic's borders that are being taken by the center are patently inadequate. They do not provide any guarantee against new armed attacks, new and still greater sacrifices, against the expansion of the scales of aggression. It is possible that this will happen because of the underestimation of whole seriousness of this sinister provocation and its unpredictable consequences.

In connection with this, I propose to the participants of the plenum to adopt an appeal to the President of the USSR, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M. S. Gorbachev, with the demand to guarantee at once in full and final measure the protection of the constitutional rights of the Azerbaijan SSR, to put a stop to the aggressive encroachments of Armenia.

For the preparation of the text of the declaration, it is proposed to create an editorial commission. It is requested to submit suggestions concerning the composition of the commission to the Secretariat.

Comrades, from all of us, as never before, vigilance and again vigilance is required. This 2 years should teach us not to give in to provocations. We must, finally, understand very well that from the Armenian side everything is constantly being done to excite the situation, to draw our republic into an adventure in order to again blame everything on somebody else. And there to demand the introduction of presidential rule in Nagorno-Karabakh. This, as you understand, is the chief goal of all the events that have unfolded recently.

We assure that we will act resolutely and energetically, always remembering that the main thing—the honor and dignity of our people and the inviolability of the republic's borders.

During this entire period, certain forces in the neighboring republic did everything in order to excite the situation. They armed themselves, they seized weapons in state institutions and in military units. It is no secret that all of this was perpetrated with the connivance of the republic organs.

And here today, the newspaper IZVESTIYA reports an appeal of the Armenian CP Central Committee, the Presidium of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, and the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, calling upon the republic's population to stop the wave of arbitrariness and violence, to think about the future of the Armenian people. Well, we will hope that the fact of the acknowledgment of the essence of the events that are occurring indicates the beginning of sobering.

Comrades! I now proceed to the basic question of our plenum agenda.

The communists and workers of the republic connect with the work of the plenum the hope that its decisions will determine subsequent actions, will make it possible to fully master the situation and to direct into the channel of practical affairs and creation. Now the significance of the civic responsibility of everyone of us for what has happened and what is happening is growing as never before.

Allow me, on behalf of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Buro to present to the plenum the analysis of the situation and to share some thoughts on the ways to get out of the crisis.

Above all, we, communists, need to answer the main question, which is troubling the workers of the republic: Why is it that restructuring has not begun properly? Not having examined the real reasons behind the braking, we are unable to understand how we are to go on living.

Restructuring has opened the practical possibility of radical renewal and the overcoming of everything that led to stagnation. However, instead of the development of intense rectification work, in our republic, as before, they became confused in declarative slogans, appeals for struggle against the negative phenomena of the past not reinforced by anything. The appearance of dynamic growth was created, meanwhile the disproportions in the national economy became intensified and the economy increasingly lost its social orientation. Growing unemployment, social neglect, the lag of the well-being of the people behind the average union level in terms of many indicators—here is a far from complete picture of the background against which we began restructuring. Meanwhile the shadow economy increased its influence, many managerial structures became corrupted, and gross violations of the principles of social justice did not cease. All

this aggravated the general social state of people and the moral and political atmosphere in the republic.

Acknowledging its responsibility for the fate of the people, the Azerbaijan Communist Party tried to overcome the unhealthy tendencies and to impart dynamism to the transformations. The implementation of a radical economic reform began, the introduction of progressive forms of labor and management organization, lease relations, cooperative and individual labor activity. Some improvements were observed in the socio-economic sphere, in particular in food production, and in the improvement of the health care of the population.

In public life, a difficult process of rethinking our spiritual and moral values, our history, went on. People are learning openness, they increasingly participate in state life. And this is the main mark of restructuring and democratization, if you will, our important political capital.

Meanwhile it should be underscored that the acuteness and the dimensions of the problems that have come to light in the course of restructuring have proved to be much larger than could have been proposed. They were aggravated by new mistakes and miscalculations permitted during the reforming of the national economy. The Central Committee and the government of the republic, having become bogged down in the last few years in the problems of inter-nationality conflict thrust upon us, virtually withdrew from questions of the consolidation of the economy, as a result of which, in terms of many indicators, the republic slipped to the level of the pre-perestroika level. And this downward slide has not yet been stopped. Hence—an increase in social tension, the dissatisfaction of people with the course of restructuring, the disappointment with its ideas, and the decline of the authority of the party.

Self-critically, it must be acknowledged that the Central Committee Buro and the entire membership of the Central Committee were not able to put the practical demands advanced by life at the basis of a realistic policy.

Something else should be stated frankly. The policy of the republic party organization aimed at renewal encountered concealed and well-organized resistance of forces for whom changes and glasnost were a stick in their craw. Making use of the fact that the organs of power had appreciably weakened, and the new political institutions had not yet taken shape, they rushed into the battle for power. In so doing, making use of the possibility of democracy for the destabilization of society, the creation of a situation of lawlessness, anarchy, the moral and physical terror of the population, and the erosion of foundations.

In this situation, the informal organizations began to exert an ever increasing influence on the socio-political situation. Having arisen on the wave of democratization and nation-wide support for restructuring, they could have deepened the positive processes in the republic, but

in actual fact they played a destructive role. Under the cover of pseudo-patriotic slogans and demands for a fair solution of the "Karabakh question", they created their structures in the labor collectives, state and public organizations, penetrated the mass media, and formed parallel organs. They added to their armor the methods of political manipulations of the sentiments of the masses and crude, forceful pressure.

This became all the more dangerous and intolerable because extremist, nationalist, anti-Soviet groupings, and openly criminal elements dragged themselves into the arena. As never before, the population felt its lack of protection, alarm, and uncertainty about tomorrow. During 13-16 January 1990, in Baku, mass disorders became possible in the situation of impunity and inactivity of the law enforcement organs. The investigation agencies, which conduct careful examinations, will name the perpetrators and organizers of these outrages and acts of violence, and they will bear the deserved punishment.

The workers of the republic have resolutely and angrily condemned these criminal actions. An attempt on the life of a man cannot be justified under any circumstances and is incompatible with the morality and the humanistic traditions of the Azerbaijan people.

Pogroms, murders, robberies, the blocking of roads, administrative buildings, and military units, the seizure of weapons and military equipment, the illegal collection of funds, threats of revenge against cadres, and the practical subjection of transport and communications—those are some of the features of the real situation of those days in Baku and many regions, which became virtually ungovernable and highly explosive.

There demonstrative declarations of intentions to establish power in Baku on the model of Dzhalilabad and Lenkoran. Members of revolutionary fighting groups from the republic's rayons gathered in the city. And, indeed, all remember under what pretext the members of informal groups armed themselves—allegedly for the protection of the border regions. However, while blood was being shed there, these "patriots" publicly called for physical violence against the communists and their families and for the armed overthrow of power. In this situation, the introduction of the state of emergency in Baku became inevitable.

The stubborn resistance to the lifting of the blockade of military sub-units and the completely inexplicable creation of a living cordon in the streets indicates that the leaders of the extremists were afraid to lose the chance of a coup in Baku. And in vain they now broadcast to the world through Western radio stations that the troupes were brought into Baku to suppress the democratic movement, to conduct elections to the Soviets with the help of bayonets. The republic's Communist Party resolutely rejects these false conjectures and again declares its readiness to cooperate with any democratic forces standing on the platform of restructuring.

All the circumstances of the introduction of troops and the reasons for the tragic events of 20 January were studied by the commission created at the preceding Central Committee plenum. The preliminary conclusions of the commission will be reported to the plenum.

Condemning the totally unjustified cruelty in regard to the civil population, the evident extremes which accompanied the bringing in of the troops, and the constitutional violations during the proclamation of the state of emergency, we must at the same time have the courage to look truth into the eye and to give an objective assessment to everything that has happened. Today it must be openly said that, in the—by its character and acuteness—unprecedented political situation, the Communist Party of the republic, its party committees, and its primary party organizations did not prove to be at unequal to the task. The political dependence that was permitted turned into serious mistakes: In the provinces, they counted on the republic organs, and they, in turn, put their hopes on the decisiveness of the center. The development of the events showed the unacceptability of this passive, temporizing position.

Also mentioned should be the fact that the party committees, not having comprehended in good time the changes of public sentiments, for too long ignored the dialogue with the new public organizations. This, in particular, was manifested in the interrelations with the People's Front of Azerbaijan. The Central Committee of the party did, in fact, fail to express its, I would say, collegial attitude to it, failed to declare unequivocally what in its tasks and actions was acceptable and what was not. Although this was necessary. This necessity was dictated by the contradictions in the character of the movement, the heterogeneity of its membership, and the inconsistent and frequently incorrect conduct of the leaders of the front. This created a situation where the way out became increasingly more difficult every time.

This manifested itself more graphically on the eve of the tragic events in Baku. The leaders of the NFA [People's Front of Azerbaijan], the members of the so-called Council of National Defense, N. Panakhov, E. Mamedov, and some others were invited into the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee by comrades Primakov, Girenko, Mutalibov, and Orudzhev. In a discussion with the NFA leaders, serious claims were made with respect to the anti-constitutional activity, departure from democratic methods, and sliding toward anti-Sovietism. However, they actually remained deaf to these warnings, having this time, too, manifested their adherence to the methods of dictate and resistance. During the last week before the tragic events, extremist forces, without authorization, established posts on the republic's highways, checked passers-by, and blocked the approaches to the city. On 19 January of this year, an attempt was made to once again convince and explain to E. Mamedov and R. Kaziyeu that the blockade of military units carrying out orders is inadmissible, that it heats up the situation, that it is fraught with conflict, that the path and the means they have chosen will lead to a catastrophe, and that it is

necessary to avert this at any price. However, they again threatened to attain their goals with force. What this led to, we all know now very well.

The investigation, which is being conducted by the competent organs, reveals the true motives and the intentions of those who have urged the people to bloodshed, names specific names and the measure of responsibility for everything that has happened.

People are beginning to realize into what precipice adventurist slogans, extremist appeals, and political shortsightedness could lead. However, we do not see on the part of the People's Front a critical attitude toward their actions, the demonstrative violation of the agreement and the obligations assumed and signed during registration. Moreover, the impression is taking shape that, as before, preference is being given to confrontation. Is really incomprehensible that such a position leads to the division of the nation, weakens it, and inflicts enormous damage to the statehood of Azerbaijan.

Comrades, in analyzing the latest events, we should talk about everything that has happened in our party house. For the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, the members of the Buro, and the secretaries of the Central Committee, can raise their political authority only if the assessment of their activity will be strict and exacting. Was everything done by the political leadership of the republic to avert, to stop the dangerous development of events? I will say frankly, no. How much was overlooked, how much time and effort was spent to no purpose, instead of acting, and moreover acting energetically and resolutely.

I think it will be correct, first of all, to analyze the activity of the Central Committee Buro, to determine the measure of its responsibility for the serious mistakes that were tolerated. The main one of them is the fact that the Buro did not make a timely assessment of the many events and phenomena which seriously influenced the development of the situation. And when this happened, the analysis in many cases did not have sufficient concreteness, depth, and adherence to principle.

Already in the summer of last year, the socio-political situation demanded serious and thorough discussion at the Central Committee plenum. However, it was postponed all the time and, as a result, it was not held, although the events already had assumed a threatening course. The situation could not be corrected by meetings of the party and economic activists, different conferences which were prepared in a hurry, suffered from superficiality, were limited in terms of information, and did not give clear-cut recommendations for work at the local level in the new, extraordinary conditions.

The Central Committee Buro did not show readiness to assume responsibility for the adoption of independent decisions in regard to the "Karabakh problem". The majority of the documents sinned through pretentiousness, through looking back at the center, and they did not

take into account the opinions of the public. Not without reason, people saw in this the neglect of the interests of the republic, thereby auspicious conditions were created for political speculations and the growth of extremism.

The first draft of mistrust in connection with the "Karabakh problem" was presented to the Central Committee Buro already in September 1988. However, neither then, nor subsequently, when at meetings loud demands were already heard for the resignation of the leadership, essential correctives in the organizational and political work of the Central Committee and the party committees in the provinces were not introduced. The actions of the Central Committee Buro, figuratively speaking, came only to the putting out of local fires.

The Central Committee Buro did not succeed in attaining a change in the ideological, in the entire ideological-political work of the party committees and the propaganda services. Above all, the proper party influence on the mass media was not secured. The moment was overlooked when the primary party organizations of the journalists in the editorial boards of the party newspapers and journals, the State Committee for Television and Radio, and the publishing house "Kommunist" began to yield positions. Many of the television and radio broadcasts did not have sufficient political maturity, balance, and objectivity; moreover, they inflamed unhealthy emotions, some of them bore an openly anti-governmental character. All this, in essence, remained outside the field of vision of the Central Committee, which did not take the requisite measures to radically change the situation in the editorial collectives, to reinforce them with journalistic cadres holding clear-cut party positions.

In general, it should be noted that the style of the work of the Central Committee secretaries, in essence, changed very little. As before, the living work was replaced by endless conferences and telephone discussions. Life itself suggested the organization of work proceeding from a new look at the principle of democratic centralism, through the primary party organizations, for it is precisely in them that the opposition of opinions went on, that new views and positions were formed. Not having created a reliable union between the leading and the lower link, we virtually abandoned the primary party organizations to the arbitrariness of the meeting element. And, perhaps, it is precisely here that the root of many of our misfortunes and ill fate is found. The Buro and Secretariat of the Central Committee did not secure the activity properly, they did not occupy a firmly offensive position, and the departments of the Central Committee and the Party Control Commission at the Central Committee frequently manifested passiveness and sluggishness.

Clearly, a great deal in the development of the political line of the Central Committee Buro, its style and methods depends on the personality of the first secretary. The communists and the broad public connected great hopes with the election of A. Kh. Vezirov to this

post in May 1988. And not only because the republic had been struck by a serious inter-nationality conflict, from which they did not find a practical way out. It seemed that the new leader will be able to improve the situation, to lead the communists in overcoming the long-standing problems in the socio-economic and spiritual sphere. And his first steps and declarations inspired confidence in this.

However, instead of starting the democratic mechanisms of perestroika at full capacity, A. Kh. Vezirov acted through the methods of subjectivism, one-man management, and political improvisation. His style of work was affected by elements of conceit and superficiality. Many decisions, including decisions of political and state significance, were taken by him individually.

It is impossible not to state that the former first secretary of the Central Committee failed to recognize the necessity of the struggle for the purity of party ranks, the struggle with corrupt clans, the mafia, protectionism, the struggle for the strengthening of social justice. There were quite a few declarations to this effect, however decisive actions were clearly inadequate.

Of course, all of this aggravated the atmosphere in the Central Committee Buro and had a negative effect on its capacity for work and authority. In many respects, the mistrust in the leadership of the republic that has appeared among people and the unpopularity of many decisions taken by it are connected in many respects precisely with this. Here must be sought the reasons also of many miscalculations and mistakes that have created additional tension in the republic as a whole and especially in its capital.

But everything that happened in Baku had a decisive influence on the situation in other regions. The Baku Party Gorkom was unable to master the situation, to take it under control, and to rouse the entire aktiv to the suppression of the disturbances. Unfortunately, the actions of the party gorkom and raykoms forged passivity, in essence they kept themselves aloof from what was happening.

In such an extreme situation, the city party organization needed an authoritative leader possessing fighting and organizational qualities. Alas, M. R. Mamedov, the former first secretary of the Central Committee Buro, did not prove to be such a leader. Having been out of touch with party work and active participation in the life of the city party organization for a long time, he, having headed it, he was unable to rise above the old conceptions, to reform himself. Perhaps it was for this reason that M. P. Mamedov virtually ignored the experience accumulated by the Baku communists, especially with respect to the overcoming of crisis situations. We remember, do we not, a year earlier it proved possible to safeguard Baku from the outburst of extremism, to liquidate the flashes of inter-nationality conflicts.

The BK [Baku Committee] Plenum regarded it as necessary to strengthen the leadership of the city party

organization. We would hope that the gorkom buro and the party aktiv of the city will draw serious conclusions from what has happened and will lead the struggle for the normalization of the situation in the capital, the restoration of the authority of the organization of Baku communists.

All of us, comrades, are pained and alarmed by the state of affairs, by the still unhealthy moral-psychological atmosphere in Baku. It is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that the indigenous residents of Baku are leaving the city, its intellectual potential and cultural life are growing scanty. Whole labor collectives are virtually disintegrating, human relations are broken, we are losing workers' traditions and dynasties, skilled specialists. Is it necessary to talk about what losses all of this will turn into already in the not distant future. And in what shape will we leave to our children their native Baku, to which multilingual speech, the cordiality and kindness of its inhabitants, the diversity of cultures of different peoples, and the genuine internationalism of attitudes imparted uniqueness. Future generations will not forgive us the loss of these remarkable traditions of Baku residents.

Comrades, our party positions have proved to be weak in the village as well. Having encountered unaccustomed problems, not having clear-cut political directions and reference-points, many party raykoms let themselves be led by the events, easily yielded their positions, here and there not only lost their heads, but simply lost heart, having essentially resigned themselves to the seizure of power.

The Agdzhabedinskiy Party Raykom virtually lost the confidence of the population, not having endured the pressure of the anti-perestroyka forces. In many respects, the style of work of its former first secretary, A. Alyev, who manifested rudeness, intolerance of criticism, and localistic tendencies, led to this. Because of connivance, the rayon has been in a state of fever for a month and a half, the population has been terrorized by competing groupings, and today the situation here is tense.

E. Agayev, the former first secretary of the raykom, was not able to stop the crisis that had mounted. Having utilized the outburst of the just dissatisfaction of the population, a group of dubious persons destroyed the raykom, having made an attempt on the life of the new first secretary and having practically carried out a coup.

In the Dzhalilabad incident, as in a drop of water, were reflected both the inability of many party officials to act in extreme conditions and the helplessness of the Central Committee, and many hidden destructive currents which had ripened in the republic in the general situation of destabilization.

A great deal is now becoming clear. And the question cannot but arise: How do such adventurists appear in the political arena as a certain Bakhramov, who pushed people into unlawful actions in Dzhalilabad? Why were such rogues, who for a long time had parasitized the

sacred feelings of the people, who had defamed party and soviet cadres, not rebuffed as they should have been? Incidentally, having felt that he would have to bear responsibility for what had been done, Bakhramov tried to escape across the destroyed border into Iran, having taken with him almost 3 million rubles, which had been obtained through extortion from the population.

The events in Lenkoran unfolded in accordance with an analogous scenario. Here, too, the renewal of the leadership of the gorkom did not lead to the improvement of the situation. A. Ragimov, who was sent from Baku, now already the former first secretary, proved to be clearly unprepared for the role of party leader, did not understand the situation, neither people nor the local problems. Ya. Rzayev, who had replaced him after a few months, in his turn, manifested lack of adherence to principle and conducted a policy of compromise. As a result, on the first demand of the extremists, the party and soviet organs of Lenkoran easily and without resistance gave up power.

All of these incidents, comrades, again convince us that the time has come long ago to repudiate the vicious practice of the replacement of elected posts through appointment [naznachenchestvo], of rash practical conclusions. The practice of promoting to the leadership of rayons only their natives also did not prove its value. Life showed that thereby communal [zemlyacheskiye] tendencies, which we try so hard to overcome, become unintentionally more intensified. Helplessness and confusion were manifested in the work of Agdamskiy and Yevlakhskiy party gorkoms, and of Belokanskiy, Imishlinskiy, Lerikskiy, Akhsuinskiy, Sabirabadskiy, and Khanlarskiy party raykoms (comrades A. Kuliyeu, N. Mamedov, B. Islamov, G. Kambay, Z. Rustamova, A. Kaffarova, V. Seidov, and G. Iskenderov). But, you see, many of them are experienced party officials, who have been in the republic party organization for a long time.

A difficult situation took shape in the Nakhichevan Party Organization. It was unable to mobilize properly and in the end was led by openly anti-perestroyka forces. Precisely under their direct pressure in a highly explosive situation, called forth by the blockade of the autonomous republic, the unconstitutional decision of the Nakhichevan ASSR Supreme Soviet concerning its withdrawal from membership in the USSR was taken, which, it is true, was rescinded after 3 days.

This is a lesson not only for the Nakhichevan communists. It showed once again that decisions of state importance, which determine the fate of the people, cannot be taken under pressure, under the influence of emotions and momentary sentiments. Compromise in the final analysis will lead to political bankruptcy.

Many now explain their miscalculations by the lack of work experience in extraordinary conditions, pressure and threats. However, administrators and party committees were found, which did not give in to blackmail, which maintained the party positions, and were able to

show political will. And they, about which I want to speak with satisfaction, were the majority. The Ali-Bayramlinskiy Gorkom, the Agdashskiy, Kubinskiy, Udzharskiy, Geokchayskiy, Shemakhinskiy, Shamkhorskiy, Kyudamirskiy, Kutkashenskiy, Zardobskiy, Beylaganskiy, Zakatalskiy, Saatlinskiy, Divichinskiy, and a number of other party raykoms came out of the trial strengthened, having been able to unite the healthy forces, to defend restructuring.

The events of the recent period compel us to look in a new fashion at the work of the primary party organizations. Many of them have proved to be in such a state of ideological fermentation that it would not be difficult to drag them away, using Leninist words, into a political swamp. Is this not why they did not make the appropriate party assessment of the incidents of the heating up of inter-nationality discord, instigation to strikes, and the destabilization of the situation.

Today we must present a serious bill for their unprincipled position to the administrators and primary party organizations of the associations Azerelektromash (general manager E. Aliverdiyev, secretary of the party committee G. Aliyev); Azerelektrosvet (V. Dzhililov, E. Shiriyev); Ulduz (N. Nasrullayev, G. Mamedov); Bakstankoprom (P. Ismailov, A. Ganifayev); Geofizpribor (I. Efendiyev, A. Yakubov); Khimprom (F. Saldykov, F. Ismaylov); Orgsintez (N. Babayev, R. Dzhaferov); the Plant imeni ley. Shmidt (A. Musayev, Kh. Gyulaliyev); the subdivisions of Glavbakstroy (R. Gyulmamedov, M. Tukanov), the Baku and Nakhichevan departments of the railroad (V. Mamedov, Kh. Guseynov, M. Faradzhev, and T. Godzhayev), and many others.

In this connection, I would like to dwell especially on the—for the republic party committee—unprecedented phenomenon, which the incidents of the mass surrender of party cards. Of course, many were driven to this desperate step by the exceptional nature of the moment, the tragedy of the events, and the outraged feelings of the people, but there also proved to be those among them who did not understand the essence of what had happened, who were confused, and who manifested cowardice. We will not explain the action of the secretaries and members of the bureau of the Mingechaurskiy Party Gorkom, who burned their party cards in public.

402 secretaries of primary party organizations surrendered their CPSU membership cards. This, of course, is alarming, but such incidents may also be regarded as the natural purification of the ranks of the party, which has happened repeatedly at sudden turning-points of its history.

Having gotten rid of morally immature elements, the party will only add to its authority. At the same time, we also see something else. There are quite a number of illustrations to the effect that the surrender of party tickets in many respects is the consequence of the planned and organized actions of certain forces.

The Azerbaijan Communist Party was and remains the ruling party, the guarantor of restructuring, under its guidance the process of democratic relations, which is vitally necessary to our republic and our people, is consolidated. And no one has the right to defame the members of the party, compelling them through threats and blackmail to surrender their party cards. In the political struggle, such methods are compatible neither with democracy nor with the convictions of communists.

Yes, we declare that the party is sharing power, but the party will not give up power; it has taken part and will take part in the administration of the state and society.

The Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Plenum that took place at the end of January showed the mobilizing influence on the activity of the party organizations introducing an improvement in the moral-political atmosphere in the republic. The meetings [as published] of the members of the Central Committee Bureau with the labor collectives and representatives of labor collectives made it possible to remove stress and spiritual confusion from people and was conducive to the organization of a constructive dialogue with the various strata and groups of the population. Gradually the work rhythm of the republic was normalized, the workers of the collective developed the struggle to overcome the lag that had been permitted.

Many party committees analyzed their actions critically, were able to give a principled assessment of the conduct of individual communists and economic managers. They made quite a lot of efforts to put a stop to the strikes, which had inflicted enormous losses on the republic, and to stabilize the situation.

The management of a number of Central Committee departments, party committees, and Soviet organs has been strengthened. And this work in regard to the purification of the cadre corps, its reinforcement. [as published]

The Central Committee Bureau discussed the question of the activity of party, soviet, and law enforcement organs of the city of Baku and gave it a principled assessment.

We regard everything that has been done during this short period as the beginning of the radical transformations, which should be given an irreversible character.

Comrades! Regardless of the point of view from which we examine the crisis processes in the republic, we must inevitably return to the "Karabakh problem." Now it is already fully clear that, without having undone this tight conflictual knot, it is impossible to secure the stabilization of the situation, the settlement of the inter-nationality relations in the region.

The events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and around it, which have grown, like a snow ball, have taken too much strength from all of us and have diverted the republic from creative activity and the solution of urgent social problems. The consequences of

these difficult years, replete with drama, will still be felt by us for a long time to come.

About the reasons and the pre-history of the conflict, quite a bit has been said at various levels. At present I want to dwell only on some fundamentally important factors, which, remaining in the shadow for a long time, exerted decisive influence on the whole course of the development of events in the region. From the very beginning, the conflict was qualified as an inter-nationality conflict. However, the real underlying reason of this political adventure, skillfully fitted into perestroika, was obvious: The seizure of part of the historical territory of a sovereign republic.

These claims, it should be noted, arose previously as well, and, as a rule, at critical turning-points of our country's history, during the replacement of its political leadership. But invariably, they met with a rebuff on the part of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee and the center, as being in fundamental contradiction with the principles of the Soviet federation and the very foundations of Soviet statehood. There was always a clear understanding that, if we were to permit such a precedent, a chain reaction would take place, fraught with unpredictable inter-nationality collisions. Unfortunately, 2 years ago such an unequivocal reaction and understanding did not follow.

It is no secret that the present separatist campaign was preceded by long and careful preparation. For many years, the nationalist cultivation of the Armenian population of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was conducted. Distortions of historical facts and the falsification of well-known documents, as well as all sorts of chauvinist publications, insulting to the Azerbaijan people, began to circulate. However, all of these unworthy actions, which sowed inter-nationality discord and enmity, were left without attention on the part of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee.

For many years, the internationalist principles of personnel policy were grossly violated. The representation of the Azerbaijan minority in the party committees, the Soviets, the trade unions, and the Komsomol, as well as in the militia and people's control organs, in short, along the entire vertical of power, did not correspond to the percentage correlation of the population.

The impression is taking place that the leadership of the republic during that period preferred to hush up, to drive deep the urgent problem, as, by the way, many others as well. Is this not why the politicians overlooked the illegal outburst in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in February 1988? But, you see, already several months before this, the Central Committee was informed about the extensive dissemination of leaflets of nationalist content, the collection of signatures, and petitions in Moscow.

The party and state organs of Azerbaijan manifested a superficial, let us speak frankly, an irresponsible approach and, after the aggravation of the situation,

inability to control and in good time to stop the provocative tricks, basing themselves on the force of law and the Constitution.

Of course, the Central Committee undertook steps aimed at relaxation and the organization of a constructive dialogue. In 2 years more than 60 decrees of the Buro and Secretariat of the Central Committee, connected in one way or another with the "Karabakh problem", were adopted. They also reflect a correct internationalist position, there are sensible thoughts and ideas. But, unfortunately, many documents were adopted after the events, were not reinforced with decisive actions, and for this reason remained on paper.

This indecisiveness and the fear to assume responsibility are explained to a certain extent by the lack of work experience in crisis situations, by the habit of shifting the solution of difficult questions to the center, of [as published] the expectation of instructions from above. Unfortunately, this syndrome of the past brought us quite a few misfortunes.

An unpardonable mistake was the fact that from the very beginning the center permitted open interference in the internal affairs of the republic. Already in the spring of 1988, in a well-known decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, the participation of the Armenian SSR in the realization of the plans for the socio-economic development of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was legalized. This laid the foundation for the resubordination of the industrial enterprises, to the practical withdrawal of the oblast from the political and economic structure of Azerbaijan.

This process became still more intensified during the period of the activity of the Committee for Special Administration. It should be recognized that, during its creation, a violation of a constitutional provision was permitted, which was not followed by the proper reaction of the republic leadership. Moreover, it was transferred to the Committee for Special Administration, and subsequently it simply kept itself aloof from the government of the autonomous oblast. The further escalation of separatism was a logical consequence of such a position.

Unfortunately, these aspirations were encouraged by the unconstitutional decisions of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet. The oblast was saturated with weapons and ammunition, here detachments of members of revolutionary fighting organizations were brought, which unleashed terror against the peaceful population. These already were the ominous signs of the armed seizure of the territory.

The broad public of both the republic and the country, as before, were ignorant of the true dimensions and goals of the adventure, which was camouflaged under restructuring processes and democratization. Meanwhile it was suggested to the people that Nagorny Karabakh continues to remain part of the territory of the republic and the problem is being solved.

But objectivity requires me to say that the center during all this time made efforts to try to understand what was happening, to achieve reconciliation and a political settlement. In rendering this enormous and difficult work its due, we believe—and with full justification—that the conflict would not have taken on such a protracted character, would not have ended in an internationality tragedy, had the country's leadership, basing itself on the Constitution and on Soviet laws, always acted decisively, in a principled manner, and consistently. For too long and too persistently in the solution of this extraordinary problem, they set their hopes only on political means, although the situation itself required the use of power as well.

The gap between the declarative announcements and practical actions, the connivance through the trampling of the Constitution, and the aspiration to observe a balance of the guilt of both sides—precisely this gave rise, among the population of Azerbaijan, of the feeling of protest and deep resentment, the crisis of confidence in the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the political leadership of the country and the republic.

Today it must be noted with regret that the center, having assumed the basic powers in the settlement of the conflict, has not regarded it as necessary to carry out a profound historical-political analysis of its reasons. This could have removed many questions and gotten rid of all possible speculations agitating the public. But, you see, in the case of the Baltic, this is precisely how they acted. Is this not why the feeling arises that, if the interests of the Union are affected, the center acts exhaustively? But when the issue is the sovereignty of a republic, such concern is not manifested?

The Karabakh crisis taught us a great deal, comrades. We learned a lot ourselves. The chief lesson consists of the following: Bearing full responsibility for the fate of the people, we do not have the right to forget about the national interests, to shift to whomever the solution of the fundamental problems of the republic.

Now briefly about what the situation in Nagorny Karabakh is today and what is being done for its further normalization. The basis of this very difficult work is the well-known decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 28 November 1989. This important document, as you will remember, was perceived as unequivocal in our republic as well.

Of course, not everything in it is indisputable. A number of points call forth objections, in particular about the creation of a control and observation commission and approaches based on parity. Precisely this was pointed out in the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. But, for all that, the decree, it seems, creates the prerequisites for the restoration of the legal rights of the republic in the autonomous oblast. Basing itself on its fundamentally important provisions, and above all on the instrument of sovereignty—the

Republic Organization Committee, we can and must realize the projected complex of measures.

The Republic Organization Committee for Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in incredibly difficult conditions succeeded in doing what we did not have in the last year or the year before last. In close cooperation with the military commandant's office, roads were opened, trains moved, the Sarsangskiy Gidrouzel [integrated water power development] operated at full capacity, and there was an increase in assistance to Azerbaijan villages. And these are only the first motions.

However, the attempts to put an end to the confrontation and to normalize life encounter the fierce resistance of subversive forces. Rejecting cooperation, the separatists, as before, nurture plans for the seizure of the oblast, compress the situation, exerting constant pressure on the center.

In spite of the repeated and persistent demands of the republic, the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 6 May 1989, which legalized the re-subordination of the enterprises of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, has not been abolished up to now.

The complete disarmament and cleansing of the oblast of members of revolutionary fighting organizations, who keep the population in fear, is the paramount task. With this goal in mind, it is necessary to raise the question of the co-subordination of the contingent of internal troops in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to the Republic Organization Committee in order not to lose time for all possible agreements. It is necessary for the republic law enforcement organs to make maximum use of the opportunity of the emergency situation in the autonomous oblast. The party committees and the soviet and economic organs must make the transition to the phase of decisive actions so as to restore in actual fact the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. And this should be done decisively, without delay, first of all in the Azerbaijan villages. Figuratively speaking, all patriots of Azerbaijan ought to become members of the Republic Organization Committee.

The refugee problems is one of the most tragic consequences of inter-nationality conflict. The Azerbaijan people, showing compassion and spiritual generosity to the people who found themselves in misfortune, accepted them in their soil. Urgent measures to provide amenities for the immigrants are being carried out by the government of the republic, party and economic organs. A great deal of assistance on this plane has been given by our charitable societies, and I would like to express sincere gratitude to them for this.

All of this made it possible to lower somewhat the acuteness of the problem, but not to remove it. For it is so complex and multifaceted that it does not seem possible to solve it through the efforts of the republic. It has been calculated that no less than 2.5 billion rubles are needed for the full provision of amenities for the

more than 200,000 refugees who have arrived in Azerbaijan. The corresponding needs connected with the material-technical supply have been submitted to the union organs. It is necessary for the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan to show greater persistence in the solution of the question of the allotment of assistance to the republic.

I believe that the plenum has the right to express dissatisfaction with the activity of the government in this question. We have repeatedly informed it both in writing and verbally, in what poor situation Azerbaijan has proved to be through no fault of its own. However, we are not experiencing effective assistance, on the contrary—we see what delays are put in the way, and then there is simply the manifestation of the unwillingness to solve question that do not tolerate delays. But you see, we are not demanding anything superfluous, only the most necessary to provide amenities for the refugees.

A special role is being assigned to the recently created republic committee for refugee affairs, whose work should be increased. Unfortunately, the decree of the republic government on the distribution of the immigrants in rural regions, adopted already during the past year, has not been implemented. Moreover, increasingly more refugees have begun to accumulate in Baku. But, you know, these people have been engaged in peasant labor all their life, but what will they do in the unaccustomed conditions of a large city? It should be acknowledged that from the very beginning a strategic mistake was permitted in the questions of the distribution of refugees, a mistake which cannot be aggravated.

Comrades! The destabilization of the socio-political situation in the republic revealed with all acuteness the chronic maladies, the incompetence of many of our state institutions and political structures, and the low professional level of the management link. All this was especially clearly manifested in the activity of the law enforcement organs, which in essence overlooked the emergence of anti-social processes and were unable to stop the dangerous development of events, to neutralize the criminal elements. The protection of law and order was organized extremely unsatisfactorily. Of course, it is impossible to disregard the fact that the personnel of the militia already for the second year is operating in conditions of an increased moral, psychological and physical load. And those should be rendered their due who honestly carry out their duty.

At the same time, during the period of mass disturbances the internal affairs organs again turned out to be virtually paralyzed, they were not able to rebuff the thugs [pogromshchiki]. Being captive to falsely understood ideas of patriotic duty, many militia officers occupied a temporizing position and were led by destructive elements. Incidents of cowardice and treason are directly connected with the immoral conduct, the low official discipline of the staff members of the internal affairs organs, which we condoned for too long. But, you see, day after day this undermined their authority, and

consequently also the authority of power, which they represent and are called upon to defend.

The collegium of the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs could not mobilize their personnel for energetic actions to stop the crimes. The leadership of the ministry in the extreme situation looked simply helpless, incapable of to take decisions independently. This is a consequence, first of all, of the perversions in the selection, placing, and training of cadres. Being responsible for this important sector, the former deputy minister M. Ilyasov, who himself turned up in this post on the basis of protection, allowed unscrupulousness in promotion, and indulged in the clogging up of the organs with chance officials, unfit in terms of their moral-political and professional qualities. How can one in earnest speak about the high responsibility of those who have been entrusted with the protection and security of people if during the last 2 years alone 250 staff members of the militia have been punished for the violation of socialist legality.

The complete downfall in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is directly connected with the stagnation in party and political work. The political organs and the primary party organizations of the militia collectives engaged in window-dressing, in chatter, and lost touch with the concrete tasks of increasing the battle readiness of the sub-units.

Inconsistency was demonstrated by the Internal Affairs Administration of the city of Baku and its former head N. Kerimov, whose low professional qualities aggravated by conceit and political unconcern. What else can one call the departure, at the end of the past year—at the very height of the events—almost a whole delegation of the Baku Internal Affairs Administration for a fascinating tour abroad.

The gross miscalculations in the work of the militia were immediately utilized by the criminal world. We became witnesses of the growth of the organization and mass armament of the criminals of all colors, of their fusion with corrupted clans. And it is no coincidence that during the past year alone crime in the republic increased by 14 percent, including its most serious types—by almost one-third. The struggle against the underground bosses, the operators of the shadow economy has been dislodged, the sources of finance of the political adventurers and criminal groups are not being exposed.

And with all this, the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has constantly put on a good face to the effect that the republic, in terms of the level of crime, against the background of all-union indicators looked, as it were, favorable. These false conceptions only disoriented the public and created an atmosphere of complacency. It is necessary to resolutely get rid of such sentiments.

In conditions when the decisions of the authorities were demonstratively not implemented and the law was impudently challenged, the organs of the Azerbaijan SSR Procuracy also proved to be unprepared for the execution of their functions. During all this time we thus did not receive from them concrete proposals and actions aimed at the strengthening of legality and law and order. We will say further that the tactic of the non-interference of many responsible officials of the procuracy was a deviation from the fulfillment of their official duty. Even during the period of the aggravation of the situation, practically no one among the extremists guilty of this were officially warned or had administrative, not to speak of criminal, proceedings instituted against them.

In general, the activity of the organs of the procuracy have called forth many criticism for a long time. The structures of organized crime and the leaders of the mafia groups that are forming remain outside its purview. What is the problem, why the lack of professionalism, adherence to principles, and honest among procuracy officials?

As a result of the lack of the requisite supervision of the republic Procuracy over the activity of the investigation groups, a number of so-called "cotton affairs" stretched out for many years. Many complaints about violations of legality during investigation are being received, for example, from Kasum-Ismailovskiy Rayon. Here already more than 10,000 people have been questioned, including many school children, and the end of the case is not yet in sight.

We are for the intensification of the struggle against the plunderers of socialist property, but with the strict observance of legality and the rights of citizens.

All these serious shortcomings are far from accidental. They have deep roots connected with the absence of a self-critical stance and the loss, by some responsible officials, of their party and civic positions.

Considerable claims should be made against the Azerbaijan SSR KGB, which was unable to properly protect the constitutional order of the republic from the criminal encroachments of anti-socialist forces. Unfortunately, for a long time professionally unsuitable and politically immature officials found themselves in the organs of state security. And this could not but blunt the effectiveness of the work on the prevention of anti-social actions, the attacks of extremist groupings.

At a recent session, the Central Committee Buro presented a serious claim against the entire law enforcement system. The leadership of the republic's Ministry of Internal Affairs is being strengthened, a number of responsible officials of the law and order organs are being punished. It was especially underscored that inaction in regard to violators of the law and the instigators of disturbances will henceforth, too, be regarded as failure to fulfill official duty, incompatible with further work in these organs.

The reduction in the effectiveness of the law enforcement organs to no small degree is connected with the weakening of their relations with the party committees. The raykoms and gorkoms of the party, while not interfering in the practical activity of the courts, the procuracy, the and the militia, at the same time are obligated to try to attain the strict implementation by them of the party policy aimed at the strengthening of legality and law and order.

Comrades! If what happened in Azerbaijan we call a political crisis, it is equally necessary to openly acknowledge also the presence of a spiritual crisis, an ideological crisis. The manifestation of ideological instability and the devaluation of moral values has ripened long ago, and restructuring only revealed and demonstrated the unsoundness of our ideological services.

The system of party and propaganda work, which still quite recently seemed harmonious and well-adjusted, in the changed conditions, to put it mildly, started to slip. The party committees did not switch over in good time to the democratic wave, did not get rid of the stereotypes and dogmas that eaten into flesh and blood. The large detachment of lecturers, propagandists, and agitators in actual fact proved to be not so numerous and, moreover, poorly armed.

The intelligentsia of the republic proved to be unprepared for the radical changes in public life. Rendering its intellectual contribution to the development of the spiritual potential of the people and to the awakening of the national consciousness its due, it must at the same time be acknowledged that part of the leading figures in science and culture did not find themselves and did not determine their place and role in the new conditions. The low level of political culture, the lack of development of democratic traditions, and the at times narrow-nationalist approaches to the perception of important social problems and phenomena had an effect.

With regret it must be stated that many representatives of the intelligentsia enjoying great authority among the people could not understand the difficult situation that had taken shape, occupy the correct position, and head up healthy forces.

This was painfully reflected in the moral-psychological atmosphere of the educational institutions. The natural patriotic feelings of the young people and the unconsolidated world view were used for drawing them into the maelstrom of the political game.

It would seem it would benefit V. Gadzhiev, the specialist for foreign literature, professor of Baku University, more to bring up the students on the great humanistic traditions of human civilization than in the name of his own ambitious aspirations to draw it into meeting passions and to push it into unlawful actions. The same kind of disgraceful example of degeneration, moral duplicity, and treason to the duty of spiritual mentor was the conduct of the former director of School No 42, N. Aliyev, and teachers of School No 104, A. Nadirov, and

of SPTU [Rural Vocational-Technical School]-71, M. Mekhtiyev, and others. And they did their improper actions before the eyes of the pedagogical collectives and communists. Why did no one straighten out these excuses for educators, stop them and hold them responsible?

The Ministry of Education of the republic (comrade R. B. Feysullayev) and the party committees must make a thorough analysis of pedagogical and all ideological-educational work in the educational institutions, to carry out an exacting certification of the professorial and teaching staff, to give a principled assessment of every case of political short-sightedness, and disregard of moral-ethical norms.

In general, it needs to be said, comrades, that in recent years the youth environment and its problems for some reason slipped out of the purview of the party organizations. And this, in many respects, because we depoliticized the problems of young people instead of solving them. The Komsomol, hit by the prolonged restructuring bustle, is increasingly losing the role of leader of the working class, student, and school youth. The ideological vacuum is being filled by people with the most diverse, at times vague platforms, which are difficult for young people inexperienced in politics to understand. It is good, of course, that the young people has started to move, but will it not turn out that a whole generation of future specialists will enter life with a great deficit of knowledge, morally on the decline. You know, the future of the republic lies on the other side of them.

We acknowledge that we were poorly guided, what is more, even now we do not always trust the young forces. Meanwhile, among them there so many real patriots, erudite, capable, and energetic people. And they by right should occupy a fitting place in all spheres of our life—political, economic, and scientific.

A considerable part of our scientists proved to be captive to far-fetched schemes and projects, cut off from the realities. In raising painful problems, discussing the paths of national development, they did not advance any acceptable programs. Having disturbed public opinion with Populist declarations, they were unable to direct it into a constructive channel.

But now is the time, is it not, for bold ideas and conceptual developments, without which it is impossible to determine the prospects of the republic and the development of its national economy and the growth of the well-being of the people. As usual, we do not have anything of this sort from the Academy of Sciences and the industrial institutes.

The public connects such fruitlessness directly with the unhealthy atmosphere in many scientific collectives, with the careerism, communalism, the lack of continuity, and scientific schools. Such a situation calls forth special resentment among young, talented scientists, who for years have been deprived of creative growth. Similarly, the leadership of the Academy of Sciences

(comrade E. Yu. Salayev) and party organizations have resigned themselves to such a situation.

Perestroika and glasnost took away the rigid ideological corset from public thought, but our historians, philosophers, and social scientists, as before, stay under the press of accustomed dogmas and obsolete conceptions, in no way can go beyond the limits of narrow-minded thinking.

All of us know very well that for long years many pages of our history and the development of democratic thought in Azerbaijan found themselves under secret prohibition. But science for some reason is not hurrying to make use of the possibilities that have opened up to look in a new and objective way at the historical path traversed by our people. And this when interest in the past is becoming almost a national necessity!

Of course, the new reading of history requires not only new thinking, but also honesty and a certain courage of the scholar, in order to renounce what was written at one time. And, it seems, for this important work it is necessary to open the door more widely for young, fresh forces.

Lately a number of investigations and publications on Nagorno-Karabakh have been published. A good and necessary undertaking. At the same time, I would like to caution against market-determined, superficial approaches to this serious subject.

Attaching great significance to the formation of the historical consciousness of the masses, the republic CP Central Committee came out with the initiative of the development of a state program for the study, teaching, and popularization of the history of Azerbaijan. Among the measures envisaged is the scientific re-creation of the integral history of our people and its culture, philosophical thought, the publication of multi-volume sets on the history of Azerbaijan, the history of the Azerbaijan language and literature.

The turn to the study of the historical past called forth enormous interest in the cultural legacy of the people and its traditions. This is the delicate fabric of the people's life. And, in restoring long-forgotten holidays, rituals, and customs, it is necessary to show a maximum of delicacy and tact in order not to offend national feelings, but at the same time not to permit hastiness and new mistakes.

In developing the national distinctiveness of the people, we must devote special attention to the study and broad use of the Azerbaijan language in all spheres of the life of the republic. It is necessary to activate in every conceivable manner the work on the realization of the program set forth in the respective resolution of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee.

In the sphere of language policy, the Azerbaijan Communist Party stands for the development, in all citizens

of the republic, of an understanding of the social assignment of the Azerbaijan language as the state language, and of the Russian language as the language of internationality relations, for the free and equal development of the other national languages of the republic's population.

It is necessary today to sound real alarm with respect to the serious deformations in the sphere of the cultural life of the republic. We are losing before our eyes outstanding creative and selfless traditions, which have been formed through the efforts of more than one generation of writers, composers, and artists. One cannot but be disturbed by the growing lack of spirituality, the alienation from genuine art, and the passion for the superficial imitations of mass culture. On the other hand, pseudopatriots have appeared, who, under slogans of the return to the national sources, have gone so far as to demand the removal of the portraits of Western classics even from conservatories. Do we need to talk about the fact, comrades, that this leads directly to degradation? It is well known that the outstanding creative achievements of Azerbaijan literature and art owe their birth to the harmonious combination of national distinctiveness and the best traditions of world civilization. We will always remember this. We do not have the right to yield to the ignorance and narrow-mindedness, which is starting to overwhelm our concert halls, television, and video libraries.

One of the chief reasons for the weakening of cultural life, which has lasted already for more than a year, is the striking inability of the Ministry of Culture and the creative unions of the republic to influence in an organized manner the development of the artistic process, its constant enrichment, to find and to foster talents, and to open up new possibilities for cultural exchange. Is this not why the theater life of the republic has taken a back seat in ministerial attention, and guest performance concert activity has been reduced to flying visits to rural regions of combined artistic crews, and to the wedding programs of other variety stars.

In its time, some kind of strange practice became established of assessing the activity of the Ministry of Culture on the basis of gala government concerts. Through this window-dressing, serious failures in concrete work, such as, for example, the outflow of many masters of art from the art collectives. It is a pity that quite a few of our creative officials became keen on the creation of cooperatives and associations which have nothing in common with art. But it won't do at all that on the territory of the philharmonic, which Baku residents have always regarded as the temple of music, they are busily dealing in shashlyk. In the restored kirkh [from German "Kirche" = church], where music lovers were promised chamber music concerts, only the bar is enjoying popularity up to now.

Time itself requires the radical renewal of the activity of the party organizations of the creative unions and the cultural organs. Many communists here have not found

their bearings in the extraordinary political and ideological situation and do not influence the frame of mind of people, on the creation of an atmosphere of high exactingness and mutual respect. Unfortunately, we are becoming witnesses of the fact that the life-giving relations of the party committees with the creative intelligentsia have begun to break. Everything must be done to stop this dangerous process.

In short, we need a national program of spiritual development, which will drastically change priorities and will give a powerful impulse to the advance to a qualitatively new level of education, science, literature, and art. The enrichment of the cultural life of the people at the threshold of the 21st century is unthinkable without getting accustomed with the best achievements of human genius. This is how the main line of the rebirth of our national spirituality is seen. All these ideas will go into our platform, which will be presented at the 23rd Azerbaijan CP Congress.

Comrades! If we critically assess the path traversed and soberly picture the socio-political realities that have taken place, we must implement profound and rapid reforms in the organization of the communists of the republic. Otherwise the Azerbaijan Communist Party threatens to be pushed to the side of political life.

What are our first and foremost tasks in this connection? On the basis of the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress, we will have to restructure the intra-party relations so as for all communists and primary party organizations to receive, not in words, but in deeds, the possibility of practically taking part in the formation of party policy, in the elections of all its leading organs right up to the Central Committee. This will make it possible to establish reliable relations between the low links of the party and its leading organs and will create serious prerequisites for the democratization of party life. We are talking about granting the primary party organizations broad possibilities in the determination of their structure, forms of activity, and active influence on the work of the higher party organs, conferences, and congresses. Otherwise it is impossible to remove the discontent of the ordinary communists and to return to every one of them the feeling of their own dignity and internal freedom. Today the question about the development of the program documents has become acute—the documents that regulate the position of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan within the framework of the CPSU, guaranteeing it a large measure of independence. This process is acquiring special political significance in the conditions of the transformation of the Soviet federation.

From this new point of view, taking into account the changed demands, it is necessary to look at the activity of the elective party organs and, above all, of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee. We will say frankly, in the form in which it is today, it is difficult to call it a militant staff, which generates fresh ideas, which steadfastly implement the policy of restructuring.

The commissions of the Central Committee, which in essence duplicate the work of the departments of the apparatus, operate formally and out of touch with the dynamic of life. It is difficult to remember any project, born in the depths of the commissions, which would be introduced in the Central Committee Buro and stirred up the public. It is necessary for the commissions to turn in the direction of analytical research, sociological and economic prognostication, and modelling of the possible situations.

All of the work of the elective organ of the Communist Party should in the most active way be guaranteed by the apparatus of the Central Committee. Unfortunately, its style and methods are still far from the demands of present-day party thinking and the new approaches. The reorganization carried out a year ago also did not do any good in this sense. The departments, as before, are carried away with paper-shuffling and gravitate toward the replacement of the organizations being restored, instead of conducting political work in the masses, accumulating experience and new ideas, and strengthening relations with the party committees in the provinces. The new subdivision of inspectors at the Central Committee Secretariat and the consultants of the departments have practically not found their place in the structure of the apparatus.

The party organization of the Central Committee apparatus, which, it would seem, should in everything be an example of party work at the primary level, also is not proving its worth.

Recently it has almost become the fashion to severely criticize the apparatus and the party functionaries, to accuse them of all adversities and disorders. This calls forth natural irritation among many comrades. But let us try to understand calmly, without emotions. If we treat this as public criticism, we need to acknowledge that there is quite a lot in it that is true. The apparatus of the party committees and even of the Central Committee is clogged up with time-servers, careerists, and opportunists. Let us say, it is not such a great secret that there are still secretaries and officials of party committees who conduct themselves immodestly, permit actions that discredit the title of communist, and do damage to the authority of the party. During the years of restructuring alone, 32 obkom, gorkom and raykom party secretaries were dismissed from the posts for shortcomings in work and punished in accordance with party procedure.

All these distortions became possible not in the last instance because of the weakening of party discipline, the disregard, by some communists, of the statute requirements, norms of party ethics, and morality.

About these shortcomings, we speak openly and with sincere regret, hoping that the criticism will become a lesson for all party committees. But this does not mean that it is permissible for anyone to use the shortcomings being brought to light by us for the indiscriminate

running down of the party apparatus, to sow distrust of it among the people, and to destroy the brain-center of the Communist Party.

Comrades, I would like to caution against the possibility of a repetition of what happened during the election campaign, when there proved to be quite a few persons in the country's parliament, who achieved popularity on the critical wave, so to speak. Now their interminable debates, which lead the deputies away from the problems that disturb the people and the country, are already calling forth disappointment and dissatisfaction.

What if this business would repeat itself in our republic at the party meetings and conferences. We must conduct them on a democratic basis so that the most deserving come into the party committees. This is necessary, comrades, for the party, this is necessary for the sake of our people.

Looking ahead, we must take up the serious renewal of the staff of the elected organs and the apparatus of the party committees. With this goal in mind, it is necessary to make effective use of the forthcoming reports and elections. They must be carried out with a critical mood, under the sign of the democratization of party life, alternative nominations, the free will of communists, and the pluralism of opinions.

In so principled a manner we should approach the preparation of the 23rd Azerbaijan CP Congress, the dates for the holding of which we will determine today. The special nature of the this congress lies in the fact that it will have to sum up the 5 years of restructuring in the republic, to provide a generalizing analysis of the difficult processes and phenomena that have arisen in the course of the transformation of our life, to adopt a program of action for the Communist Party, and to determine the strategy and tactics for its realization. On this political base, having reinterpreted our place and role with regard to the new arrangement of the social forces, we must go out to the 28th CPSU Congress.

The changes in articles 6 and 7 of the USSR Constitution, which were introduced by the 3rd USSR Congress of People's Deputies, give the Communist Party a fundamentally new status. Remaining the ruling party, it will henceforth equally with other political organizations by democratic methods seek to attain the right to form the organs of power.

The Azerbaijan communists are for political pluralism in public life, but under one indispensable condition—respect for the law. The programs, the theoretical developments, and the practical activity of the new social movements must, according to our conviction, broaden the framework of democracy, serve the national revival, and accelerate social progress. It seems, this is an acceptable platform for cooperation.

The responsibility of the Communist Party and the democratic organizations before the people is too great. The communists see their task in the consolidation and

the unification of all the healthy forces. To help bring the points of view together and to attain a consensus may be conducive to a broad dialogue, which it is assumed will be conducted in the near future. Both the Communist Party and representatives of the new socio-political organizations will take part in it.

I think that such a form of interaction is extremely acceptable and promising. Such democratic understanding of the consolidation of all social formations will unconditionally serve the advancement of Azerbaijan along the road of democratic and social progress.

We say this because we are today, were, and will be the most powerful and representative party.

In this connection, it is impossible not to see the attempts of determined forces to win the masses over to their side, to lead them away from socialist goals and ideals. Some of the groupings and leading figures are clearly counting on imposing their views through force, through arousing intolerance and nationality discord, and pressure on state and public institutions by means of any sort of categorical demands. There must not remain any doubts in anyone: We, the communists, will not permit this. For society and the people will not accept and repudiate such methods, which basically contradict the goals of restructuring and are dangerous for the young, not yet consolidated democracy.

The elections of the Azerbaijan SSR people's deputies and the local Soviets will become a serious test for the party organizations, an examination of the real abilities to influence the masses, to earn their confidence in the conditions of stiff political competition.

To the republic's highest organ of power must be properly elected competent people, who possess all-round erudition and have state perspectives. You know, they will have to take decisions determining the destinies of people and the republic. And here it is impossible to be guided in the old fashion as the basic criterion only by the production successes of the candidates for deputy, the posts occupied by them, and their formal social membership. It is necessary that in the deputy body there be broad representation of political scientists, lawyers, economists, sociologists, journalists, and other specialists, as well as individuals who are active in public life. It is impossible in this important matter to repeat the mistaken approaches permitted in the elections of USSR people's deputies.

Comrades! Life itself has led to the necessity of proceeding at once to the creation of an integral, scientifically-substantiated conception of national development. We regard it as a document of extraordinary importance, and our best forces, leading scientists and specialists must be attracted to its development. We are counting on the fact that the broad public, too, will have an attitude of the deepest and most profound interest in this patriotic undertaking. And it is our duty to create the appropriate conditions for such participation.

We are ready to examine also the alternative variants of this program by the new social organizations. Let there be a number of projects and a different vision of the future. And let the public itself decide which of them is more substantiated, realistic, and acceptable.

We are talking about filling our statehood with new content, the precise determination of the relations of the republic and the Soviet federation, the further development and consolidation of democratic principles in political life, the accumulation and enrichment of the intellectual potential, and the development of the living and cultural level of the people. And the main thing is to formulate a model of the economic development of the republic, without which all our thoughts will remain good intentions.

There is no reason to say that the spiritual development of the people is unthinkable without economic reforms, without the solution of the urgent problems that influence the frame of mind and the way in which a person is situated, his emancipation. We must do everything in order to deliver man from agonizing searches for, as they say, daily bread, to create all the conditions for the consumption of spiritual food. The economic potential accumulated in the republic during the years of Soviet power and its natural resources are a sufficient basis and guarantee for further progress. It is necessary to have a clear idea about the paths of the republic's economic development, to define priorities, and to map out effective measures for their realization.

Without a doubt, this is a multi-stage since it is impossible to do at once what must be implemented. This is an axiom.

Here it is necessary to see immediate and long-term tasks. The basis of their solution must be new approaches. In particular, this is a reanimation of the feeling of ownership among the workers and collectives, the use of all forms of property, and resolute steps in regard to the development of all forms of leasing, as the only measure of improving and stimulating economic reforms recognized by the state in the current stage.

A careful analysis of the state of the economy and the development of a package of documents for the realization of the tasks of the republic's transition to self-financing are necessary. This is a very difficult process—the consistent achievement of economic sovereignty and the subordination to the republic of all the economic structures that are found in our territory. In so doing, we ought to try to attain the harmonious combination of the integration links within the country on the basis of the principles of equivalent commodity exchange and direct international economic partnership. We also regard as necessary the creation of free economic zones, the broad use of such forms as joint enterprises, which will help us move into modern equipment and the world market. By such means we can form a republic foreign exchange

fund. This task is one of the most important ones, all the possibilities available in the republic should be aimed at its solution.

Along with the increase of deliveries of finished goods for export, more effective use should be made of the sale of scientific-technical developments in the world market and the sale of licenses, in other words, products of engineering and scientific thought. In this, it seems to us, the patriotism of our scientists, their desire to serve their people and to guarantee it a better life, should be manifested above all.

Without a doubt, in order to carry out what has been said, it is necessary to radically change the attitude to work, to create the general conditions for the generation of new cadre potential, for healthy competition and scientific-creative competition. We must in the most serious manner reform the entire system of cadre training, having begun it with the school and right up to the VUZ's. It is necessary already now to search out possibilities for the instruction of gifted young people, not only in the country's VUZ's but also abroad. In short, we must fully use the Constitutional Law on the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet.

The realization of all these difficult tasks requires the careful elaboration of the strategy and tactics of the republic's economic development. This is all the more important because already beginning next year Azerbaijan will start to operate in new economic conditions. Now in various circles a great deal is being said about almost absolute independence, without imagining the whole complexity of this problem.

There is, of course, reason in these discussions, but there are also quite a few Populist aspirations. Not by chance, not one among the authors of these projects presented any substantiated calculation.

What is the reality? Let us argue on the example of the traditional sectors of the economy of Azerbaijan.

The idle words about the enormous oil resources, permitting us to become almost a second Kuwait, are, to put it mildly, groundless. It is a well-known fact that the measure of the level of the economy is a maximum isolated processing system for quality and cheap raw material into end products, which fully supplies our own needs and is capable of being competitive in the world market. For the achievement of such a level by the republic, the stage-by-stage solution of many problems is required, and first of all, the improvement of the base sectors of industry.

During the first stage of the transition to economic sovereignty, maximally efficient use must be made of inter-republic economic relations and the possibility of the Union must be made. During the years of Soviet power, Azerbaijan generously shared its natural resources with the country. And for this reason, we have the right to raise the question about increasing the

investments of the center to eliminate the disproportions that have taken shape for a long time. It goes without saying, we must make efficient use of these resources, both now and in the future.

Let us take oil production, for example. On land, the oil resources in easily accessible depths have been practically exhausted, deposits are being developed with a high degree of water content, strongly exhausted stratum energy, and the unsatisfactory state of about 80 percent of the total oil well inventory. The Azneft [Azerbaijan Oil Production] Association is unprofitable, every year the center is allotting on the order of 60 million rubles in subsidies. And given the current prices for oil, you cannot manage without it. Calculations show the further reduction of oil production.

For the stabilization of the production and extraction of the remaining deposits, modern technology of secondary and tertiary methods is required, which the country does not have at its disposal. And this means new, enormous material and financial resources. The production cost of oil will soar unavoidably. But from where take these hundreds of millions of rubles in capital investments, how pay in world prices the necessary material resources, how restore the Apsheron areas that were taken out of production? It seems to us that, along with the increase of capital investments from union sources, the creation of joint enterprises with foreign firms is necessary, firms which have a large amount of experience in the development of exhausted deposits. There is already fundamental agreement on this. And now work is being actively done in the republic Council of Ministers.

The prospects for oil production in the sea are connected with the exploitation of deposits at a depth of 200 meters and more. And here the technical solution of the problem requires several billion rubles and large foreign exchange investments. Thus, one stationary sea platform today costs about R250 million. And hundreds of such platforms are required, not to mention other, no less expensive technical means. This is what our own oil in the sea will cost us. Can we raise all these questions? It seems, for the time being, no.

Another opinion is also being expressed: Is it worthwhile to continue the increase of sea production, is it not better to stabilize it, having thereby preserved our national property for the future? And to put the stress on the reproduction of unique fish resources. Here is something to reflect on.

Now about the processing of oil. The only products we have that are competitive in the world market are gasoline AI-93 and electrode coke. The output of commodity production per ton of oil in the republic is 25-30 percent lower than world indicators and 8-9 percent lower than domestic indicators.

Earlier we produced more than 20 percent of the petroleum oils in the country, and their quality was rather good. Today these production facilities have become hopelessly obsolete, and the question is whether they

should be closed down. For the introduction of imported equipment, for example, the American firm Lubrizol demanded approximately \$0.5 billion.

The further development of this industry is seen in the realization of reconstruction, the increase of the depth of oil processing, the gradual reduction, and then the complete refusal, of the delivery of sulphureous oil. In so doing, it is necessary to attain the reduction of the state order for oil products in order to export up to 20-25 percent ourselves. The transition to the processing of only our own oil will make it possible to exclude the construction of installations for hydrofining and sulphur cleaning, and the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of people from the sanitary zone, but at the same time will also lead to a reduction in oil processing of up to 14 million tons.

The level of production of the petrochemical industry is recognized as an attribute of industrial society. In approaching our industries with this measure, it is necessary to note that we find ourselves only in the first stage. With the introduction of catalytic cracking at the NBNZ [Novobakinskiy Oil Processing Plant imeni Vladimir Ilyich] and the development, finally, of the capacity of the EP-300 [not further identified], the necessary hydrocarbon raw material base is being created. For its processing into the polymer end product, namely into polypropylene, polystyrene, linear polyethylene, and templen [not further identified], and for the output, on their basis, of articles made of plastic more than R1 billion are required. To carry out the ecological improvement programs of Sumgait, R300-350 million are necessary.

Meanwhile the large enterprises of the industry are operating with losses, many of them today have tens of millions of rubles in debts in the card-index. How can that be? The solution of a whole complex of problems from oil and gas production and oil and gas processing to petrochemical end products requires, according to approximate estimates, R6-7 billion in capital investments, moreover without the construction of social projects.

To create modern manufactures for polymer products and plastics is possible only through the purchase of imported equipment, for which up to half a billion rubles in foreign exchange are necessary. All of this we hope to realize through the centralized capital investments and foreign currency funds being allotted by the union government.

A few words about the machine building complex, whose successful operation is determined by a complex system of cooperative relations with the enterprises of other regions of the country. More than 70 percent of the products of our machine builders depend on deliveries, especially rolled ferrous and non-ferrous metals, cable products, enameled wire, and others, as well as tens of thousands of supplementary products, including imported ones.

Can one really seriously count on the independence of enterprises of instrument-making, radio electronics, and other progressive industries without their own element base? The microcircuits and the simplest condensers being produced in the republic are even below the domestic level. One needs only to stop the deliveries from the black market, and this entire industry will come to a halt. Without an element base, it is impossible to develop non-metal-intensive and science-intensive industries and to produce complex consumer goods.

For the completion of the construction of the automobile and machine building plants in Gyandzhe, the distribution of branches and small mobile enterprises in the regions that have surplus labor resources, the renewal of the obsolete machine-tool park, and other tasks, up to R5 billion in capital investments are required. And here it is necessary, of course, to utilize the assistance of the center and to look for partners for the creation of joint enterprises.

One can add to all that has been said that in the system of the indicators accepted by international experts the maximum reduction of expenditures for the development of base industries, which are very high in our republic, is the chief thing.

The economic model for the development of our economy must change the correlation of the import and export not of raw material, but of finished goods, moreover of such goods as are in demand in the world market. Only in this way can we create a foreign exchange fund for the republic, which is a measure of the economic development and statehood. Today we can independently only go after credits, with it being necessary to keep in mind the payment of high interest for them. But with what to pay them off? You see, we do not have products that are competitive. If with raw material, then in 10 years we will become a republic which exports it in the world market. This is also a debt trap and economic servitude. So that in these questions it is impossible to lose our heads, what we need is sober economic calculation, and not emotions.

Specialists also have different views of the prospects for the development of agriculture. They suggest two paths: A sharp increase of the production of agricultural products and the exchange of part of the industrial crops, for example, cotton, for food products. It seems, both approaches deserve attention, but with regard to a realistic view of things.

Let us say, is it possible to meet the republic's demand for grain ourselves? For this, we must either triple the area under grain crops or increase the productivity by as much. As you understand, both the one and the other in the immediate years ahead are practically impossible. We can also not disregard a factor which is of no small importance for the peasants: A cotton hectare produces on the average R1,550 in income, a grape hectare—R3,000, and a hectare of grain field—only R386, which, respectively, is 4-8 times less. The question is, do some

of our scientists and journalists, who call for the increase of grain production to the detriment of other industries, have any idea about these unsophisticated indicators? Economic dilettantism, incompetent and at times also irresponsible criticism can lead our agrarian policy into a blind alley and arouse social tension.

But let us take the problem of full self-sufficiency in animal husbandry products. For this, an additional 300,000-350,000 hectares of irrigated land are necessary, which we simply do not have. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the majority of arable lands is in extremely neglected state. Their improvement and restoration does not tolerate delay. The union ministries, too, must join in this work. The Azerbaijan lands for decades served to strengthen the country economically within the framework of cooperation and the inter-union [as published] division of labor, and today we have the right to raise the question with the union organs.

It is necessary to reexamine the structure of the sown areas and plantings of many years, having in mind the further development of agricultural crops that are economically advantageous for the republic and that enjoy the greatest demand. For example, to put the stress on the introduction of cotton varieties with high industrial fiber qualities, the establishment of new plantations of traditional and surviving crops. This will make it possible to sharply reduce their import and for us to go out in the world market ourselves.

In short, to achieve economic independence it is necessary to go not through force [lomka], but through the development and intensification of integration, the utilization of the advantages of a single all-union market, it goes without saying, on a mutually advantageous and equivalent basis.

An important reserve for improving the economy and the solution of many social problems is the further expansion of foreign economic relations and the direct pursuit of foreign partners. The organization of joint enterprises must be oriented to the saturation of the republic market with goods that are in short supply and the creation of additional jobs. Here it is necessary to be guided by the interests of the republic, and not by momentary dubious advantages.

The various associations, joint enterprises, and other organizations of an export-import profile that have appeared recently are acting in an uncoordinated manner, frequently not becoming oriented to the specific nature of the foreign market, not knowing its conditions. Here you cannot manage without the creation of a republic center, which would take upon itself the coordination and implementation of a unified policy in the sphere of foreign economic relations.

The Council of Ministers could, without postponing, develop a long-term program for foreign economic cooperation, having singled out the priority directions in it, such as the creation of free economic zones, the granting of concessions for the development and production of

some raw material resources that are difficult to extract, the development of foreign tourism, which, incidentally, is one of the most important sources of foreign exchange receipts in many countries.

To solve these tasks, let us say frankly, we do not have sufficient modern economic thinking, commercial grasp, and management training. This is why today a special subject of concern is the formation of a new type of managers with entrepreneurial vein, the training of management specialists. With an amateurish approach and cavalier attacks we will only ruin this extremely important undertaking. All, as it were, understand this understand this problem, but nevertheless there are not quite enough practical improvements.

We must also make more active use of foreign experience in the training of management personnel. The idea of the creation of a management and business center in the republic is ripening. Do we have possibilities for this, or should we for the time being limit ourselves to training outside the republic? We must find our position in regard to this question as well, but we have no right to lag behind here.

I have only briefly dwelt on the key questions of the state and the prospects of the economy of Azerbaijan. Enormous work lies ahead, in many respects new work. But only in this way, scientifically adjusting every step, being guided by world progress, is it possible to move ahead. These and other suggestions will go into the platform of the Azerbaijan Communist Party with which it will go to its 32nd Congress.

And now a few words on the current tasks. Today the situation that has developed in the national economy of the republic can be characterized as extremely difficult. Strikes and violations of the labor rhythm have led to a reduction of industrial production in Baku, Gyandzhe, Mingechaur, Lenkoran, and other regions. According to the results of the past year, instead of the projected 104.3 percent, the growth of production actually came to 99.3 percent. From the beginning of the past year to the present, products valued at more more than R800 million were not shipped to consumers, which put hundreds of the country's enterprises in a very difficult position.

During the current year, the situation became still further aggravated. Since 18 January alone, losses in industry came to about 800 million rubles. A difficult situation arose in the fuel and energy complex of the Kasporneftegaz [Caspian Sea Oil and Gas] Association and Azneft [Azerbaijan Central Oil Board] underdelivered hundreds of thousands of tons of oil to the plan. Alarm is called forth by the increasingly frequent accidents, fires, and underwater ruptures of oil pipe lines. There has been a sharp deterioration of the indicators of the work of Azglavenergo [Azerbaijan Main Administration for Energy] and the machine building and metallurgy enterprises. The shortcomings in the railway are throwing the economy into a fever. From the beginning

of 1989, the republic's receipt of railway cars with national economic cargo fell short by 100,000.

The tasks for all indicators in capital construction have been defeated. Slightly more than half of the projected children's pre-school institutions, hospitals, outpatient and polyclinic institutions were built, and the housing program was not fulfilled. The volume of incomplete construction reached almost R4 billion and came to 126 percent of the annual limit of capital investments, which exceeds the norm by a factor of 1.7.

As I have already said, we have raised the question before the USSR Council of Ministers about the allotment of additional appropriations for the solution of the problem of refugees. And here we do not assimilate the state capital investments guaranteed with material resources. Would it not be better to reorient this part to the provision of amenities for the refugees? Not long ago, we discussed with comrade R. Agayev, the first secretary of the Baku Party Gorkom, the idea of starting to operate part of the capacities of the DSK [House Construction Combine] for the output of housing for the refugees. Of course, having gotten the OK from the inhabitants of Baku, who, it seems, will respond to this noble cause. Moreover, to erect not only houses for the refugees in various rural rayons, but at once take up the development of the infrastructure, so that people would receive at the same time also hospitals, schools, and clubs.

If the Azerbaijan Communist Party in the pre-election stage comes forward with this initiative and actively tackles its practical realization, it will, without a doubt, seriously strengthen its authority.

The situation in the consumer market is becoming aggravated. During January-February alone, the population failed to receive 20 million square meters of fabric, 300,000 square meters of carpet and carpet goods, 2.5 million pairs of shoes, a large quantity of complex household equipment, etc. As a result, there has been a sharp expansion in the list of goods in short supply. During the first 2 months, the tasks in regard to paid services were fulfilled to the extent of only 69.7 percent, retail commodity turnover—to the extent of 97.4 percent. All of this has aggravated the situation in money circulation and makes the payment of wages to labor collectives more difficult.

As you see, the situation is an extremely tense one, and you cannot manage with half-measures here. The party committees have to increase the personal responsibility of all the communist leaders from top to bottom for increasing state, labor and production discipline, the state of the moral-psychological situation in the labor collectives, and to secure the unconditional filling in of the permitted lag. It is necessary to make a principled assessment of every case of the frustration of plan tasks and the destabilization of production.

It is necessary for the republic's Council of Ministers to establish strict monitoring of the outlined measures in regard to leading the economy out of the breakdown and

to take up thoroughly the improvement of the financial state of the sectors of the national economy in order to correct the situation as soon as possible.

Today one must also talk about those social spheres of life, which in many respects form the sentiment of people, their everyday life, and their general state of well-being. We are talking about the necessity of seriously improving the work of trade, everyday services, transport, public health care, and municipal services, where there are still many outrages. For many years, a negative system developed in the relations of the officials of this sphere along the vertical and their criminal interlocking with the law enforcement and control organs. About this we talk a great deal, there is no counting of the instructions being sent out at the various levels. Meanwhile there is still no appreciable improvement in securing order. The people correctly address criticism of these outrages to the leaders of the republic. We limit ourselves to arguments on this account at the plenums, the Buro, sessions, and all sorts of conferences.

Today the party organs must determine their attitude to how, in what way they will influence the spheres. You know, on the one hand, we should not replace the soviet and economic organs, but, on the other, does such non-interference not lead to a deterioration of the situation? Whether we like it or not, the people as before will address their claims to us. I think it will be correct to make increased demands, to make a strict party assessment of the work of the communist leaders of this sphere, right up to their recall from the posts occupied by them if things are not put in order.

We must keep in mind the fact that things in the consumer market will not seriously improve if there will not be an increase in the production of goods and services, if we will not escape from the captivity of the shortages. In connection with this, it is very important to radically improve the work of the economic and soviet structures, to carry out a program of measures for the upsurge of agricultural production, the processing industry, and the entire system of the production of consumer goods and services. This important task must be solved by all ministries and departments. The republic's Council of Ministers must toughen its control in this direction.

Comrades A. Bagirov, the minister of trade, Z. Abdulayev, the chairman of Azerittifak [not further identified], and the executives of all subdivisions of these branches must do some serious thinking, to rouse the officials for the struggle with the inveterate shortcomings, and raise the demand and responsibility of the leaders of all links.

In recent years, quite a lot has been done to strengthen the material-technical base of public health care. New hospitals, polyclinics, and outpatient clinics, equipped with modern equipment, have become operational in the republic. The neuro-surgical complex and diagnostic center, the new maternity hospital being turned over in

Baku in a matter of days, and the oncological and ophthalmological centers that are being constructed may serve as an example. The work in this direction is continuing.

At the same time, it is impossible to be silent about the fact that there is nothing to praise our public health care service for in the standards of service. Callousness, nonchalance, irresponsibility, and painful indifference have not yet been overcome. There have been many complaints by the population about rudeness, bribery, insanitary conditions, lack of professionalism, and the poor situation with medicines. The collegium of the Ministry of Health, the minister comrade T. Kasumov, the directors of the medical institutions, public health organs, the ispolkoms of the local Soviets, and the body of deputies must actively undertake the correction of the situation and raise precisely these strata, which have become overgrown with the weeds of ignorance and criminal negligence.

Our first and foremost task and patriotic duty is to bring about every conceivable improvement in the life of the people. This is one of the decisive factors of the normalization of the moral-political atmosphere and bringing the republic out of the crisis.

Comrades! In concluding my report, I would like again to emphasize: We are at a decisive turn, at which, as never before, the destinies of the people, the republic, and the Communist Party have joined together. We have embarked on the path of decisive renewal, the path of rebirth. And how it will be traversed depends on the positions and activity of every member of the Central Committee, every party worker, and every communist, on our willingness for performance not in words, but in deed, if you like, for self-sacrifice in the name of the great goal—the future of our people.

Presidency in Kazakh SSR Discussed

90US0909B Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by V. Malinovskiy, docent, Department of Soviet State Construction and Law, Alma-Ata Higher Party School, candidate of jurisprudence: "On the Path to a Presidency"]

[Text] The published draft Platform of the Kazakh CP Central Committee for the 17th Kazakh CP Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress states: "In the interests of establishing equal rights interrelations between the Union and the republic, of strengthening the political-legal status of the Kazakh SSR, and ensuring balanced and effective activity for the entire state mechanism, we consider it advisable to confirm the presidential form of government in the republic. The republic president is the embodiment and guarantor of national statehood, territorial integrity, observance of the union treaty, and a factor in the consolidation of people residing in Kazakhstan, of all healthy social forces supporting perestroika."

Thus, the idea of establishing the post of the republic president received the approval of the participants of the 20th Kazakh CP Central Committee Plenum. The development of the drafts of the corresponding laws was completed. We were all witness to the most pointed discussions that unfolded at the 3rd Congress of USSR People's Deputies on various aspects of presidential power. I would like to share certain views on that account, as they apply to Kazakhstan.

So, first a few words about the need for a Kazakh SSR President.

The need, conditioned by a number of reasons, to introduce the post of USSR President was discussed in sufficient detail at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Among those reasons named were getting nowhere in the transformations in the economic and political spheres; the delay in the transfer of empowerments from the party organizations to the state organs; insufficient coordination in the activity of the highest organs of state power and administration of the Union of SSRs; the weakness and disorganization of the executive branch of power, leading to the difficult realization or basic sabotage of the laws at various echelons of the state apparatus in the center and the provinces. Attention has been directed to conflicts in interethnic relations and social tension, and certain other things, requiring immediate and effective reaction. In one form or another, they, of course, are typical for our republic as well.

At the same time, there also exist factors requiring the establishment specifically of the position of Kazakh SSR President. There are reflected concisely and laconically in the draft Kazakh CP Central Committee Platform. I will cover in more detail the factors which, in my view, merit greater attention, particularly in practical terms.

The first is the establishment of the post of Union of SSRs President, which immediately raised the problem of regulation of the executive branch of power on the vertical axis: The Union—the republic. And under the conditions of the radically renewed federation there will exist a roster of causes common to all the republics. The strong executive power of the Union of SSRs in the person of the President will hardly be compensated here (I purposely do not use the term "countervail" here) by a system of organs headed by the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers. All the same, an independent state organ is required for the normal organization of an independent fortified branch of power. Such a situation exists in the majority of modern federations, although in the United States, Mexico, and others, this position must be labeled differently (in the majority of countries, a governor). In FRG, there is no such position, since the executive power in the states is "crowned" by the heads of the state governments—the prime ministers (minister-chairman), who are part of the Bundestag by position, in fact a second chamber of the FRG Parliament. And the federal President occupies quite a modest position.

Perhaps the current Kazakh SSR highest official, the republic Supreme Soviet chairman, could share the new supplemental authorities? The problem would hardly be solved this way. And this is why. Along with the parliament and the government, there must be an organ acting as a sort of arbitrator in the event that any sort of discord arise between them. That is the President, being *de jure* and *de facto* independent of both the Supreme Soviet and the republic Council of Ministers, a component of neither one nor the other, and not dominating them; he can bind their activity with one another rationally, and help them decide in the event of disagreements.

The President will have the opportunity to influence the legislative activity of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet should the need arise in returning approvals of a draft law for repeat discussion and voting. While in the USSR Supreme Soviet, at the cost of alternate discussion in the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, then in the joint sessions of both chambers there takes place the refinement and polishing of disputed statutes of an act, in the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the President's postponing veto is the single opportunity to look at the law "from the side" (if of course we do not count the opportunities of the Kazakh SSR Constitutional Oversight Committee). Such a measure will probably promote an increase in the level of legislative work, the quality of the laws adopted.

I see the following as one other basis for the advisability of introducing the position of Kazakh SSR President. Look at the nature and urgency of the transformations taking place in the country and in the republic through the activity of the Supreme Soviets. Television broadcasts, reports in the press, and public opinion poll results give a basis for concluding that the USSR Supreme Soviet has become at the union level the center of perestroika processes despite all organizational problems. But in Kazakhstan? May the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet deputies forgive me, but the majority of them have worked out at the finish line in the traditions of the worst times of stagnation, despite exclusively propitious conditions. Now, of course, it is difficult to guess just how active and concerned with the positions of their electorate a body of Kazakh SSR people's deputies will be formed as the result of the current elections. However, probably among the most important and unnatural tasks in the concept is that of "pushing" the deputies, to direct, to a certain degree, the activity of the republic Supreme Soviet. I will say more. Hand on heart, I cannot exclude such a situation: a contradiction (and possibly, a counter action) between the passive Supreme Soviet, representing to a significant extent the interests of the ruling apparatus, and the active President, advocating the demands of the population. Thus, in such a situation, the Supreme Soviet chairman will prove practically powerless.

Nor can I fail to speak of Kazakhstan's socioeconomic and demographic particulars by comparison to those of other republics: the immense territory, the multiethnic composition of the population, the disastrous neglect in

the development of many regions. All of this also requires an intensification of the consolidating principles of the executive branch of power in the person of the Kazakh SSR President.

For the determination of the political-legal status of the Kazakh SSR President, it is necessary to have two aspects in mind: consideration for world experience is required, as is a basis in the actual conditions of Kazakhstan. By ignoring the examples of neighbors in the world community, we frequently attempt to create something all our own by means of repeated trial and error. In operating on the "American" or the "French" or any other models, we somehow forget the fact that "civilized" statehood did not form in a year or two, but appeared as the fruit of a very long, painful development, a struggle of disparate powers that still emphasize in turn first one, then another branch of power and corresponding organs. In every country, these processes have been nourished by their own specific juices, national psychologies, religions, etc.

The reader may get the impression that the author is fighting for unrestrained, unlimited power for the republic president, which will crush under itself the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers, and under the condition of jointly held posts in the party and state, the Kazakh CP Central Committee. This is far from the case, since the idea held by some that the basic meaning of the separation of power is reduced to the creation of an omnipotent parliament whose only task is the unrestrained criticism and shaking up of the body of the government is incorrect. I see as the panacea for our many woes the formation of an optimal, precisely functioning, especially on the edges with the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of power of the state apparatus on the one hand, and with the state and public (including party) principles of societal administration on the other.

This must be embodied first and foremost in the law that will be adopted at the first session of the newly-elected Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. But they are a special case.

Results Reported in Election of Kazakh People's Deputies

90US0909A *Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 1

[Report of Kazakh SSR Central Election Commission for the Election and Recall of Republic People's Deputies: "Report of the Kazakh SSR Central Election Commission on the Results of the Elections of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies in 1990"; 30 March 1990]

[Text] Having reviewed the reports received from the okrug election commission and the election commissions of public organizations on the results of the elections of Kazakh SSR people's deputies, the Central Election Commission for the election and recall of republic people's deputies reports:

The Results of the Elections in the Election Okrugs

The lists of voters for the elections of Kazakh SSR people's deputies in election okrugs comprised 9,738,548 persons, and 8,177,059, or 84.0 per cent, participated in the voting. In the oblasts and the cities of Alma-Ata and Leninsk, there participated in the voting: Aktyubinsk Oblast, 81.1 per cent; Alma-Ata Oblast, 90.1 per cent; East Kazakhstan, 77.1 per cent; Gurev Oblast, 81.7 per cent; Dzhambul Oblast, 89.8 per cent; Dzhezikazgan Oblast, 82.8 per cent; Karaganda Oblast, 75.1 per cent; Kyzyl-Orda Oblast, 92.5 per cent; Kokchetav Oblast, 88.5 per cent; Kustanay Oblast, 84.8 per cent; Pavlodar Oblast, 79.3 per cent, North Kazakhstan, 84.4 per cent; Semipalatinsk Oblast, 86.7 per cent; Taldy-Kurgan, 91.2 per cent; Ural Oblast, 85.3 per cent; Tselinograd, 86.6 per cent; Chimkent, 90.2 per cent; Alma-Ata city, 72.5 per cent; Leninsk city, 78.9 per cent of the voters.

A total of 270 election okrugs were formed within the territory of the republic in order to conduct the elections of Kazakh SSR people's deputies; 1,031 candidates were on the ballot in them. Yet on election day, in 27 okrugs there was one candidate on the ballot; in 78, two candidates, and in 165, three or more candidates.

The elections took place in all 270 election okrugs. People's deputies were elected in 131 okrugs. In 126 okrugs, in each of which more than two candidates were on the ballot and no one of them was elected, in accordance with Article 57 of the Law on elections of Kazakh SSR people's deputies, a runoff will be held. In 13 okrugs in which 1-2 candidates for deputy were on the ballot, they did not receive the necessary number of votes and were not elected. In these okrugs, in accordance with Article 58 of the Law on elections of Kazakh SSR people's deputies, repeat elections will be held.

Reports of the results of the elections in each okrug are published in the local press by the okrug election commissions.

The Results of Elections From Public Organizations

The elections of Kazakh SSR people's deputies from public organizations having republic organs took place at their plenums. A total of 165 candidates were on the ballot for 90 deputy seats. Eighty-one people were elected deputies. Nine deputies from fifteen public organizations were not elected. In accordance with Article 58 of the Law on elections of Kazakh SSR people's deputies, repeat elections will be conducted in these public organizations. Reports of the results of the elections for each public organization are published in the press.

On the basis of Article 54 of the Law on elections of Kazakh SSR people's deputies, all people's deputies of the republic elected from okrugs and from public organizations were registered by the Central Election Commission.

In total, 212 of 360 Kazakh SSR people's deputies were elected. A total of 148 remain to be elected, including 139 from okrugs and 9 from public organizations.

Among those elected deputies: women, 18, or 8.5 per cent; men, 194, or 91.5 per cent; workers, 35, or 16.5 per cent; kolkhoz workers, 10, or 4.7 per cent. Total workers and kolkhoz workers, 45, or 21.2 per cent. Among the deputies, 205, or 96.7 per cent are members or candidate members of the CPSU; 7, or 3.3 per cent are non-party members; 10, or 4.7 per cent, Komsomol members.

Citizens of 13 nationalities living within the territory of the republic were elected to the highest organ of state power.

The elections were held with high voter activity, with great concern, and with the aspiration to elect to the highest organ of power of the Kazakh SSR worthy advocates of perestroika.

The roster of those elected Kazakh SSR people's deputies is published in the press.

Tajik Supreme Soviet Issues Decrees

Video Salon Controls Tightened

90US0805A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 4 Apr 90 p 1

[Ukase of the Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet "On Regulating the Work of Video Salons, Video Halls, and Video Bars"]

[Text] In connection with the numerous proposals of citizens, the Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To establish that the showing of video productions may be carried out only in video salons, video halls, video bars, and other institutions of the state cinema system on the basis of registered certification and on the basis of tickets, the prices of which have been approved by the USSR State Committee for Cinematography, the USSR Ministry of Finance, and the USSR State Committee for Prices, and only of those films which enter into the state video library.

The work regime of video salons, video halls, and video bars is established, and the supervision of them is carried out, by the ispolkoms of the local Tajik SSR Soviets of People's Deputies.

2. Violations of the rules established by Article 1 of the present Ukase entails the cessation of the activity of video salons, video halls, and video bars.

3. The persons who are guilty of showing video productions propagating pornography, the cult of violence and cruelty, bear responsibility in accordance with Article 244¹ of the Criminal Code of the Tajik SSR.

In connection with this to introduce in Article 244¹ of the Criminal Code of the Tajik SSR, confirmed by the Law of the Tajik SSR of 17 August 1961, having set it forth in the following wording:

"Article 244¹. The manufacture or distribution of works propagating pornography, the cult of violence and cruelty.

The manufacture, distribution, and showing or storage with the goal of distribution or showing of movie or video films or other works that propagate pornography, the cult of violence and cruelty are punished by the deprivation of freedom for a period of up to 3 years or corrective labor for a period of up to 2 years, or a fine of up to R1,000 with confiscation of the works and the means of their manufacture and showing."

4. The Tajik SSR Ministry of Culture and the Tajik SSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting are to intensify supervision of the movie repertoire, keeping in mind henceforth not to carry out the purchase and showing of films, whose content is not conducive to increasing the cultural level of the viewers.

*G. Pallayev, chairman,
Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
A. Kasymova, secretary,
Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet
29 March 1990 Dushanbe*

Criminal Code Amended

90US0805B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 5 Apr 90 p 1

[Ukase of the Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet "On the Introduction of Changes and Additions in the Criminal Code of the Tajik SSR]

[Text] With a view to the further improvement of the criminal legislation of the Tajik SSR, the Presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

To introduce in the Criminal Code of the Tajik SSR, confirmed by the Law of the Tajik SSR of 17 August 1961, the following changes and additions:

1. To supplement part two of article 7¹ after the word "robbery (articles 91 and 156)" with the words "extortion under aggravating circumstances" (articles 95, parts two and three; 160, parts two and three)".

2. In paragraph three of part four of Article 23, to replace the words "(Article 95)" with the words "(Article 95, part one)".

3. To supplement point two of part one of Article 24, after the words "robbery with the goal of seizing state and public property, or personal property of citizens (articles 91, 156)" with the words "extortion under aggravating circumstances (articles 95, parts two and three; 160, parts two and three)".

4. To supplement part 6 of Article 51, after the words "violation of the rules on currency operations under

aggravating circumstances (Article 86, part two)" with the words "extortion under aggravating circumstances (articles 95, parts two and three; 160, parts two and three)".

5. To supplement point two of part six of Article 52, after the words "robbery with the goal of the seizure of state, public property, or personal property of citizens under aggravating circumstances (articles 91, part two; 156, parts two and three) with the words "extortion under aggravating circumstances (articles 95, parts two and three; 160, parts two and three)".

6. To set forth articles 95 and 160 in the following wording:

"Article 95. Extortion of State, Cooperative, or Public Property

The demand for the transmission of state, cooperative, or public property, or the right to property under the threat of coercion against the person in whose charge or under whose protection this property is found, coercion against his relatives, the divulging of defamatory information about him or his relatives, the damage or destruction of their personal property, or state, cooperative, or public property in their charge or under their protection (extortion)

—is punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to 4 years with or without confiscation of property, or by corrective labor for a period of 1-2 years with or without confiscation of property.

Extortion committed repeatedly, or on the basis of preliminary collusion by a group of people, or under the threat of murder or the infliction of serious bodily injuries, or in combination with coercion not dangerous for life and health, or with the damage or destruction of property

—is punished by the deprivation of freedom for a period of 3-7 years with confiscation of property.

Extortion committed by an organized group, or by an especially dangerous recidivist, or combined with coercion dangerous for life and health, or which has entailed the infliction of heavy damage or other serious consequences

—is punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of 6-15 years with confiscation of property."

"Article 160. Extortion

The demand of the transmission of personal property of citizens or the right to property, or the perpetration of any actions of a property character under the threat of coercion against the person of the victim or his relatives, the divulging of defamatory information about him or his relatives, the damage or destruction of their property (extortion)

—is punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to 4 years with or without confiscation of property, or corrective labor for a period of up to 2 years with or without confiscation of property.

Extortion perpetrated repeatedly, or on the basis of preliminary collusion by a group of people, or under the threat of murder or the infliction of serious bodily injuries, or combined with coercion not dangerous for life and health, or with damage or destruction of property

—is punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to 3-7 years with confiscation of property.

Extortion perpetrated by an organized group, or by an especially dangerous recidivist, or combined with coercion dangerous for life and health, or which entailed the infliction of heavy damage or other serious consequences

—is punished by deprivation of life for a period of 6-15 years with confiscation of property."

7. In Article 103:

Replace the word and figure "and 93" with the figures "93, 95";

—after the figures "154-157", supplement with the figure "160";

8. In Article 163:

Replace the word and figure "and 157" with the figures "157, 160";

—after the figures "89-93", supplement with the figure "95".

9. The ukase becomes effective from the day of publication.

*G. Pallayev, chairman,
Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
A. Kasymova, secretary,
Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
29 March 1990 Dushanbe*

Information Reports from 12th Session of Tajik Supreme Soviet

19 April

90US0915A KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in
Russian 20 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "1st Session of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation: Information Report on the Meetings of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] On 19 April the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet continued its work. The morning meeting was opened by K. M. Makhkamov, chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

Taking into consideration the recommendations expressed by people's deputies at previous plenary meetings, the question of the program for the forthcoming actions of the republic's government is included in the session agenda. A report by the chairman of the Council of Ministers on this question will be given and discussed after the formation of the government has been completed.

Then, on the basis of a representation by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the deputies discussed the candidacy of the chairman of the Tajik SSR People's Control Committee. N. Sharipov, Kh. Tabarov, N. Dustov, A. Dostiyev, and other deputies took part in the discussion. By vote, a decree concerning the election of V. A. Aminov, who had been working as first deputy chairman of that committee, to that position was adopted.

In conformity with Articles 82 and 106 of the Tajik SSR Constitution, the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet was formed. It includes the chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet; first deputy chairman and deputy chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet; deputy chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet—chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast; chairman of the Tajik SSR People's Control Committee; and the chairman of the permanent commissions of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

The next question on the agenda was the question of electing the chairman of the Tajik SSR Supreme Court, the candidacy for filling that position, in accordance with the republic's Constitution, was submitted for the deputies' discussion by K. M. Makhkamov. As a result of the voting, the Supreme Soviet enacted a decree concerning the election of Sh. Makhmudov to that position.

After the discussion of the candidacy of K. Khasanov, which was submitted by the chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, to the position of Tajik SSR chief state arbiter, the deputies enacted a decree concerning his appointment to that position.

A plenary meeting considered the question of the draft of the Tajik SSR Law entitled "The Status of People's Deputies in Tajik SSR." A report was given by Ye. I. Turgunov, chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet. Taking into consideration the corrections and comments made by the deputies who spoke—N. Khuvaydullayev, V. I. Abdusamadova, Sh. B. Usmonova, Yu. Egamberdiyev, and a number of others—and as a result of the voting, the draft was passed in the first reading and was handed over for modification to the permanent commissions of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet with the participation of representatives of public organizations.

Deputy S. Kendzhayev spoke at the meeting on procedural questions. K. M. Makhkamov, chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, gave replies that satisfied the deputy.

The the Supreme Soviet began to form the republic's government.

In conformity with Article 112 of the Tajik SSR Constitution, the candidacies for persons to make up the government that were submitted by I. Kh. Kayeyev, chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, had been preliminarily discussed at meetings of the Supreme Soviet permanent commissions. The commissions had prepared the appropriate conclusions for each candidacy.

The contenders spoke at the meeting, giving detailed programs for their future activity. Deputies Kh. Tabarov, D. Ashurov, V. M. Mazo, D. Sharakhmatulloyev, A. Dzhabborov, A. Sharipov, R. K. Alimov, and others took part in the discussion of the candidacies.

The session will continue its work on 20 April.

20 April

90US0915B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 21 Apr 90 p 1

[Information Report on Meetings of 1st Session of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] On 20 April, at a plenary meeting of the session, under the chairmanship of K. M. Makhkamov, chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, the people's deputies continued to form the republic government.

The following took part in the discussion of the candidacies submitted by I. Kh. Khayeyev, chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers: A. Dzhabborov, A. Khabibov, M. Rasulov, M. Kurbonov, Z. Sh. Davletaliyeva, A. Rakhmonova, U. Shokirov, Kh. Nasredinov, Yu. Bulanov, I. Rakhmonov, M. Nazarshoyev, Ya. Mirzoyev, Yu. Egamberdiyev, Dzsh. Mansurov, S. Tagoyev, S. Kendzhayev, A. Khodzhayev, and other deputies.

Taking into consideration the numerous requests from the Communists of the Dushanbe city party organization and the delegates to the 33rd city party conference to hear reports and hold elections, D. Kh. Karimov, Tajik SSR people's deputy, and first secretary of the party's Dushanbe City Gorkom, who had been recommended by the republic's chief of government to fill the position of first deputy chairman of the chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of Tajik SSR Gosplan, withdrew his candidacy.

The candidacy of T. Nazarov was presented for discussion by the session. The following took part in the discussion: Yu. F. Ponosov, B. Sobir, R. G. Musayeva, Kh. Sandmurodov, V. I. Abdusamadova, R. Atayev, R. Makhkamov, O. Berdiyev, M. Mirzoyev, and other deputies. With a consideration of the findings of the permanent commissions and on the basis of the voting results, T. Nazarov was elected first deputy chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of Tajik SSR Gosplan.

Thus, the corps of deputy chairmen of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet was completely formed. In addition to T. Nazarov, the following were elected first deputy

chairmen of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers: G. V. Koshlakov and V. V. Vakhidov; and deputies: Yu. P. Zatsarinnyy, O. Latifi, G. F. Muravyev, and A. A. Samadov.

After the discussion, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet appointed a number of ministers whose candidacies had been submitted by the republic's chief of government.

Deputy inquiries were announced at the session.

On 21 April the 1st Session of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation, will continue its work.

21 April

90US0915C Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 22 Apr 90 p 1

[Information Report on Meetings of 1st Session of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] On 21 April the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet continued its work. The plenary meeting was opened by K. M. Makhkamov, chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

People's deputies considered questions linked with the appointment of the administrators of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Communications and of Tajik SSR state committees.

The following took part in the discussion of the candidacies submitted by I. Kh. Khayeyev, chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers: T. M. Dodavayev, V. I. Abdusamadova, M. F. Zaripov, N. Yunusov, N. Ashurov, B. Sobir, F. Gurezov, A. Sakhibnazarov, R. Makhkamov, Kh. Sharipov, N. Dustov, T. Gafarov, D. Ashurov, T. Dzhabborov, A. Khabibov, G. Savriddinova, A. T. Kakharov, D. Murodov, V. I. Pripisnov, N. Sharipov, A. Kh. Khodzhayev, A. Avgonov, Yu. F. Ponosov, Kh. Azimov, P. Solikhov, Ya. N. Azimov, S. G. Safarov, Kh. Nasrednikov, M. Karimov, A. N. Martovitskiy, S. Kendzhayev, M. Sheraliyev, A. Gulomov, K. Imomov, A. Yatimov, A. Abdushakhidov, N. Khuvaydullayev, and others.

The Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet expressed its gratitude to D. I. Popov, former Tajik SSR minister of communications, for his many years of work.

Thus, the makeup of the republic's government includes the following ministers: motor transport, Nariman Kholovich Yakubov; internal affairs, Mamadayev Navzhuvanov; housing and communal management, Yuriy Borisovich Kostarev; public health, Dzshura Imomovich Imomov; foreign affairs, Lakim Kayumovich Kayumov; culture, Tamara Maksimovna Abdushukurova; light industry, Sharif Kalandarovich Kalandarov; local industry, Abdukhakim Baymatovich Baymatov; land reclamation and water management, Akhtam Nurovich Nurov; public education, Ismoil Davlatov; communications, Ibragim Usmanovich Usmanov; rural construction, Rakhimdzhoi Gafurovich Gafurov; social

security, Adolat Temurovna Kasymova; construction and operation of motor roads, Abdukhakim Khalimov; construction, Yuriy Filimonovich Ponosov; trade, Opa-khon Katayevich Katayev; finance, Dzhanobiddin Lafizovich Lafizov; grain products, Abumalik Abdullayevich Abdullodzhanov; justice, Fayzullo Abdulloyev; and the following chairmen of state committees: agroindustrial, Akhmal Maksimovich Babayev; construction and architecture, Tursunboy Abdullayevich Abdullayev; material-technical supply, Sergo Shermatovich Ashurov; inspection of safe working conditions in industry and mining, Vadim Ilich Malygin; providing of petroleum products, Khodoykul Makhmudov; environmental protection, Munavvar Nazriyevich Nazriyev; press, Bobokhon Aliyevich Makhmudov; training of worker cadres, Shukurdzhon Zukhurov; statistics, Ismatullo Khamidovich Karimov; television and radio broadcasting, Akbar Shadmonovich Dzhurayev; labor and social questions, Yuldash Abdukarimovich Shakarimov; physical culture and sports, Ibragim Rizovich Khasanov; and state security, Vladimir Viktorovich Petkel. Salimdzhan Makhkambayev was appointed as business manager of Tajik SSR Soviet of Ministers.

The appointment of the chairman of the newly formed Tajik SSR State Committee on National Questions will be considered at the next session.

The deputies listened to an information report from the session secretariat concerning the citizens' letters that had been addressed to Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

G. V. Koshkalov, first deputy chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, submitted for review by the session a governmental recommendation concerning the enactment of the Supreme Soviet's decree entitled "Benefits for Families of Employees of Tajik SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Killed While On Duty." With a consideration of the deputies' opinions and comments, the draft of that document was transferred to the Tajik SSR Commission for Questions of Legislation and Citizens' Rights and Appeals and Tajik SSR Commission for Questions of Legality, Law and Order, and the Fight Against Crime.

On the recommendation of deputies, it was decided that the report by I. Kh. Khayeyev, chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, concerning the basic trends in the government's forthcoming activities will be published in the republic's newspapers before it is discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the session.

On 23 April the 1st Session of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet will continue its work.

23 April

90US0915D Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 24 Apr 90 p 1

[Information Report on Meetings of 1st Session of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] On 23 April the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet continued its work. The morning plenary meeting was opened by K. M. Makhkamov, chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet. Participants in the discussion of the report by I. Kh. Khayeyev, chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers, on the basic trends in the government's forthcoming activities, which was published the day before the meeting, included: people's deputies A. Mirzoyev, S. Z. Shoyev, M. S. Tabarov, A. Dzhabborov, A. Kh. Khabibov, K. Koimdodov, B. Sirozhev, N. Dustov, A. K. Anvarov, G. Fazylov, V. A. Shichkin, S. Kendzhayev, S. Tagoyev, V. I. Abdusamadova, A. Abdulloev, A. T. Kakhorov, B. Fattidinov, A. Kh. Khodzhaev, M.M. Ikramov, and U. Shokirov. The final statement was made by I. Kh. Khayeyev. Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet supported the program for the government's forthcoming activities and adopted an appropriate decree.

At the evening meeting, the session adopted a decree concerning the election of the chairman of the Tajik SSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight. I. Kh. Khodzhaev was elected to that position.

Then the participants of the session elected the makeup of the Tajik SSR People's Control Committee.

The session considered the question of the makeup of the Tajik SSR Supreme Court. The persons who participated in the discussion were: deputies V. I. Abdusamadova, N. Khvaydullayev, V. I. Pripisnov, S. Kandzhayev, Dzh. Murodov, A. Sakhbazarov, and E. S. Kurbanov, as well as G. V. Koshlakov, first deputy chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers. The Supreme Soviet adopted a decree concerning the election of the Tajik SSR Supreme Court.

Then the session considered questions linked with the election of judges for oblast courts, the Dushanbe city court, and the people's judges of rayon and city people's courts in rayons and cities of republic subordination. An appropriate decree of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet was enacted. The people's deputies elected the presidium of the Tajik SSR Supreme Court, and approved the makeup of the board of governors of Tajik SSR Gosarbitrazh.

Then the deputies listened to a report given by K. A. Aslonov, first deputy chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, concerning the draft of the Tajik SSR Law governing the making of amendments and additions to the Tajik SSR Constitution (Basic Law). Participants in its discussion included deputies T. Dzhabborov, Kh. Saidmurodov, A. Sakhbazarov, Kh. Azimov, S. Gal-iyev, S. Kendzhayev, V. A. Shichkin, N. Khuvaydul-layev, and others. As a result of an article-by-article vote, the Supreme Soviet made amendments to Articles 6, 7, and 49 of the Tajik SSR Constitution (Basic Law) and enacted a corresponding Law. With a consideration of recommendations made by deputies, the question of introducing amendments into other articles of the republic's Constitution will be considered at the next session after additional work has been done on the question at

the Supreme Soviet's Permanent Commission for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Citizens' Rights and Appeals, with the participation of the republic's Council of Ministers and public organizations.

After considering the question of the deadlines for activating individual articles of the Tajik SSR Law on Language, the Supreme Soviet passed a decision to transfer the government's recommendations to the permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet for review, and to return to this question at the next regular session.

The deputies began to discuss the amendments to the Tajik SSR Code Governing Marriage and the Family, that are linked with implementing the Tajik SSR Law on Language. A report was given by D. A. Ashurov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Commission for the Development of Literature, Language, National Traditions, and the Protection of the Historical Heritage.

The Supreme Soviet will continue its work on 24 April.

24 April

90US0915E Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 25 Apr 90 p 1

[Information Report on Meetings of 1st Session of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] A regular meeting of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet that was held on 24 April with K. M. Makhkamov, chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, presiding, the deputies continued the discussion of questions included on the session's agenda.

Lively discussion was evoked by the legislative draft concerning the introduction into the Code Governing Marriage and the Family of amendments and additions linked with the implementation of the Tajik SSR Law on Language. The participants in the discussion included people's deputies T. Gafarov, Kh. Nasredinov, R. Makhkamov, Kh. Saidmuradov, D. A. Ashurov, Dzh. Murodov, T. Dzhaborov, R. Abdurakhmanov, B. Sobir, and S. N. Karimov, and also Sh. D. Makhmudov, chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Court.

With a consideration of the recommendations and comments expressed by the deputies, and as a result of the voting, the Law governing amendments and additions to the Tajik SSR Code Governing Marriage and the Family was enacted by the Supreme Soviet.

Then the deputies discussed and approved the provisional rules that had been proposed by the Supreme Soviet's Commission on Questions of Legislation and Citizens' Rights and Appeals, jointly with other permanent commissions, and that pertain to the submittal to Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet and the consideration at the permanent commissions of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet of the drafts of laws and proposals for the enactment of Tajik SSR laws.

Following a report by Ye. I. Turgunov, deputy chairman of Supreme Soviet, the session considered the question of approving ukases of the Presidium of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

Participants in the discussion of the report included N. Dustov, Ya. N. Mirzoyev, A. T. Kakhorov, A. Sakhibnazarov, Dzh. Murodov, R. Abdurakhmanov, M. Makhmadaliyev, A. P. Vysochin, A. Saidmurodov, V. M. Mazo, and K. Imomov, as well as I. Kh. Khayeyev, chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers; D. L. Lafizov, Tajik SSR minister of finance; G. V. Koshlakov, first deputy chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers; and I. Davlatov, Tajik SSR minister of public education.

The Supreme Soviet enacted appropriate laws dealing with the question that was discussed.

The draft of the Tajik SSR Law on Responsibility for Restabilizing the Sociopolitical Situation in the Republic that was submitted for review by the deputies was actively discussed by them.

A report on that draft was given by F. Abdulloyev, Tajik SSR minister of justice. Participants in the discussion included T. Dzhaborov, N. A. Senshov, A. A. Kakharov, S. Kendzhayev, A. G. Kopyltsov, R. K. Alimov, M. Sheraliyev, V. A. Shichkin, A. T. Kakhorov, and V. I. Pripisnov, as well as G. S. Mikhaylin, Tajik SSR procurator; G. V. Koshlakov, first deputy chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers; and I. Kh. Khodzhayev, chairman of Tajik SSR Committee for Constitutional Oversight. Then the law was enacted.

Then the ministers began to discuss the second reading of the Law Governing the Status of People's Deputies in Tajik SSR. A report on the results of the review of the deputies' recommendations and comments that had been expressed during the discussion of the draft in the first reading, and findings of the Supreme Soviet's Permanent Commission on Questions of Legislation and Citizens' Rights and Appeals, were presented by deputy N. Khuvaydullayev, chairman of that commission.

The Supreme Soviet enacted the Tajik SSR Law Governing the Status of People's Deputies in Tajik SSR.

With a consideration of the wishes of the people's deputies, certain changes were made in the makeup of individual permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet.

Responses to inquiries by people's deputies S. Tagoyev, Ya. Mirzoyev, D. Mansurov, and A. Abdurazokov were given by Yu. P. Zatsarinnyy, deputy chairman of Tajik SSR Council of Ministers; and N. Kh. Yakubov, Tajik SSR minister of motor transport.

On the basis of the responses to the deputy inquiries, the Supreme Soviet enacted the appropriate decrees.

In conformity with Article 87 of the Tajik SSR Constitution, the republic's Supreme Soviet enacted a decree

governing the preterm cessation of the powers granted to Tajik SSR people's deputies I. Davlatov and Yu. F. Ponosov as a result of their having been confirmed as Tajik SSR ministers.

Then the deputies returned to the government-submitted draft of the decree entitled "Benefits to the Families of Employees of Tajik SSR MVD Killed While On Duty." With a consideration of the additional work that had been done on the draft at the permanent commissions and the recommendations that had been expressed by deputies in the course of discussion at the session, the Supreme Soviet enacted the decree providing benefits to the families of workers in law-enforcement agencies, military personnel, and members of people's *druzhinas* killed while on duty.

The session considered the question of the chairman of the Republic's Electoral Commission on Elections of Tajik SSR People's Deputies, approving Kh. Sharifov for that position and relieving I. F. Dedov of his duties as commission chairman as a result of his retirement.

The Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet expressed its heartfelt gratitude to I. F. Dedov for his many years of fruitful work in the soviet and party agencies of Tajik SSR.

In connection with the forthcoming 45th anniversary of the Victory, people's deputy M. Mamadzhanov, Tajik SSR military commissar, spoke in the name of war veterans and internationalist fighting men.

The Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet passed a message to all the citizens of the republic, which will be published in the press.

The concluding speech at the session was given by K. M. Makhkamov, chairman of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, and first secretary of the Tajik CP Central Committee.

Thereupon the 1st session of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, 12th Convocation, completed its work.

New Tajik Buildings Still Lack Resistance to Earthquakes

90US0851A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 17, 25 Apr 90 p 14

[Article by N. Asadulloyev and V. Makartumyan: "Warning: Sand Castles"]

[Text] We saw a number of new buildings at the entrance to Kolkhozabadskiy Rayon on the territory of the Kolkhoz imeni Lenin. The buildings are of clay and sometimes two-story. A concrete foundation and two stories of clay. Such a building will not stand under strong earthquakes; it will crash down like a house of cards, burying the inhabitants under it. But certainly all the buildings must be built according to the plan ratified by the rayon architect. They must be designed for a certain earthquake resistance. But who permitted the construction of two-story buildings? We addressed that

question to the deputy chairman of the Kolkhozabadskiy Rayispolkom Kh. Rustamov.

"No one monitors the quality and earthquake resistance of individual construction projects," he answered. "There is no plan, no expert appraisals, no inspection for them. We have only one architect for the entire rayon and what can he do? You can't keep track of everyone, and many people are building now."

In fact all of Tajikistan is now in scaffolding. Construction in rural areas is going on at a particularly rapid rate. In order to fulfill the republic program "Housing-93," lots are being allocated everywhere for construction of individual housing and banks are giving long-term loans. People are hastily building themselves on days off and during vacations, often by the "khashar" method, that is all together. Houses spring up like mushrooms after rain and the quality and earthquake resistance of many of them inspire one with real fear.

Tajikistan is a zone of active seismicity. On the average there are up to about 2,000 underground shocks a year, every 3 or 4 years—strong earthquakes, and every 10-15 years—catastrophic earthquakes.

The largest number of victims during an underground shock which devastated the Armenian cities of Leninakan, Kirovakan, and Spitak occurred in the taller frame-type buildings. They are built using the method of raising floors. It is precisely that kind with nine or more stories which Dushanbe is now building.

At the 42nd Session of the UN General Assembly, the 1990s were declared the International Decade of the Struggle to Reduce the Number of Victims and Destruction from Natural Catastrophes. The goal is to reduce the number of human victims and the scale of socioeconomic losses from natural disasters. But, no matter how strange it may seem, in Tajikistan people are building and living just as carelessly as in regions without earthquake danger. The only positive result of the Gissar tragedy is the emergence of a republic commission on emergency situations of the republic Council of Ministers. Unfortunately, over the decades no one has worked out a program of instruction for people: what should they do in emergency situations? How should they behave during an earthquake? If they are in an elevator? A building? Standing at a machine tool at work? No one in the republic explains that. But how much one can learn from failures and mistakes?

Even today the republic's inhabitants are psychologically completely unprotected during an earthquake. Can millions of square meters of housing of poor quality and low stability really be built just to become the graves of their inhabitants tomorrow?

Tajik Commission on Resettlement Suggested

90US0851B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 1 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by G. Sigareva, candidate of economic sciences and senior scientific associate, and E. Maslyakova and Kh. Nasrulloev, scientific associates of SOPS (Council for the Study of Productive Resources): "The Warmth of the Home Fire Does Not Only Have a Moral Value"]

[Text] This article is the result of research done by the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences SOPS on settlement issues. An attempt is made on the basis of materials of a sociological survey through a program developed in the institute to look at the problem in retrospect and show possible consequences of resettlement. The republic's future development will depend largely on creating a rational system of settlement. Therefore, we hope for a broad discussion of the problem.

Quite a few lances have been broken in recent years over the resettlement of people from the flood zone of the Rogun GES. On the main issue—to leave or not—they have no choice; but if they do, where do they go? The contradictions of reality—the planned formation of the republic's production-economic complex and system of settlement as well as the danger of natural catastrophes in many cases requires resettlement of people from places well-developed long ago to new territories. This resettlement often does not satisfy the internal interests of the person. That is where the dissatisfaction with the new living conditions (if they are objectively better than the old ones) and the desire to go back or resist the decision already made comes from.

Attempts to find compromise variants, as in the case of the Rogun GES, begin in the production sphere. For example, the question of whether to reduce the height of the dam and by how much is being fervently discussed. But all these variants propose a momentary solution to a conflict and do not predict their social or economic consequences.

However, in meeting today's challenges it is not at all harmful to look back at the past and carefully study its experience and on this basis draw conclusions for the future. For this is by no means the first time that the country and the republic have faced problems of forced migration. One should remember the eviction of whole peoples from familiar places. Nor has Tajikistan avoided that wave. The first data on it go back to 1927-1928.

Resettlement (largely residents of mountainous regions to flatlands) seemed to have good intentions: equal allocation of land for farms, rational use of work force in an agriculturally overworked area, and enlargement of cotton fields through development of empty lands. A system of measures to stimulate the moving and ease the living conditions of the migrants was envisioned.

The opinion is frequently expressed that developing flatland territories with intensive irrigated farming was vitally important to the republic at that time. It is

difficult not to agree. But a different opinion is formed when one studies the means by which the priority economic goal was reached. The methods used were by no means persuasion and incentive.

In many mountainous kishlaks [villages] houses were simply destroyed and families who wrapped up their simple household goods in a few hours were taken many kilometers away. Frequently people did not know what awaited them in the new place. This was explained by good intentions—the need to enlarge rural populated points so that better conditions could be created for social and economic development. However, universal enlargement with no consideration of the specifics of resettlement ultimately led to destruction of a significant part of the housing fund of the developed lands, to economic losses for the state and the population, and to considerable moral damage.

In mountainous regions the economic potential of developing agriculture has declined. For example, in 1970 the area planted to winter wheat was 78.8 percent of the 1940 figure, while for spring wheat it was 21.6 percent, and for potatoes—88.6 percent.

Twenty households remain in the village of Nurundzh in Komsomolabadskiy Rayon. There is one mill, and that does not operate constantly because grain fields are small and so the harvest is insignificant. But before the resettlement there were 120 farms here and they produced so much grain that 20 mills were built to process it.

Forced resettlement in the past has aggravated today's social problems, created a decline in the level of labor productivity in agriculture, and created the problem of unemployment of the able-bodied population.

But the most destructive thing is perhaps not even that. The psychological unreadiness of people for resettlement resulted in a state of uncertainty and the sense of being a migrant, which does not pass for decades. We talked with people who confessed that they did not feel themselves at home in the new place until 20 years later. Even returning to their birthplaces does not always help eliminate the sense of lost years. The exacerbation of the negative consequences of forced migration leads to conflict situations.

So are the contradictions between the objective necessity of developing the republic's economy and the personal needs of its residents so unresolvable that one will inevitably suffer at the expense of the other? And if they are resolvable, how? And what are the sources of these contradictions? We posed these questions and last year conducted a sociological survey on the prerequisites and consequences of forced migration.

We gave the questionnaire to three population groups: those who were compelled to leave mountainous rayons and adapted to the new conditions; those who left but returned to the former place of residence; and those who face leaving habitable rayons under pressure of external circumstances. Very interesting results were obtained.

Most of the representatives of the first group (about 80 percent) mentioned that after moving to the Vakhsh Valley, they began to live in better conditions, got the opportunity to find a job they wanted, and quickly set up relationships with those around them. They also mentioned the good condition of the roads. To a lesser degree conditions changed for cultural relaxation, entertainment, and the opportunity for working their own subsidiary farms. Even so about 70 percent of those who answered expressed regret that they came to Vakhsh Valley. Only one out of five of those who came fully adapted to the new living conditions. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority did decide to return.

In principle this desire coincides today with the objective need to revive the mountainous regions. However, what do the residents themselves expect to find in them? Those who had already returned to the mountains answered that question. I must say that the return to the birthplace began just after the forced migration, only at first only a handful dared to: until the 1960s returning to the birthplace was considered almost a crime, and local authorities punished those who returned by destroying the homes they had rebuilt and evicting them from the territory of the rayons within their jurisdiction.

We talked with a woman whose husband moved her family that way three times. And only in the 1960s, when returning was secretly allowed, was her appearance in the mountain village "not noticed." It was as if she had not existed for several years. Incidentally, there were many others too. Those who returned got some independence from local authorities, but they were also "independent" of them in obtaining help. However, even these conditions increased the stream of those moving back.

What drew them home? After all, the majority noted better living conditions in Vakhsh Valley. Even that could not compensate for the internal protest formed during the forced move to the flat regions, and that feeling could not be extinguished for many years.

The respondents named yearning for their birthplace as the main motive for returning to the mountainous regions (69 percent). About 12 percent of those surveyed returned because of better economic conditions in the mountainous regions and about 10 percent moved for health reasons. "You understand that it's easier to live in the valley, but where will you find such water, such air?" old people said to us.

The mountain residents' strong attachment to their regions of habitation should be taken into account when measures on the policy of resettlement, from the zone of the future Rogun Water Reservoir for example, are determined. But are they? In surveying the residents of these villages, we understood that most of them do not know about future living and working conditions in the new populated point.

Only 42 percent of those surveyed were informed on the new place of residence and more than half do not have any information at all on the resettlement point. It is not

surprising that in Komsomolabad almost half of those surveyed categorically do not want to move to the new place—the overwhelming majority expect only worse conditions for themselves. And almost all of them believe that no forms of compensation or concessions can influence their decision.

The lack of information is by no means the only factor in this behavior, although it is an important one (31 percent of those asked reported that they agreed to move if better living and working conditions were created). People are offended. They are offended that they were not considered in planning the resettlement and calculating its economic efficiency. That someone decided their fate for them. They said to us outright: the planning and construction of the Rogun GES has been underway 20 years already. But why did you not consult with us in the very beginning and allocate plots of land in places we wanted to live beforehand? During that time we certainly could have built our own houses and planted gardens and then moved to places that were not empty.

A very great misunderstanding exists even now. And it is a mutual misunderstanding among all parties involved. For example, evaluations of the value of housing and private plots, compensation, and concessions conflict. Frequently, in arguing their position, people pick out certain theses from official speeches and interpret them as it suits them. For example, they announce that the Rogun GES will be of no benefit to Tajikistan and so it is not necessary. That is where demands to either stop construction or reduce the height of the dam come from. Power-engineering in turn cites its own counterarguments: there is not enough electricity, the sector should be developed faster than the economy as a whole or otherwise we will never reach a normal level of development.

But what steps should be taken now? In our opinion, psychologists, jurists, sociologists, and propagandists should first be sent to potential migrants to explain the situation and their rights to them, eliminate fear of the future, consider their desires and needs, and eliminate the condition of conflict. For now mutual misunderstanding and mutual distrust and the feeling that each party is trying to deceive and outsmart the other bring any negotiations to an impasse.

But various circumstances can influence the decision to move. It is a secret to no one that in Khaite fine houses remain empty because the migrants prefer to build their own. Most of those who expect to move are certain that the promises of the local organs of power to help in providing services for the new place will be only promises, and construction materials will have to be bought from speculators for three times the price. What can you do? Their experience leads them to that conclusion. And even the concessions in the 1930s, in our opinion, were substantially more significant than now. But how can you leave a private plot which feeds the family? It has been estimated that just one walnut tree provides about 1,000 rubles of income during the season.

We believe the approach to settlement where literally every family in each village is planned for resettlement is one-sided. Life is life and it makes its own corrections and everything that looked so good on paper may prove to be stillborn tomorrow. In our opinion, instead of attempting to lay everything in straight rows of figures it is better to set up a competent commission which would individually sort out each case and where a migrant could turn for consultation and help.

It seems there would be more than enough work for this commission. Even now certain contradictions are apparent. For example, old people who live on memories of their birthplace yearn to return to the mountains. Their children, and certainly their grandchildren, are not particularly anxious to return to the mountains. But who will develop the land and feed the family and the republic then? And the local authorities pose a condition: the entire family must return.

Most likely, this is realistic if one thinks first of all of roads today. Isolation from the big world for half a year when the roads are covered with snow or mudslides hardly attracts young people. But many problems are solved with roads. Possibly not every village will need a school, a club, and a store, and better conditions for cultural relaxation and education may be created.

Is it expensive? Most likely. But even so we must also consider how much each object in each settlement costs. That is the first thing. Secondly, it is not everything that costs little that is inexpensive—we must learn how to figure the social effect and remote consequences. But they can be very unexpected, as the start of the resettlement epic showed (we already talked about that here). And thirdly, unusual solutions and original work methods must be sought. For example, setting up road building cooperatives in villages. Or, let us say, cable lines and funiculars. In short, search. The trouble is that we are always trying to catch up to life and have not yet learned to anticipate its nonmaterial needs.

Uzbek CP Secretary Exhortation on Party Adaptation, Restructuring

90US0902A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
22 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Uzbek CP Central Committee Secretary R. Popov: "On Sudden Turnabouts in Life"]

[Text] The nation and the Communist Party are getting ready for the 28th Party Congress. Preparations are taking place in complex conditions, as the politicization of society has reached its peak and many of the principal tenets of Marxist-Leninist teachings are being questioned. But it has never occurred to chronic complainers that for us, the most important thing is a Leninist methodology of evaluating the situation. That, and not dogma or quotations, has brought the country to perestroika and to the need for reform in all aspects of our life.

In order to orient oneself toward the events and phenomena of our changing conditions, I must necessarily attempt to find solid ground, and on this basis I would like to define my own position; this is all the more important, in that today even a neutral attitude amounts to a position which one politicized group or another may turn to their advantage:

- THE SOCIAL SYSTEM WITH THE HIGHEST LABOR PRODUCTIVITY WILL WIN

- CONSOLIDATION, IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE'S INTERESTS

- THE TIME HAS COME FOR CREATIVE WORK

At the 19th All Union Party Conference many delegates were concerned about the questions: how shall the Communist Party continue to exist, and can it function effectively without outside criticism. There was even a dispute about the independence of the party organ, the newspaper PRAVDA, from its Central Committee. Numerous suggestions were offered about an alternative party. Our impressions on the party and society have sharply changed over the last two years. Life itself has led to a situation in which it is simply unthinkable for the Communist Party to exist as the sole party. The fact of the formation of other parties is already evident. Under such conditions the task for all communists is to define a program of action in a new political situation.

People often speak about the need for political struggle, the struggle for power. But at the same time, not much is said about what the power should be used for once it is achieved. In the dawn of its life, the Party defined its task as to take power, not for power's sake, but only in order to utilize it as a means of building a just society. Lenin pointed out that Communists do not accept new members just so they can enjoy the advantages of membership in the ruling party. In competition with other social organizations, the party of the communists can win only by means of a constructive program, and the ability to convince the masses and organize them for realizing that program. Today this is our principal advantage, since we are the ones who have a clear-cut program for the socio-economic development of the republic. But we are also prepared to examine the programs proposed by other social organizations and parties as well. And we can enter a coalition, if it is deeply concerned with the interests of the man of labor.

Are we afraid of schism, or the departure of a certain group of members from the party? After all, such a schism could entail the dismemberment of society. But on the other hand, one must not fail to consider that our party organism has far too many members who are not active communists in the Leninist conception. And if those who leave us do not support the communist platform for social change, then our party can only gain by losing them. A number of republic party organizations have acquired a certain amount of experience in holding attestation of communists (although of late it has somewhat lost its momentum). And nevertheless, we are

faced with the necessity to purge the party ranks. And we must make serious preparations for this. If the people who discredit the communist ideal do not leave us, we shall be forced to suggest that they either conform with perestroyka, or leave. Otherwise we will be overwhelmed with passivity.

People in working collectives often remark that of late many different terms have appeared, which have not been clearly defined. At times progressive terminology is used to erode class concepts and reference points in the communist movement. We have begun to be ashamed of the word "communism." Even the Communist Party more and more often refers to itself as "the party of socialist choice." And just what is socialist choice and how does it differ from the communist, or from the choice of the social-democratic parties of other countries—if there is no clear-cut definition? The class approach to evaluating situations and actions is being pushed into the background. It is hard to agree with those who want to delete the words "working class" from the concept of the party. After all, since the very beginning, the RSDRP [Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party] has been a party of the working class, and in its essential being it is the party of that very working class, the bearer of progressive ideology. Other classes and strata have merged with the workers' party, and have adopted communist ideology. Who would need the party without the workers, and whose ideals would it defend? We all must gain a thorough grasp of the processes taking place in society and define our positions—whether we are active builders of a new life, or fellow-travelers, or bystanders; or whether we are enemies.

One of the classic principles of Leninist methodology of managing the process of social development is—scientific forecasting and programming. I am pleased to say that the pre-election platform of the Uzbek CP Central Committee is a program document that mobilizes. It brought a lively response from the republic's workers owing to its specific nature, its constructiveness and its clear-cut milestones. On the basis of such a platform one can confidently go to the party congress and carry on party work among the people. However, it also behooves us to examine more thoroughly its economic section, and give concrete expression to it on the level of every oblast, city, rayon and collective.

Behind the veil of political passions the man of labor has receded into the background somewhat. It has become unpopular to take an interest in problems of increased labor productivity or the innovator movement. The idea of dividing up administrative functions in the Soviets between workers and intelligentsiya is heard very frequently. The opinion is becoming widespread that it is necessary to make the deputy's activities more professional and that the representatives of the working class are not capable of carrying them out, allegedly because of insufficient education. The fact of the matter is, that such ideas are attempts to prevent the workers and peasants from taking part in administering the affairs of state.

Extrapolating such a process, one can presume that by just such methods, a reformed Soviet could become much more "bureaucratic" than traditional party committees. In the latter, contact with the worker-peasant milieu was guaranteed by their high level of representation in the membership of raykoms and obkoms, since this category of workers did not exist in the apparat itself. And in many Soviets today, workers are a distinct minority, a fact which is fraught with rather dangerous consequences.

In this connection, Lenin's persistent demand to increase the Central Committee membership from 50 to 100 members—primarily by virtue of workers—once again requires serious thought; workers, moreover, taken directly from their lathes, inasmuch as they understand the life of the working collective best. In our case, the lopsided representation which has come to pass in our Soviets makes it necessary to devote considerably more attention to the actions of the communist-deputies, and thoroughly acquaint them with the problems of the workers and ordinary peasants, and other poor social groups. If we, the party of the communists, want to continue to enjoy the support of the working class and the laboring peasantry, we must by our own actions provide them social guarantees and protection in market conditions.

Our opponents persistently demand the depolitization of the economic organs and the withdrawal of the CPSU from economic work. Initially this demand was formulated in terms of dividing the functions of party, Soviet and economic organs. Subsequently it was transformed into the refusal to substitute one for the others; and today—to complete rejection of party participation in managing the economy. Actually, our practical experience contains numerous examples of duplication and finger-pointing at economic managers from the party on very specific technological questions. It is possible that at certain stages of socialist construction such control was indeed required. But our times have introduced significant changes to these relationships. Today the raykom apparat, and especially the obkom apparat, have sharply curtailed their involvement in economic matters, one of the reasons for which was the widespread cutbacks in the economic departments. For example, until 1989 there were six departments, comprising 28 responsible officials, occupied with economic questions at the Tashkent party obkom—while at present there is one department, numbering seven officials. Dictated by financial problems, a forthcoming staff cutback will reflect on this department as well. At the Uzbek CP Central Committee, there used to be six departments occupied with economic problems, employing 48 officials. A year ago, a unified socio-economic department was established in their stead, employing 24 officials. One day it too will be reduced by half. Naturally, such cadre cutbacks have already narrowed the sphere of party organ participation in economic matters—especially at the oblast and republic levels. A forthcoming cutback and regrouping of the party gorkom and raykom apparats will also significantly change their participation in the economic processes in the cities and rayons. Under these conditions an intensive search must be conducted for forms of party

influence on socio-economic processes; for otherwise, all that will remain of the economic goals of the Communist Party proclaimed in its Program, and its policy for simplifying socialism and raising the living standard of the Soviet people, will be its good wishes. How can one program for socio-economic growth without taking part in supporting it?

Let us take another aspect of party participation in this process that does not limit the freedom of the Soviets and economic organs. Under conditions of developing democracy, administrative independence of territories and industrial organizations, providing the purposeful influence of the CPSU in these spheres represents the highest algebra of party work. Perhaps this could explain the aversion of various kinds of amateur organizations to preparing a concrete program for their participation in economic affairs. After all, it is easier to criticize and to shout slogans, than to engage in day-by-day creative work.

One cannot help speaking about yet another aspect of the problem of depolitization of the economic structure and the withdrawal of the party from the economic sphere. While carrying out the functions of the ruling party, the CPSU fully acknowledges and accepts responsibility for the mistakes and unfinished work of the past, and is making an effort to correct them. A concrete example of this is the major reform being carried out in the economy of late upon the initiative and under the leadership of the CPSU. But if the party is excluded from the economic sphere, it will cease to be responsible for all the transformations being made here. The sole responsible body will be the Soviet, elected for a five-year term. It is well-known that many economic reforms realize their effects (or negative consequences) in five years or more. In this case, we could be faced with a situation in which no one is responsible for anything. Just imagine: the membership of a Soviet undertakes reform, but a different membership elected in five years or less will not be responsible for its consequences—or may change it altogether. Such a gap in continuity in responsibility for the fate of the people, coupled with the lack of a single policy in economic construction could result in great losses for society. The introduction of the presidency personifies responsibility for affairs in the country and in the republic; however, even such a form of rule can entail abrupt changes in incumbency, and provides no guarantees of continuity and responsibility in practical matters of administration.

None of this means that it is necessary to return to the previous system of staff pressure by party committees on economic subdivisions. A new system is needed for participation of party committees and organizations in administering the socio-economic processes on a territory. Rejecting direct involvement in the activity of specific economic-administrative links, party committees, through their commissions, are called upon to focus special attention on analysis of socio-economic processes, working out fundamental programs for improving them, and organizing the process of putting them into effect through the communists who work at the Soviets and economic subdivisions. The latter formula is not new in party practice;

today, however, it is filled with qualitatively new content. This is brought about by the principally new status of the Soviets, the new economic status of the economic organs, and by the sharp cutback in the size of the party apparatus.

In this respect it would seem necessary to fundamentally reorganize the party committees—especially the city and rayon links. In order to simplify the interaction of primary party organizations and raykoms it would be useful to simplify their structure, and keep the officials thus released on the rolls of the primary organizations recommending them.

At the party raykom three basic commissions should be formed: on organizational-party work, ideology, and socio-economic questions. Their membership should include, along with those raykom members not relieved, two or three officials entirely relieved of their basic duties, and also four or five party organizers from among the employed workers. Each commission could be headed by one of the secretaries. As it appears to us, such a party committee structure could best link up with the primary organizations, and would simplify their interaction. If all raykom officials were left on the permanent rolls in primary party organizations, this would also bring them closer to the lower links, and would provide control from below.

Time is relentless; society is increasingly entering a new socio-political situation. Under these circumstances it is necessary to undertake active, energetic work to enlist the people of labor to work in building a socialist society. This requires a new formulation of the task of the mass information media as well. Lenin's reminder that the newspaper is the organizer of the masses applies all the more now. The radical build-up of the material base of the primary party organizations stipulated in the draft Regulations, along with the simultaneous cutback in the apparatus of the higher-ranking links and the increased independence and initiative of the lower-ranking links, could lead to a certain amount of uncoordinated activity. And this necessitates an increased role for the party press as the means of unifying party organizations and Communists in the finest traditions of ISKRA.

We are at the threshold of major political events—the 22nd Uzbek CP Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress. Not passive anticipation, but urgent regrouping of party forces, organizational cohesion and ideological firmness—that is what the present moment demands of us, the Communists. A period of cardinal socio-economic changes is upon us. And under these conditions the people of labor especially need a unified, ideologically-endowed and highly-organized party, capable of standing up in defense of their interests. I would like to believe, that by July the endless chain of reorganizations and demonstrations will reach an end, that systematic creative work will begin, and that days of intensive work will commence.

Sajudis, Rukh, Belorussian Front Meeting
90UN1862B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
28 Apr 90 p 1

["Protocol of a Working Meeting of Representatives of the People's Movements of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania"]

[Text] A working meeting of representatives of the people's movements of the Ukraine ("Rukh"), Belorussia (the BNF [Belorussian People's Front]), and Lithuania ("Sajudis") took place on 26 April 1990. Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], the Belorussian SSR, and the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council took part. They discussed the political situation in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania and issues related to the economic blockade of Lithuania and to a meeting of democratic forces in Kiev scheduled for 5 and 6 May.

Special attention was allotted to problems of the Chernobyl disaster and its effects. The meeting's participants resolved to join forces in the matter of resolving the ecological, economic, and humanitarian issues stemming from Chernobyl. It was stressed that the economic blockade organized by decision of the Presidential Council and the administration of the USSR complicates the economic situation in the neighboring republics, which undoubtedly is reflected in the implementation of state programs for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. It was agreed that it is necessary to prepare concrete joint measures to defend the vital interests of the citizens of the Ukraine and Belorussia who are suffering from the catastrophe.

The decision was made to conduct such working meetings regularly.

Sergey Golovatyy, on behalf of the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika ("Rukh")

Virgilijus Cepaitis, on behalf of the Lithuanian movement "Sajudis."

Zenon Poznyak, on behalf of the Belorussian people's front "Adradzhenne."

Minsk, 26 April 1990.

Moscow Soviet Discusses Refugee Problem
90UN2088A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 7 Jun 90 p 1

[Article by M. Marinich: "Come Back, Refugees!"]

[Text] A press conference was held at the Moscow Soviet. Members of the Deputy Commission on Refugee Problems, representatives of a number of services of the Moscow Gorispolkom and also of the committee of Russian-speaking refugees, and leaders of party and Soviet

bodies of Baku who came to our city answered correspondents' questions. Actually, this press conference was held basically due to the visit by the representative delegation from Baku.

First Secretary of the Baku Party Gorkom R. Agayev, First Deputy Chairman of the Baku Gorispolkom K. Shcherbakov, and representatives of the Azerbaijan SSR reported that the city authorities would guarantee the safety of all Russian-speaking refugees who wish to return to Baku. The Baku residents are awaiting the return of their friends and neighbors and have guaranteed them the return of housing and jobs held previously. More than half of the 11,000 persons of Russian nationality who left Baku have already returned. About 270,000 Russian continue to live and work in Baku.

However, these guarantees do not yet apply to persons of Armenian nationality. Their return is complicated by the fact that there are now about 100,000 Azerbaijanis in Baku, refugees from Armenia, whose situation remains difficult due to not being provided housing, work, and so forth. The first secretary of the Baku Party Gorkom reported on this.

The deputies of the Moscow Soviet updated the figures on the number of refugees in Moscow and the oblast. According to official information, there are 5,500 of them in the capital and more than 5,000 located near Moscow. It is possible that this information does not provide the full picture and that there, in fact, are several thousand more refugees in the Moscow region. However, they do not number in the tens of thousands, as rumors would have it. The USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems [Goskomtrud] has actually officially registered about 50,000 people, but the majority of them have already left for other cities and regions of the country.

The deputies made a statement for the mass media.

As far as the statement made by the representatives of the Azerbaijani capital about the guarantees of safety for Russian-speaking refugees returning to Baku is concerned, the delegation of Moscow deputies that visited Baku confirmed that it is now calm in the city and the attitude toward Russians is friendly. However, the military is still keeping peace in the capital of Azerbaijan. They are not seen on the streets in the daytime; they go to their posts at curfew.

At the end of the press conference, at the request of the correspondent from VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA, the chairman of the Commission on Refugee Problems, A. Melnikov, answered questions encountered in letters from our readers. He decisively rejected the conjecture that the previous Moscow Soviet had given out thousands of apartments to refugees, that they have occupied entire buildings in Solntsev, and that they were buying up everything in the stores for speculation and that is why there is nothing for the Muscovites to get.

"We have not detected even isolated vouchers made out to refugees," A. Melnikov emphasized. "No houses were turned over to them, and the fact that 5,000 or 10,000 refugees can seriously affect trade in a city of 9 million people that has hundreds of thousands of visitors daily simply does not stand up to elementary logic. Of course, there is speculation in Moscow, including the buying up of goods for this purpose by visitors to the capital. This is evidenced just by the cases discovered upon inspecting automobiles leaving Moscow. But we should not accuse just the refugees of doing this."

In conclusion, the deputy said that the problem can be fundamentally resolved only at the state level.

Pace of Estonian Path to Independence Questioned

90UN1739A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in
Russian 20 Apr 90 p 4

[Article by E. Poldroos, translated from PAEVALEHT No 58, 10 Apr 90: "A Sense of Emptiness After the Adoption of an Important Decision"]

[Text] On 30 March at 20:07, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on the state status of Estonia. The deputies applauded without standing up, as was accepted in the past. There was neither a press conference, nor an enthusiastic public in the Gorkholl.

The international reaction also proved modest. The world's attention and sympathy had been turned to Lithuania. At best, we were mentioned in connection with this as "other Baltic states." The Lithuanian problem became the subject of international negotiations at the highest level, and it is probable that the Estonian problem was not included in them. Even though we forced Gorbachev to frown, he all the same decided that a personal telephone conversation with Mr. Rüütel was sufficient.

Everything is coming about somehow insipidly. Some anticipated more radical decisions from the Supreme Soviet, even up to the proclamation of independence. Some wished that the Supreme Soviet had not made any decisions at all. Sometimes politics takes strange turns. Three opposing political forces attempted to avoid the radicalization of the Supreme Soviet, each for its own particular reasons.

First of all, the adherents of the national idea, associated with the Committee of Estonia, reserved for themselves the exclusive right to restore the Estonian Republic and completely reject the right of the republic Supreme Soviet to concern itself with issues of the state status of Estonia. Secondly, well-known political figures of the old doctrine have simply been scared. Third are the [intery], who desire to retard the radical measures we are undertaking.

The motivations were different, but the result is the same: The Supreme Soviet must get out of the game or

limit itself to the issue of the status of Estonia by declarations composed in general terms, deciding nothing.

In this situation, the People's Front proved to be the single political force that came to the Supreme Soviet session prepared, with a package of draft laws aimed at restoring Estonia's independence. The portfolios of all the other political forces remained empty. The impression was also created that a significant portion of the deputies were oriented only toward a power struggle.

The People's Front could not permit itself a repetition of the solo spectacle of Yu. Aare, which took place at the last session of the Supreme Soviet (as we know, his proposal to include the proclamation of independence in the agenda was not adopted). It was completely obvious that in the current situation the only proposals that could be made were ones with the prior assurance of support by the pro-Estonian minded forces. For this purpose, before the session and during its course, intensive consultations were held with representatives of other political groups. Contacts with the Committee of Estonia became a determining factor, which, stemming from the aforementioned causes, applied powerful pressure in order to smooth out the rough edges of the draft laws presented by the People's Front. The adoption of radical decisions in the Supreme Soviet was blocked. The People's Front was forced to retreat step by step. They had to repudiate their demand to suspend the force of the USSR Constitution within the territory of the Estonian SSR, but in the resolution on state status, they managed to preserve the point on the illegality of USSR state power in Estonia. The proposal "The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet proclaims itself to be independent of the state power of the Soviet Union, and depends only upon the will of the people that elected it," etc., was lost. The idea of abolishing the title "Estonian SSR" and all the attributes associated with it are now cast in doubt: the flag, the seal, the anthem. (The corresponding draft law has been presented by the People's Front). The same fear is at fault: We suddenly sense the smell of a heretical third republic. However, is precisely on such a path that we could announce to the world public the fact that we are in a transition period, which must also signify a break of ties with the past. We are no longer the Estonian SSR, but we are not yet the Estonian Republic.

The path to the rebirth of independence proposed by the Estonian Congress is wonderful in its logic and legal purity. But do we have enough time? We proclaimed a transition period. In a normal situation, this would be an understandable means, and the only true means. Yet who can predict what the situation in the USSR will be like by the end of this transition period, in one year, or even in a few months? Can we speak of restoring independence at all at that time? What will happen if the development of events in the country takes a sharp turn toward dictatorship? Of course, a return to the past cannot continue for long, but after this will we still be

capable of restoring independence? We have bet everything on a card without knowing whether we hold the trump card.

We will hope that this is the case, yet I cannot get away from the fear that the future historians may say "In the spring of 1990, the Estonian people let slip the only chance presented to it for liberation."

We have little force, and even international law does not sufficiently compensate for our weakness, although we assert that we have a surpassing wealth of arguments grounded in this law. Our chance consists of joint actions with our comrades in this fate—the other Baltic states. In the case of coordinated joint action, our forces would not only triple, but grow in geometric progression. We must consider the determining factors of today's situation: For the time being, it is still possible in the Soviet Union to act in the name of restoration of independence. Owing to the liberation process in Eastern Europe, this problem is keenly recognized by the international public. Such a favorable situation may not continue for long. We have no right to miss this train.

The danger that Moscow may contrast the "moderate" Estonians to the "extremist Lithuanians" in order to then force each individually to its knees cannot be excluded. In this case, we might even get a reward—"sovereignty in the renewed federation." By doing so, we would not only betray the Lithuanians, but deliver a cruel blow to our own aspirations toward freedom.

I think that we must all act peacefully, yet a great deal more decisively than we have until now. If the Committee of Estonia is capable of taking steps with which both the West and East is forced to reckon, then it must do so. But if for the time being, it has no such opportunities, then let the Supreme Soviet act. Or they should act together. We must achieve a point where at all levels, including that of the May negotiations of Gorbachev and Bush, the words "the Lithuanian issue" be replaced by the words "the Baltic states issue."

Good people, we must get out of this absurdity. When we become the Estonian Republic, no one is going to ask, how classic were the means by which we got to that point."

While participating stormy Estonian politics, I recall the story of how Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn freed Nigger Jim "by all the rules." Only Nigger Jim remained unemancipated.

Estonian Party Members Deny Nationality-Based Split

*90UN1698A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 17 Apr 90 p 2*

[Letter to editors by delegates to the 20th Estonian CP Congress Kh. Barabaner, R. Kudryavtsev, V. Lipatenko, M. Menshov, G. Mokretsov, Yu. Petkevich, S. Smolyakov, M. Sorokin, A. Khmyrov, and S. Etlin: "For Balanced Decisions!"]

[Text] A serious situation has developed in republican party organizations since the 20th Congress of the Estonian Communist Party. Differences in the ideas of communists concerning the direction of the Estonian Communist Party development in the conditions of the political processes taking place in the republic have led to an organizational split among congress delegates. **It would be a great mistake to consider that this split has followed ethnic lines.** A large part of the Russian-language congress delegates supported the idea of setting up a coalition Central Committee within the framework of which a mutually acceptable path of development of the Estonian Communist Party should be found during the transitional period. We are convinced that at such a difficult time for the republic only the joint work of communists of different nationalities can reduce social tensions and contribute to inter-ethnic cooperation.

Today it is obvious that there are forces which would like to turn division along ideological lines into a split of the Estonian Communist Party according to ethnic background. We consider that, in the situation evolving in the republic, this is disastrous not only for the party itself, but also for the development of democratic processes and the formation of a civic society in Estonia. Up until now the Estonian Communist Party has been a valid political force capable in many ways of preventing nationality-based confrontation in the republic. If the communist party splits along ethnic lines it may become a factor aggravating such confrontation. Such a course of events clearly plays into the hands of both those who see Estonia's future as a mono-national, national-socialist type of state and those who would like to see it a province in a neo-Stalinist empire.

It must be clearly realized that in the conditions of present-day and future Estonia, in the conditions of transition to a multiparty political system, the influence of right-wing political movements and chauvinistic parties, regardless of their ethnic orientation, can grow and is already growing. Strengthening of those forces can lead to an acute, and maybe tragic, escalation of inter-ethnic confrontations in the republic. These forces must be opposed by an influential left-wing party (or bloc of left-wing parties) speaking for the interests of people of labor and uniting progressively minded workers, peasants and intellectuals regardless of nationality or native language in its ranks.

In these conditions mutual understanding and unity among all the democratic forces of the republic is extremely important. Accordingly, we consider it right and essential for democratic forces within the Estonian Communist Party to consolidate regardless of ethnic background. That is precisely why we feel that the formation of a parallel Central Committee by some Congress delegates was a hasty act. They in advance rejected any possibility of advocating different positions, as the coalition Central Committee retaining unity with the CPSU during the transitional period proposes. In this our position coincides with that of the CPSU leadership.

Joint work requires the unity of civic positions. Only such unity allows joint work to be conducted. We consider that there are several fundamental principles without recognition of which no communist can consider himself to be a democratically thinking citizen. These are:

- The right of nations to self-determination, including secession and formation of an independent state, as a basic principle of democratic resolution of the nationalities question. At the same time, the specific ways of implementing that right must necessarily take into account generally recognized human rights;
- Democratic organization of political power, based on the rule of law, parliamentarianism, and multi-party conditions;
- A healthy economy, which can only be based on a diversity and equality of forms of property;
- Existence of a system of state, political and public institutions ensuring the social and legal protection of every member of society;
- Recognition of the fact that one of the basic purposes of society and duties of the state should be the development and protection of the spiritual culture of all ethnic groups represented in the state;
- The priority, in a rule-of-law state, of common human values.

Proceeding from recognition of these principles we espouse:—A sovereign Estonia as a subject of international law which bases its relations with the USSR as a whole and all the other constituent republics on mutually acceptable and mutually advantageous treaties;

- Determination of the nature and form of sovereign Estonian statehood on the basis of the expressed will of all Estonian citizens;
- A "zero" variant citizenship law (that is, granting citizenship to all permanent residents of Estonia at the time when the law is enacted, if they do not wish otherwise);
- Repeal of the residence requirement for Estonian citizens in election laws;
- Development of Estonia's economy that would take into account its geopolitical location and be aimed at preserving economic contacts with the East and expanding them with the West. In this, we consider that ties with the economy of the Soviet Union shall predominate throughout a very extensive period of time;
- Status of the Communist Party of Estonia as part of the political system of a sovereign state.

We stress our conviction that Estonian sovereignty is possible only in conditions of civil peace and the triumph of democratic forces in the USSR. To ensure peace and

concord in the republic during the adoption of any decisions it is necessary to take into account the interests of both the Estonian and non-Estonian segments of society.

In view of the fact that the Russian-speaking population constitutes a considerable segment of inhabitants of the republic who are at present concerned about their future, it is necessary, in our opinion, for the Estonian Communist Party to support a number of steps aimed at removing those concerns. Such steps include:

- Extension of the coming-into-force period of the Language Law in view of the absence of adequate state preparedness for teaching the Estonian language to the Russian-language population on a massive scale both in secondary schools and work collectives.
- (It is unrealistic to require people working eight hours a day, and given the difficulties of our daily life, to swiftly master the language. It is necessary to take the age factor into account. As a rule, older people will be unable to master the language to the degree required by sublegislative acts);
- Guaranteeing the principle "Not worse than before" in the area of social security (pensions, allowances, etc.), including for retired military people;
- Establishment, under supreme and local government agencies, of structures to preclude any encroachments on citizens according to ethnic background. They should include representatives of those communities on a parity, consensus basis;
- Providing Russian-language educational institutions with material and technical resources and skilled instructors on a par with other such institutions. The training of teachers for Russian schools begun in the Tallinn Pedagogical Institute should be expanded along the entire range of school subjects. Children are the future, and people must be confident of it.

We are confident that democratically minded Estonian communists will support these measures. Their implementation will undoubtedly facilitate civil peace, and for a party seeking to become a party of social renaissance of society and social protection of every member of society, civil peace is today a political task of primary importance.

We denounce the actions of political leaders who, in the conditions of deepening economic, social and political crisis, are fanning inter-ethnic discord and sowing mutual distrust against people of different nationalities in the republic, seeking thereby to acquire political dividends. Speculating with national feelings, with the pain and worries of the population, is unworthy of serious policy. Impulsive, hasty, imprudent political moves, at whatever level they may be undertaken, cannot lead to a happy future, they can only increase destabilization and social tensions in the republic.

Today the republic's communists are facing a serious task. Complex, ambivalent processes are taking place in

the country, the republic, and the party. Each one of us must discern their inner, fundamental essence. Any decisions concerning one's party affiliations or the ways of party development must be based on a clear civic stand rooted in common human values. These decisions must be seriously weighed and reached on the basis of one's conscience, without pressure from any group interests or threats of organized retaliatory measures.

The realities that have taken shape in the Estonian Communist Party since the 20th Congress are such that each Central Committee reflects the positions of large groups of communists. In these circumstances, it is necessary to seek reasonable, balanced compromises that would promote democratic change and the preservation of civil peace in the republic.

Latvia's Ethnic Culture Association Chairman Interviewed

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[Interview with Refat Chubarov, chairman of the Association of Ethnic Cultures of Latvia (ANKOL) and chairman of the Society of Crimean Tatars of Latvia, by N. Sokolova: "The Basis of Harmony—the Agreement of Interests"; date and place not specified; first two paragraphs are interviewer's introduction]

[Text] The discussion with Refat Chubarov, the chairman of the Association of Ethnic Cultures of Latvia (ANKOL) and chairman of the Society of Crimean Tatars of Latvia, should have taken place long ago. One thing, another, and a third interfered. The last time my telephone call was answered by his colleague, who said that he had left for Moscow, but will soon return. And here I am finally in my office in the Central Archive of the October Revolution and Socialist Construction of the Latvian SSR.

My interlocutor was worried about something. Having apologized, he orders a telephone call with Bakhchisaray. Something had happened. It turned out, there, in the Crimea, there was trouble. The discussion was about a lawyer, about assistance to people who proved to be in a difficult position. They returned to their homeland, but there was nowhere to live, they huddle together in tents, from which they also drove them out. And here the tragedy happened—the self-immolation of one of the compatriots of Refat Chubarov, who had been driven to despair . . .

[Chubarov] In this tragedy, a great deal was mixed up. Not only the sad past, but also, unfortunately, the present of the Crimean Tatar people. In spite of the declaration on the illegally repressed peoples, adopted by the 2nd USSR Congress of People's Deputies, nothing has changed in their fate up to now. And the question is not simply objective difficulties. Here there are also quite a few speculations about the stereotypes that took

shape under the influence of the Stalinist lie of the kind that they do not exile anyone for nothing.

In the Crimea, as everywhere, they are now preparing for the elections. And it is easiest of all to make political capital, having intimidated a certain group of the population "with the dangers threatening it" from those who have returned and having become its defenders. There meetings of the Russian-speaking citizens in settlements and villages are now being held, so-called committees are being created, and resolutions are being adopted to the effect that the Crimean Tatars should not be allowed into their homeland. I understand that this is a process difficult to regulate. And in such a situation some very balanced actions of the authorities at all levels are needed—at the rayon, the oblast, and the national levels. Even an appeal by the CPSU Central Committee would not hurt precisely here. And in this case there would not be any strained interpretations—one would simply have to explain to the population of the Crimea that it is their human duty to help put an end to injustice, that people should return to their homeland, that all can live here together. Here there have, unfortunately, not been such steps. Instead of this, there appears the Declaration of the CPSU Central Committee on the situation in the republics of the Soviet Baltic, although the events in these republics did not require such an appeal.

[Sokolova] You just now returned from Moscow. Tell us, please, about the purpose of your trip.

[Chubarov] As you know, in the resolution of the 2nd USSR Congress of People's Deputies, there is an instruction to the USSR Council of Ministers concerning the creation of a commission for the development of a state program for the return of the Crimean Tatars to the historical places of their residence. Such a commission is now being created—during the past week, on 23 January there was a meeting in the commission of the Council of Nationalities for nationality policy and inter-nationality relations under the chairmanship of G. Tarazevich, at which the leaders of the national movement of the Crimean Tatars were present. Theoretically speaking, in it there exist, as it were, three tendencies, and leaders of all three were invited, to decide the question of candidates representing our people in this commission.

[Sokolova] You are to work in this commission?

[Chubarov] Possibly. The thing is that my candidacy is one of those which are proposed for membership by the Organization of the Crimean-Tatar National Movement (OKND). By comparison with others, this is a radical current if I may say so. But all our radicalism consists only in the fact that we believe—our people should be returned to its homeland and the status of the Crimean Soviet Autonomous Republic should be restored. Precisely in this we are not inclined to make a compromise, fearing that otherwise the whole question can take the form of cultural-national, but not national-territorial autonomy. That is, the statehood of the Crimean Tatar people will not be re-created.

Regardless of whether we will enter into the commission or not, we will prepare our alternative variants of a program of return. Here, of course, much will depend on the union republic, on the Ukrainian SSR, which is sovereign, and its sovereignty in recent times, as in all the republics, has increased. This is why a well-developed state program alone is little, we also need good will on the part of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian authorities. We hope that there will be this good will, since not only in Central Asia, in particular in Uzbekistan, but also in the Crimea and in Kiev study commissions for assistance in the realization of the program will be created.

[Sokolova] Tell us a little bit about yourself, please.

Evidently, there is a connection between your personal fate and what you are now engaged in both in the Association of Ethnic Cultural Societies in Latvia, and, possibly, as a professional historian.

[Chubarov] I belong to the generation which, one can say, was born and grew up under the badge of misfortune and malicious injustice perpetrated on my people. I was born in Samarkand in 1957. This is the place of exile of my parents, they were exiled there as children along with their elders. And here they grew up there, were married, they had children born to them—there are four brothers in our family. Only a year before I was born, in 1956, the military regime [komendantskiy rezhim] in relation to all exiles was lifted by an Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet. But in one of the points of the Ukase it was stated that Crimean Tatars are not only prohibited from receiving compensation for the property confiscated at the moment of exile, but also from returning to their Homeland. My father remembers that in 1956 they were all called to the commandant's office and they were forced to sign printed forms, in which it was stated that they renounce their property.

Incidentally, it is precisely these forms which some people now try to brandish. Evidently, this was thought out that long ago. . . .

Like all the children of the repressed, I was deprived of the possibility of learning in my native language. I went to school in 1964. I had the choice of either Russian or Uzbek. My father sent us all to the Russian school. When in 1967 the Pale of Settlement was lifted with respect to the Crimean Tatars and—in the people this was called "recruitments"—the resettlement of about 200-300 families to the Crimean Oblast was organized, our family proved to be among them. Soon this was again concealed with all sorts of secret instructions and orders. And the people who after 1968 already themselves, "unorganized", came to the Crimea, were evicted by literally the same methods as those used in 1944. I myself am an eyewitness and am able to speak quite responsibly—they made some buses suitable, switched on loudspeakers, and started up music, so that the people living next door would not be alarmed. They seated the whole family in the bus, then in the best of cases they sent them on the

train to Central Asia, in the worst case—they sent them to Kherson Oblast and dropped them in the middle of the steppe.

In general, our family was lucky—we were "organized ones" and remained in the Crimea. Only with the school the situation did not change, it even got worse—if in Central Asia beginning in 1968 the optional courses for the study of our native language were organized, in the Crimea they were opened only in 1988. Thus I completed 10 classes without instruction in my native language.

[Sokolova] Did you at any time during the pre-April period think about such a change in your personal fate as has taken place recently? And was your choice of profession an accident?

[Chubarov] In general, I think, I chose my specialty deliberately. It was my intention to take up the study of the history of the Crimea and the Crimean Tatars. I assumed that after graduation from the Moscow Historical Archive Institute I could work in the Crimean Oblast Archive. This is a basic depository, where the sources for the history of the Crimea and the Crimean Tatars are found. But when I went there half a year before graduation from the Institute, they rejected me, rejected me precisely for reason of my nationality. They told me this directly when they found out about my nationality. I do not condemn those people, they were open with me—they would be glad to receive a young specialist with such a profile, but they will simply not permit to take me, even if it should prove possible to solve the problems of registration, housing, etc.

In general, my hopes collapsed. My wife and I (in the fifth course I got married, my wife is Latvian) started to think, what shall we do? To tell the truth, I also was not free of stereotypes with respect to the Baltic, of the idea that here I will be constrained and restricted in my possibilities. But I was attracted by the fact that my wife and I were given work in line with our specialty, and there was hope to get our life arranged. In short, although I came here with a great deal of apprehension, now, of course, I do not regret that everything turned out this way. But the thought of returning to the Crimea nevertheless does not leave me. And precisely while living in Latvia, I understood many things, and I even reinterpreted both in myself and in my understanding of the Crimean Tatar problem.

You know, I will now say something which will, possibly, surprise some people. But today we must really be open to all. Prior to the Institute, even before graduation from the VUZ, I had the idea that only the Crimean Tatars have problems. It seemed to me that among all the other peoples they had been solved—among the Russians, the Latvians, the Ukrainians, and the Uzbeks. There was the feeling that we are social outcasts, we do not have a homeland, no elementary possibilities for any kind of cultural self-development. You watch television in the evening—they show, let us say, Voronezh dances (they

did not show, did they, the villages of the Smolensk Region that have fallen into ruins), some kind of folk chorus—wo-o-nderful! Or tons of cotton are shown, for example, and the flourishing Uzbek women—wonderful, you understand? All are living well, all are satisfied, only we alone in this world are such defective people.

It seemed to me, it is worthwhile to bring this problem, I apologize, to the mind and the notice of our enlightened leaders, to convince them how bad this is, how it will be solved in a flash. With this, most likely, my entry into the party (as a candidate—in the army, as a member of the CPSU—already in the Institute) is connected. For a long time I really believed that in such, well, educational manner it will be possible to convince not only the leaders, but also the population of the Crimea, how important, how all are obliged to help correct the injustice with respect to its indigenous inhabitants. You know, in the Union, I thought, there is only one such big problem. . . .

You know, I explain this blindness of mine only by lack of information. We were deprived not only of ordinary and effective information about what is being created and where, but deprived of truthful historical information, the works of literature and journalism, let us say, of Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov, not to speak of Orwell or Zamyatin.

And here, when in recent years all this was piled on us, I was horrified. It turns out, the Crimean Tatars are not an exception, that our question is closely interlaced with all the nationality questions. It is impossible today to take and solve only it, leaving aside, let us say, the question of Karabakh or the problems that are arising in the Baltic, in the Ukraine, and in other regions.

I drew a conclusion for myself—perhaps, this sounds high-flown—that for our country today the most important thing is to undo the tangles of previously committed injustices, the nationality offences inflicted, and the inter-nationality tensions and tragic conflicts called forth by them.

And when I saw the explosion of national self-consciousness of the Latvian people (let us recall the plenum of the creative unions), I will say frankly, this made me glad. I saw in this a good sign, also for myself, for my compatriots. Once there are people, in whom the national idea and the spirit of national unification are strong—of course, if this is not directed against other nationalities—then this is a guarantee that they will give us support. For, unfortunately, I had become convinced that the problem of the Crimean Tatars could have been solved long ago, at least beginning with the 1960's, had it not been for the resistance of certain forces. Today evidence is already appearing that it was marshalled by very highly-placed people—the same Brezhnev, Rashidov and Shcherbitsky. And if the people will not in this situation give support to each other, they will deal with them one by one. This sounds terrible, perhaps, but, unfortunately, the examples show—they are dealing with

the peoples, more correctly they continue to deal with them. This pertains to the Germans of the Volga Region, the Meskhetian Turks, and a number of others.

For this reason, I repeat, I was very gladdened by the processes in Latvia, by the aspiration of the Latvian people for self-expression, for the comprehension of its problems and the search for ways of solving them. And I consider it necessary, as far as it is in my powers, to help these processes.

[Sokolova] And how did you arrive at the idea of the creation of ethnic cultural societies and their unification in an association?

[Chubarov] During the period of preparation and after the holding of the founding congress of the People's Front of Latvia, I encountered a group of people of various nationalities who were full of initiative. This group became, in essence, the embryo of the organization of the cultural societies. We began with the decision to find out whether there is such a need in society or whether it only seems that way to us. And here I was astounded by the barrage of calls, appeals, and suggestions in response to our announcement in the press. This is how the societies began to be conceived, but more correctly, to be resurrected, because the majority of them existed in Latvia before 1940, when they were forcefully disbanded.

We received a great deal of help from the Forum of the Peoples of Latvia, in the organizational committee for whose preparation our representatives also worked. Thanks to the discussions that took place at it and the resolutions that were adopted, for example on cultural-ethnic autonomy, we traversed the approval of our path of development more confidently. We did, indeed, search for our path—and place in the general process of the democratic renewal of Latvia, the acquisition by it of sovereignty, economic and political independence, and the possibility of the ethnic-cultural autonomy of the national minorities, the development of their language, culture, and self-consciousness.

At some point in time, especially during the stage of preparation for the Forum of the Peoples of Latvia, we understood that every national society will run not only into certain specific questions, but also questions that are common for all. And it was then that for the first time the idea was heard that we need to unite in an Association which would not regulate the internal life of the societies, but would coordinate the work.

The most essential such problem is the development of a legal conception of ethnic-cultural autonomy in Latvia. You see, the old command system, its false ideas about the imminent merging of the nations inflicted such damage, such destruction, on ethnic-cultural autonomy that one has to begin everything from scratch. Let us recall, for example, that before 1940 there existed schools in Latvia with instruction in nine languages of the national groups living here. They were closed, and their traditions were consigned to oblivion.

The basic ideas of the conception of ethnic-cultural autonomy were formulated at the conference of ethnic-cultural societies of the republics of the Baltic which was held in May 1989. In the resolution on autonomy, it was stated that the right to cultural self-determination of every national group must be guaranteed by law and provided, first of all, from state budget funds. Also adopted were resolutions on the status of the indigenous nations and national minorities, and a number of other documents aimed at the protection of their rights.

The representatives of the ethnic-cultural societies took part in the discussion of a number of draft laws, which have already been adopted by the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet. This, in particular, is the Law on Languages, one of whose parts—"Language, Education, Science and Culture"—was created with regard to our suggestions.

At the Forum of the Peoples of Latvia the thought was expressed of the creation, at the republic's Supreme Soviet, of a consultative council of nationalities. The members of the Association (I would like to especially single out the lawyer of the Association of Ethnic-Cultural Societies (ANKOL)—Rutu Shats-Maryash) at once after the Forum proceeded with the development of a draft statute of the council, the sense of which is the inclusion of all ethnic groups, through their representatives in the solution of nationality and inter-nationality questions, in law-making activity, which would guarantee equality in economic, social, political and cultural life. In the changes and additions to the Latvian SSR Constitution already adopted by the Supreme Soviet, the creation of a consultative council—with the right of legislative initiative—is envisaged.

On the basis of the discussions that have taken place, our Association has developed a draft of legal norms that would serve as the basis for the creation of a draft law on the rights of the nationality groups in the Latvian SSR. Activists of nine societies were included in the commission created by the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet for the development of the draft.

In all of our work, we proceeded from the fact that the foundation of the harmonization of the relations of all nationality and ethnic groups in the republic is the agreement of their interests. For the general state of each one of them depends on the possibility of the realization of these interests. One cannot speak of any harmony if this does not exist, if the national self-consciousness is injured by injustice, by some infringement. For this reason, the Association, in advocating the real sovereignty of the indigenous nation (this we announced at the first conference of ANKOL), with special punctiliousness underscores in its documents the full parity of all the national minorities, declining all attempts by anyone to play the role of "older brother" under one pretext or another.

[Sokolova] At the second conference of ANKOL, there was an acute discussion of material-financial matters,

especially about such a difficult problem as premises for the societies. Is anything changing for the better here?

[Chubarov] Although we were given promises during repeated meetings with officials of both the Riga Gorispolkom and the Council of Ministers, the problem, unfortunately, with a rare exception, has almost not budged at all. Only the Jewish and Estonian communities received their former buildings. The latter gave shelter in its building to the Livonian and Armenian societies—they lease premises there. With the others it is more complex—they simply do not have a corner of their own.

At the same time, I must also note a pleasant fact. All the same, for the work of, in my view, the main structure of ANKOL—the national schools—premises have been found. I have believed and I believe that, if there is no national school, it does not matter in what form—Sunday or class—then society is not fulfilling one of its chief tasks.

And here we most of all moved forward thanks to the responsiveness of the Ministry of Public Education. Not long ago, for example, a conference took place at which we talked about the work of the national schools already in the new academic year, questions of the preparation of textbooks, the increase in the qualification of teachers etc.

The institutions of culture—also thanks to the attention of the Ministry of Culture—on a priority basis grant premises for various cultural measures that are carried out by the societies.

In short, there is effective assistance, and there is, excuse me, verbal assistance. And in the party and state organs we would like to see an understanding of the fact that the measures of profitability or momentary expediency cannot be applied to expenditures for any cultural life. Here, let us say, the Leningrad Party Raykom frequently comes forward with some appeals, its election platform is not bad. However, there is a lack of concreteness. But why would they, let us suppose, not subsidize some concrete cultural program for the same Armenian society, even if only for a year. This would cost, possibly, a total of a few hundred rubles. But it would be of great help to the society. That is, it would be good to reinforce the restructuring slogans and words with concrete deeds. However, I would not like to be understood in the sense that we are begging for something. . . .

[Sokolova] And still the following question—at the conference of ANKOL there was discussion of the creation of a printed organ of the Association.

[Chubarov] This, I think, is a thing of the future. Frankly speaking, for the time being it is more important to us for the societies to have a permanent access to the air waves, to the republic and local press. This is especially important for those national communities which are numerous—the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Jewish and Polish

communities. The USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting has been very helpful here. Beginning in January, they have given us 6 hours of radio waves a month. These are already great opportunities to tell about what is being done by the societies and the Association as a whole, in some degree to satisfy the spiritual needs of the national minorities, and to attract attention to our problems. Pretty good contact is being arranged with the rayon and city newspapers, some of which have set aside permanent columns for us.

[Sokolova] In the last elections to the local Soviets you were elected as people's deputy of the Riga City Soviet. Other members of the Associations have also become deputies. How do you intend to use your deputy status in the solution of the problems of the ethnic-cultural societies?

[Chubarov] Besides myself, Grigoriy Krupnikov, co-chairman of the Jewish society, and Armand Melnalksnis, the organizational secretary of our Association. Of course, in our election platform we have raised many general problems that concern people. But the accent was on cultural-ethnic autonomy, on the needs of society, on assistance in the revival of their values lost by many communities in Latvia, and the recognition of legal succession to the property belonging to them before 1940.

I was also surprised and gladdened by the fact that at the meetings with voters there were different audiences—Latvian, Russian, and mixed—and no one even doubted the necessity of solving these problems. This inspires the hope that deputies of the city soviet, too, will support us when we decide pressing problems of life-support for the ethnic-cultural societies. I am convinced that in these questions there will be no conflict between, let us say, between the fraction of the People's Front, on the one hand, and the Party Gorkom and Interfront—on the other (in our republic the elections were held on the basis of these two lists).

[Sokolova] At the second conference of ANKOL there was a pointed discussion of the question of its politicization. Opposite points of view were expressed—some see in this process a blessing, others reject it. And the today already traditional question, which we ask ourselves and our interlocutor—what do you think about the political situation in the republic?

[Chubarov] In the question on the politicization of ANKOL, it seems to me, one has to bear in mind that in our work we cannot cut ourselves off from politics, what is more this would be a mistake. The more so because the societies and the Association owe their birth precisely to changes in political life. In essence, we already take part in politics, even if by what we just talked about, we take part in law-making, in elections, and in the entire democratic process. And time will show whether the politicization of ANKOL will become more intense. In the assessment of the political situation, both in our republic and in the Baltic, I will not accept one aspect—when they

pull out events that are taking place here or in another region from the Union as a whole. This is always done, it seems to me, with one purpose—to elicit in some way a negative attitude to those processes which are under way in our republic, and, perhaps, even to the people. And when I try, for myself at least, to assess the situation in the republic, it is important for me to see and to know what is happening in the Union. And I always arrive at the thought that the processes in the main are proceeding identically everywhere—the tearing away of the command-administrative system, democratization, the real expression of the will of the people, glasnost, etc. Simply the force of these processes and their speed are different. That which, let us say, happened yesterday in our republic in one form or another, is happening in Volgograd today.

In this connection—the question of the Communist Party. I am very troubled by it. I unequivocally assess both my membership in it and the very organization of which I am a member. Only for the reason that we have not yet gotten rid of the phenomena in the party which have led it to the crisis of today. I am not talking about some kind of repentance, although many talk in such terms, I also do not object to this. Without this, it is impossible to remain a force which will enjoy the confidence of any part of the population. I will not talk about everything, complete unanimity even previously was an illusion or slyness. I see that a split occurred in the party, on the basis of that kind of understanding of the situation. And, unfortunately, not only in the republics of the Baltic. In support I can cite, for example, the declaration of the All-Union Conference of Party Clubs, which support the democratic platform in the CPSU, that took place in Moscow. They advanced, did they not, very radical demands. But when you think it over, you see that these changes had ripened long ago. Let us say, the appointment by election of the delegates of the congress through the direct vote of all communists—this should have been done all the time, in order for the apparatus to be under the control of the party, and not vice versa. Or such an aspect as the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution—it places the party over society, over the people.

Why, in a discussion of the political situation, do I start with the party? Because the problems which have ripened and, forgive me, have become overripe in the party project themselves on the entire society. Let us take our city. The position of the Party Gorkom and the party leaders of the city and the position of a part of the communists, especially from among the intelligentsia—they are at polar opposites. This dissonance is also throwing society into a fever. It was worthwhile to publish the appeal of a group of members of the Latvian CP Central Committee and secretaries of party committees concerning the independent status of the Latvian Communist Party, how this, as it were, turned into a general discussion among citizens. And I have the impression that, although this is, perhaps, bad, but the split is on the whole inevitable. It is being held in check,

in my view, only by the fact that we simply do not see ways that would not lead to some difficult conflict situations.

And the other thing that is important to take into account in the assessment of the political situation not only in our republic, but again also on the whole for the Soviet Union. It is possible, my point of view will seem unacceptable to someone, but I have simply achieved it through much suffering, especially in connection with the Crimea. Here we have all the time reared the new man. There is nothing bad behind this term, is there—we proposed, or at least declared, very good, human principles—internationalism, equality, and respect for elders.

But, unfortunately, the bare proclamation of these principles and the forms and methods of upbringing led to the fact that we raised people—I am not speaking about all to a man, but a significant part—with a prejudiced consciousness, some sort of nihilists with respect to nationality. Sometimes people say that the national idea is bad, that it is terrible, that it can captivate the masses and lead to very bad consequences. Yes, under certain circumstances it can. But the idea of the denial of national values, the opposition of some peoples to others are also terrible.

Last year, my wife, our children and I spent a holiday in the Crimea. Once we went into a cafe—the children wanted ice cream. We met an acquaintance, Vitya Mayborodu. A fine lad, a wonderful worker. We talked about this and that, and suddenly he declared:

"And so what exactly have you decided there? We will not let you leave the Union quite so simply. There will be the order—we will bring in tanks."

This so stupefied me that I was unable to come up with an answer at once. Then I said:

"Vitya, you are a simple combine operator, you work in the field (and it was exactly when the harvest was going on), now how can you from here solve their problems, all the more draw such conclusions."

But, to tell the truth, I could not convince him, all arguments bounced off of him. And imagine, how many such people, like this lad, there are. Moreover, they are fine people, but they have been deceived, they were brought up this way. Precisely for this reason, I think, as long as we do not straighten out this distorted education, the problems of inter-nationality tension will remain in our country.

And all the same, with all the complexity of the situation in Latvia, we, thanks to fate, are not experiencing the tragic turn of events which they took, let us say, in the Transcaucasus. And the conduct of the indigenous population, its national trait—calmness, self-control, and in general the conduct of the non-Latvian inhabitants guard us for the time being from such excesses. But it should be remembered that this threshold may be crossed if some destructive or simply incorrect steps in policy are taken

It cannot be excluded that, let us say, if there is further deterioration of our economic situation, somebody may try to shift the tension to the nationality ground. And we, ANKOL, see our task in not allowing this to happen.

[Sokolova] You are suggesting that the ethnic-cultural societies can play a stabilizing role?

[Chubarov] I think so. Being at various events of all societies—concerts, meetings, political debates, I became convinced that the thinking of people in them differed so much from the stereotypical-narrow and prejudiced thinking, that these people are not capable, at least not having come to know the particulars, of going under some loud slogan or pecking at some superficial opinions, and then, God forbid, actions as well. But, you know, we have only taken the first steps.

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Tajik Education Official Notes 'Gradual Shift' from Russian Language

90US0877A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 19 Apr 90 p 3

[Interview with Razyk Khamidovich Khamidov, head of the Main Administration for Teaching Methods in the General Educational Schools and Pre-School Establishments of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Public Education, by I. Sorokina: "The Schools: Worries and Hopes"]

[Text] Our 10-year secondary education has once again become an 11-year education, divided into three stages (primary schools, grammar schools, and high schools), and the next step will be the transfer to the state basic curriculum.

What will it be? It has aroused interest because it has already managed to kindle the anxiety of Russian teachers even before it has been instituted.

Are there any valid reasons for this? According to Razyk Khamidovich Khamidov, chief of the Main Administration for Teaching Methods in General Educational Schools and Pre-School Establishments of the Tajik SSR Ministry of Public Education:

[Khamidov] The Russian teachers do not have any reason to be upset yet, but to make things clearer to everyone—and it seems to me that the schools and all of the innovations in them are of interest to more than just teachers—I want to begin by discussing the basic curriculum and how it differs from the earlier one.

The problems with the earlier curriculum stemmed from excessive centralization. This turned the schools into uniform and unvarying institutions intended for the average student and operating under absolutely identical conditions. Another flaw was the excessive number of required subjects. The students were overworked, and the knowledge they acquired was scattered and fragmented.

The future performer, physician, physicist, fitter, and composer all had to take the same number of classes in mathematics, biology, chemistry, and literature. This left no time to teach them the morality and ethics of professional labor. In other words, the schools could not offer the necessary career training.

We had much to say about creativity in teaching and about the importance of discovering a child's potential as early as possible, but all of this was mere rhetoric, because the schools were strictly regulated and could not take even a single step on their own initiative. And if the school was restricted to this degree, how could a teacher be free to institute the best teaching methods before anyone else? He was not. Everything was stipulated in the curriculum. It listed the subjects to be taken and the number of hours to be spent studying them. There was no leeway whatsoever. Everyone had to follow the same exact pattern.

The basic curriculum consists of three components: the union-republic (covering 41 percent of all teaching time), the republic, and the school components. It simply lists the basic elements of education and the relationship between them without specifying the exact content of the republic and school components, leaving all of this open to "interpretation" on the local level.

The union-republic component, which will be compulsory for all schools in the country, simply lists the minimum amount of time to be spent on the main areas of study, without any rigid breakdown into the traditional set of academic subjects, and specifies the minimum number of hours to be spent on certain areas of study in each grade: 33 hours for the natural sciences, 23 hours for the Russian language, and only 4 hours for the literature of the peoples of the USSR in the 10th and 11th grades. If this minimum is unsatisfactory, the figures can be augmented in the republic or school component.

The school component, for example, lists vocational guidance and training courses, electives, and advanced courses. These could include more in-depth investigations of Russian literature and foreign literature, the fine arts, music, chemistry, or mathematics. These would be a matter of choice. Teachers would no longer be restricted in their experimentation with the curriculum. This should also produce a variety of textbooks and teaching aids. Anyone who produces a good textbook can sell it on the unionwide "market."

Another thing I want to mention about the new curriculum is the fact that the school retains the sole right to choose specific courses, fields of special study, and electives and the personnel and supplies required for these courses.

The new basic curriculum will allow the republic ministries of public education and the schools—or, more precisely, the school councils—to choose an emphasis in the natural sciences (i.e., physics and mathematics) or, for instance, the liberal arts. This freedom of choice will

allow our ministry, among others, to make its own adjustments in the curriculum. The amount of time devoted to the study of the Russian language, for example, in the national schools would remain almost the same as the earlier figure of 29-31 hours a week, although the basic curriculum allots, as I have already said, 23 hours to this subject. This kind of substantial reduction in the hours of Russian language studies would presuppose a change in teaching methods for more intensive courses with less emphasis on grammar.

What else is new in the new curriculum? I would like to underscore the fact that Russian literature will now be studied as part of the general course in the literature of the peoples of the USSR.

[Sorokina] When will republic schools begin using the basic curriculum?

[Khamidov] The document was signed last September, but this does not mean that the schools have to begin using it right away. Only a few schools are using it now, and the rest are operating in line with different versions of a transitional curriculum with the traditional set of academic subjects.

The Ministry of Public Education is now working with the Tajik Scientific Research Institute of the Pedagogical Sciences on the establishment of the most favorable conditions for the gradual institution of the basic curriculum.

Several alternative transitional and long-range curricula have been drawn up, and there has been extensive discussion of teaching methods in courses in the native language, native literature, and literature of the peoples of the USSR.

The same kind of work is anticipated in connection with Russian language courses. Of course, all suggestions will be reviewed and considered.

[Sorokina] Razyk Khamidovich, you said that the Russian teachers have not experienced any dramatic reduction in hours yet, and that they will not experience it in the next academic year, but what about the future? How long will this "yet" last? Higher academic institutions, including the Tajik Pedagogical Institute, specializing in the Russian language and literature, will be turning out specialists. What can they expect? Unemployment?

[Khamidov] There is no question that the new curriculum will change personnel requirements and the need for Russian language teachers. An analysis of available data with a view to this curriculum revealed that the retention of the current admissions figures for a major in the Russian language will lead to a personnel glut within 2 or 3 years because the present rate at which teachers of this category are being trained is far in excess of the projected demand for these teachers in general educational schools.

In connection with this, planned enrollments for students majoring in "Russian Language and Literature in

the National School" and "Russian Language and Literature" have already been lowered.

These measures will require the improvement of career guidance and will make it possible to raise the admissions requirements of pedagogical VUZ's, which should improve the quality of specialist training in general.

The planned measures will be instituted gradually and prudently. In any case, we will have to prepare the necessary lesson plans and textbooks before we can begin using the basic curriculum. We will not rush into the new system, although we also have no wish to postpone the reform of education and upbringing for long. The basic curriculum could establish the kind of schools that are in such short supply today—schools in which the aptitudes and talents of children are revealed and reinforced.

Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Nationality Problem

90US0920A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 14 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by L. Korzun: "The Ice Has Been Broken, But Problems Remain: From the Session of the Committee on Issues of Interethnic Relations"]

[Text] The friendship of the peoples inhabiting our republic will be strengthened in accordance with the policy of interethnic relations we conduct and bring to life. And we interpret it simply today: All peoples, all nations are equal and have equal rights. Friendship is the symbol of perestroika, the success in all our causes.

It was from these positions that the 12 April discussion in the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Issues of Interethnic Relations was conducted; one of the items on the working agenda was "On the course of the execution of the 26 January 1989 decisions of the Turkmen SSR Commission on Issues of Interethnic Relations" and "On the work of the soviets of people's deputies of the Kunya-Urgenchskiy and Krasnovodskiy rayons for the formation of the state and economic apparatus with consideration for the principles of socialist internationalism and the practical resolution of socioeconomic tasks." The session was conducted under the chairmanship of R.K. Karayev.

It has come to pass that these rayons are inhabited not only by Turkmen, but by Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Karakal-paks, Russians, Tatars, Koreans, Azerbaijanis, and representatives of other nationalities. It was noted at this session that there are positive moves toward the consideration of common national interests in the resolution of economic and social issues over a concrete period in this region. Convincing confirmation of this is the results of the recently-held elections to local soviets of people's deputies. In the soviets of both rayons there have been elected representatives of all the fundamental population groups residing in these territories. The same composition of national representation is in the organs of economic administration, in public organizations.

Problems, first and foremost, those of a social nature, have undoubtedly become complicated. It was noted that the ispolkoms of the soviets of people's deputies have become more attentive to and demanding of the execution of planned social programs by enterprises and organizations. The ispolkoms have taken issues of construction, both capital and initiative, under strict control. In autumn of last year, the Kunya-Urgenchskiy Rayon soviet of people's deputies dedicated the regular session's agenda to the status of and prospects for development of capital construction in the rayon; there have been advances. For example, by initiative means alone, 50 kindergarten spaces were introduced in the rayon's kolkhozes last year; clubs in three kolkhozes were rebuilt; the structures of a dairy kitchen and a 5,000-volume library were built.

In meeting the wishes of the Uzbek and Kazakh population groups, in a number of general educational schools in Kunya-Urgenchskiy Rayon, classes have opened with the language of the children representing these groups as the language of instruction.

As they say, the ice has been broken. Nevertheless, the committee members were not satisfied upon hearing the detailed information of Kunya-Urgenchskiy Rayon soviet Chairman Kh. Annayev and Krasnovodskiy Rayon soviets of people's deputies ispolkom Chairman B. Kubukulov; nor were they satisfied with their reports or the materials available to the committee. And Kh. Annayev and B. Kubukulov had to manage to answer at least ten pointed question from the committee members. The population still expresses concrete claims about the slow resolution of social problems. And this is not surprising, for this is worrisome to people who have grown unaccustomed, to put it boldly, not only to living comfort, but to normal everyday conditions and benefits. For example, in Kunya-Urgenchskiy Rayon, only 13 percent of the children are provided with children's preschool institutions. The material base of cultural institutions remains poor today. Of 57 rural population points, only 22 have services facilities. There is a dearth of public baths.

Despite the fact that the "respondents" at the committee session were well-armed, it was not so easy to satisfy with answers, for example, Svetlana Ivanovna Lagashkina, deputy and committee member; she was interested in issues of training teaching personnel, for whom there is a demand, and why the supply of textbooks is bad in schools with national languages of instruction. It is a shame that no manager from Turkmen SSR Goskomisdat was in attendance; he would have been asked more than a few hard questions.

At the sessions of the Supreme Soviet committees, they do not only raise and pose questions, but adopt decisions as well. The time has passed when hundreds of decisions were adopted by a unanimous vote "for," and then just remained on paper. Stormy debates have turned up on a number of positions of a draft decision at a session. Out of all the ministerial and departmental leaders, perhaps

M.A. Aliyeva, minister of public education, has had to take the floor most often. And she must be given her due. The committee members got concrete, businesslike answers to all questions. The line adopted by the ministry for reducing tension in providing teaching personnel to Tashauz Oblast seemed very interesting to me. Tashauz Pedagogical School will become the fundamental smithy of teachers with higher education in the oblast. I have not misspoken. After completing studies there, the graduates are given the opportunity to enter without examinations the third year at the Chardzhou Pedagogical Institute. A fine and sensible move. At the direction of the VUZs, new-arrival specialists are almost never appointed to assignments in the provinces—there are also objective reasons here. The calculation is that their "own" cadres are more reliable in the appointment. The question then follows, how is it going to be in the remaining oblasts and rayons of the republic, where a similar situation has come into being? And a solution has been found here. A quota is being established for the rayons of the republic in the educational institutions of the Turkmen SSR, first and foremost preparing cadres for schools.

The nature of interethnic relations also depends upon how attentive the organs of Soviet power and culture are to the traditions of national groups and their formations on their territories. A biased examination was set up for the authorities of Kunya-Urgenchskiy and Krasnovodskiy rayons, to put it vividly. But the speakers also prepared a whole package of urgent issues. Resolving them on the spot by themselves is impossible. The committee members helped sort things out by asking eminent people in the ministries and departments directly. S.S. Rakhimov, chairman of the Turkmen SSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting gave very detailed answers to a number of questions from a speaker from Krasnovodskiy Rayon. A television broadcast calculated for the local population in the western republic is being developed, but the matter is complicated by difficulties in the expedient transfer of filmed material. A trip by television journalists to Stavropolskiy Kray is coming up, during which stories on the life of the Turkmen in this region of the country will be filmed. Radio and television broadcast hours, etc., in the Turkmen language have been increased.

A detailed decision was adopted on the issue under discussion. It comprised the concrete recommendations of the soviets of people's deputies of Krasnovodskiy and Kunya-Urgenchskiy rayons to create commissions on issues of interethnic relations under the soviets, and to more deeply study and envisage in long-term plans the rayons' development of concrete social issues, for which programs for every population point must be developed.

The committee members discussed that same day the issues associated with the draft Law on the status of Turkmen SSR people's deputies, the draft Law on constitutional oversight in the republic, and the draft Law on language, on the the committees and commissions of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet.

Donetsk Strike Committee Said To Exacerbate Regional Tensions

90UN1346A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 2 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by N. Novoselov: "Donetsk: Without Sense of Reality"]

[Text] I should confess that before the actions taken by the Donetsk strike committee in February, I had a sincere faith in the workers' wisdom of its leaders, and was even inclined to explain their temporary extremes by their insufficient experience in social activism. Unfortunately, the series of February meetings, which was opened by a so called "shoe sensation", destroyed my final illusions, and not only mine. It became clear that the strike committee members, at least the majority of them, are consciously aiming to complicate the situation in the largest industrial regions of the country, and are going to establish here an atmosphere of confrontation, instability, and social and political tension.

This was convincingly proven by the round-table discussion, held on March 1, 1990, in which representatives of the Donetsk party obkom and oblispolkom, People's Deputy of the USSR, O. Boyko, and members of the Donetsk strike committee participated. There was a single item on the agenda of the round-table discussion which, as it turned out, concerned the strike committee most: the resignation of the Donetsk party obkom. A broadened obkom plenum, to which, besides obkom members, over 500 people were invited, was held literally several days before that, as well as was a meeting of primary party organization secretaries, in which 5,000 people participated. But the strike committee ignored these as "measure contrived by the apparatchiks". Why are they so blind about the will of thousands party members who, frankly speaking, should themselves decide whether to accept the resignation of the obkom or not? The explanation is quite simple. Neither at the plenum, nor at the meeting were the propositions of the strike committee accepted—only a few persons voted for them. It should be admitted, however, that both the plenum and the meeting agreed to some demands, in particular to that of expediting the time of preparation and organization of a regular oblast party conference. It was scheduled for the beginning of April.

However, during the meeting held on February 25, the strike committee again adopted a resolution about the immediate resignation of the party obkom, and even threatened that if this demand were not met, a political strike would be organized on March 1-2. To avoid further confrontation, the opponents met at the round table on March 1. But, in fact, there was not a hint of any solution of mutual satisfaction. The obkom members, as well as lawyers and scientists, tried to convince the strike committee of the necessity of literally several weeks to finish the preparation for the conference in a somewhat stable atmosphere; they were speaking about the difficulties of the current moment, especially on the eve of the elections of republican people's deputies, but everything

came up against the wall of irreconcilability. Nothing also came of the obkom members' attempts to clarify specific motives of the ultimatums. The response was the same: "Resignation!" This dirty catchword prevailed over all efforts to conduct a reasonable discussion. Even a sober-minded and convincing speech of the USSR people's deputy, O. Boyko, was interrupted from the beginning by rather rude remarks, though it was obvious that he was right; in fact, the current obkom leadership is living out its last days and it would be unreasonable to interrupt its existence at a complicated time like this. However, they were not listening. Moreover, at the end of this fractured dialogue, they promised to take to the streets. There's an uncompromising position for you...

The Donetsk round-table discussion was shown on oblast television, and I believe that this was a good idea. Let the people themselves decide who wants what, who is headed in which direction, and who is attempting to disrupt the return of a normal, quiet life for people.

The strike committee forwarded a statement to the local press. They declared in it that because they consider the party obkom to hold a "destructive position", i.e. that they refused to resign, the strike committee members who are participating in the negotiations decided to go on hunger strike in front of the Building of Soviets, in which the party obkom is also located. Nine representatives of the city and miners' strike committees are hunger striking. They are all sitting wrapped in blankets. The purpose of the hunger strike is the same: immediate resignation not only of the obkom, as they demanded during the first round-table discussion, but of the Donetsk gorkom as well.

It would be useful to share some observations as to the reaction of Donetsk residents to the new action of the strike committee—the people are arguing amongst themselves, sometimes even using bad language. And this is indicative not only of censure of the unfinished argument on a background of perfectly clear perspectives because the present obkom leadership, as all other party committees, only has literally one more week to function. People are wondering whether this new trick of the strike committee is too well-calculated for an ordinary working movement. At this point, it has become known that a week before this hunger strike there was a telephone call from the BBC's Moscow Bureau to the administration of the Donetsk TV and Radio Committee hinting that a camera crew would be arriving to shoot the hunger strike at a time when only the organizers of the hunger strike were supposed to know about it. And foreign camera crews did come and enjoy shooting a film about this allegedly "desperate action" of the strike committee members.

That is why Donetsk residents ponder if this was really a coincidence—a hunger strike for no reason and the hum of film and television cameras in front of the Donetsk Building of Soviets?

Ternopol Party Establishment Faces Democratic Bloc

90UN1758B Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 27 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by RADYANSKA UKRAYINA special correspondent A. Kraslyanskyy: "Skirmish"]

[Text] *Almost a detective story, with elements of drama and comedy, which recently played out in the building of the Ternopol Oblast Soviet and which apparently will have a sequel*

For two days passions raged under the vaulted ceiling of the spacious hall in which the just-elected deputies to the oblast soviet met in constituent session, the first time they have assembled since the elections. People's feelings reached such a height of tension that some turned pale and gripped the arm of their chair with whitened knuckles, while at other times the deputies would suddenly break out in laughter, sometimes unaffected but more often bitter laughter. Everything that has recently happened in the oblast, taking every individual, from the great to the small, into the maelstrom of preelection events, has now become concentrated, like atomic nuclei, coming together in this small, crowded meeting hall. This was the apogee of the hard, exhausting, at times savage struggle for the deputies' seats. One small matter remained to be clarified: who had won? On whose side was right? Who in the oblast will hold the real political power for these next five years, which do not promise to be very pleasant ones.

1. Reconnaissance Before Battle

This seems to be the fate of the people of this region—always to be at the boundary of history, events and processes, of various forces which enter into conflict. A boundary is not a crossroads; a boundary is an edge, and things are so tough for those at the edge!

And now as well, during the elections, the people of Ternopol Oblast experienced a great deal of bitterness and pain. In order to grasp the entire complexity of the situation which developed in this region, one must bear in mind the fact that positions and ideas not only of the Ternopol people alone came into clash here, but also those of their neighbors, the fact that various emissaries from other oblasts came here, frequently with regular assault forces piling out of buses on the eve of election-campaign meetings and rallies, exerting terrible pressure on people's consciousness and actions. This pressure sometimes reached the point of open threats and intimidation. Just try calmly to analyze and determine the positions and platforms of the candidates. All these factors could not help but affect the makeup of deputies to the oblast soviet, while everything that had been experienced previously continued here, during the constituent session....

Following this brief digression, however, let us return to the hall. Two forces were clearly delineated: representatives of the democratic bloc, as the deputies called

themselves—members of the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika [Rukh], the Ukrainian Language Society, the "Greens" and.... And here we have a somewhat interesting situation. The fact is that the "democrats" themselves sharply separated themselves from the rest of the deputies: party members, officials of soviets, workers, kolkhoz farmers. These latter, on the contrary, stressed their desire for consolidation, for close, joint work at the deputy level, regardless of who adheres to what position in settling a given matter.

In any case the "democrats" practically fenced themselves off from the rest of the hall, and in addition demanded that all invited guests be seated as far as possible from the oblast soviet elected deputies, for the former were allegedly exerting psychological pressure on the latter. In principle an understandable desire, if it were not for the fact that the guests included USSR and Ukrainian people's deputies....

One more thing. In my opinion the members of the bloc put this essentially trivial matter up to a vote with one purpose in mind: to make an initial probe of the enemy's strength, to conduct a kind of reconnaissance in force, to see what percentage of votes they could count on when determining important issues. For when those present at the session agreed without any great objections to satisfy this demand by the "democrats," the latter embarked upon another maneuver—they initiated a debate on the size of the vote count committee, and subsequently on electing the chairman of the credentials committee. A vote was finally held, which showed that the majority, although by no means a stable majority, did not support them.

The session was in its third hour, and the deputies were still foundering in procedural matters. The far from optimal experience of the all-union parliament had put down tenacious roots into the subsoil of the local deputy assemblies. The suggestion was even making the rounds that there were those who would not be averse to obstructing the session proceedings. But why on earth? To stall for time in order to gain advantage. That is the only explanation for the stubborn attempts to torpedo the session by certain deputies who, instead of addressing key issues, stirred up a continuing fuss over such a question, for example, as whether or not to televise the entire session. Let us consider the fact that this is right in the middle of the workday. Somebody even demanded a deputy by deputy vote tally, so that the voters would know who is in favor of what.

In short the tension and fencing back and forth were increasing hour by hour, reaching a culmination when it had become simply absurd further to delay the principal business of the day—election of a chairman and deputy chairman of the oblast soviet.

2. Why Ostrozhynskyy Won

At first glance it seemed that the position of the deputies to the oblast soviet had become so polarized even long

before the constituent session that discussion of alternative candidates for the principal offices was merely a formality: everyone had determined in advance for whom he was going to vote. Nor did anyone have any doubt about who would be the candidates for the office of chairman: other than V. Ostrozhynskyy, first secretary of the oblast party committee, and B. Boyko, chairman of the Rukh regional organization and member of the faculty at the Ternopol Pedagogic Institute, there was nobody who was realistically seeking the office. This too added a unique aftertaste to the campaign struggle, for this advance determination enabled each to prepare in advance surprises for the opposing side's candidate.

The very first questions, however, which were close to escalating into full-scale speeches, indicated that not everybody had come to the session with his mind made up. Many deputies sincerely sought to find out about the positions and platforms of the candidates for the office of chairman, to feel them out, so to speak, in order to assess the situation and finally determine their choice when things came to a vote.

Just what did the leaders of the two factions—V. Ostrozhynskyy, leader of the oblast party organization, and B. Boyko, leader of the opposing bloc—submit before the court of their peers?

Before going on, allow me one more digression. Attending political rallies held by the Rukh organizations, and frequently hearing intelligent speeches by certain individuals, one often says to oneself with bitterness: why all this anguish, this hysteria, this thespian posing and sonorous phrases? Are the people standing in front of the microphone really not aware that people are bored to death with all this, that people are simply not taking it in, that people do not believe what the speakers are saying?

Something similar was also observed in the meeting hall. The platform declarations of both candidates fully coincided with one another on many points. These points included radical restructuring of the soviets, which should become fully-empowered masters within their territory, radical, decisive actions to help people economically, a campaign for an effective, socially-oriented economy grounded on various forms of ownership, social and ecological protection for the oblast's citizens, democratic organization of political power, on a foundation of total democracy, grounded on rule of law and self-government, rebirth and comprehensive development of Ukrainian spiritual and intellectual culture, and genuine Ukrainian sovereignty within the framework of the Union.

Except.... While V. Ostrozhynskyy spoke about all these things calmly, carefully weighing each sentence, in a well-reasoned manner, and appealed for unity of all forces in order to achieve these goals, B. Boyko's address was more like a mass political rally speech on a public square delivered to a crowd numbering in the thousands. The problem is that B. Boyko's emotions frequently

gained the upper hand over sober reasoning, or else his statements were simply aimed at heating up needless emotions, particularly since the point is to accomplish legislative work. Here are just a few of the phrases uttered by this candidate for the top office in the oblast: "Smash the imperial structure," "colonial nature of relations," "the institution of viceroys in the Ukraine in the person of first secretaries," plus a great many other such items. I do not believe that it is necessary to argue that these phrases per se are of a patently unparliamentary nature.

Nor was Bohdan Boyko able to restrain himself from direct attacks on the party, which evoked an indignant comment by the person sitting next to me: "These Rukh leaders really like to assume the role of judges—who is righteous and who is not! And they almost always lump everybody into the partocracy: milkmaid, mechanic, the longtime party member and the person who has only recently become a party member. As if only the Rukh people themselves got perestroika moving, as if it is being carried out through them, not by the labor of the worker and peasant."

His impassioned tone, his mass-political-rally manner, and his frequently unsubstantiated allegations placed Bohdan Boyko time and again in an uncomfortable and sometimes a catastrophic position during his statements before the body of deputies. Such was the case when he made an appeal radically to revise contractual relationships with the all-union agencies and organizations, even to the point of severing relations with them. At this point a logical question was voiced: how did he view the system of supplying the oblast with the most essential raw materials and manufactured goods, inasmuch as the oblast for the most part produces milk, meat, and other agricultural products, a question to which the candidate, try as he might, was unable to give a substantial reply.

And what is the value of his assertion that the oblast's economy will be greatly boosted by financial assistance by Canadian businessmen, who were originally from Ternopol Oblast? As if foreign business circles are merely waiting for the opportunity to hand out their money to their erstwhile compatriots.

He also exposed himself to devastating criticism when he attempted to meddle in the affairs of religious believers. Deputies Archbishop Lazar and Greek Catholic priest Polivchak related in muted anguish how the Rukh people not only meddle in the business of holding religious services but even issue direct threats to churchmen who are not to their liking. The following words, uttered by Archbishop Lazar, rang out in the hushed hall: "Wherever Rukh has passed, tears have been left behind...."

It would be unfair not to mention that a good deal of criticism was also leveled at V. Ostrozhynskyy. Many problems have accumulated in the oblast.

V. Ostrozhynskyy listened to the criticism with understanding and a willingness not only to pay heed to every

comment and suggestion but also to unite efforts in order to solve these problems, presenting a well thought-out, realistic program. Thanks to his candor and honest dialogue with the deputies, even such a matter as nomenclature privileges, which would seem to be excessively disadvantageous to this candidate, turned out to his benefit (after all, that is the purpose of open debate).

"Standing before you, my conscience is clear," V. Ostrozhynskyy responded to this question. "We have never had government dachas. Nor have we ever had special stores. The only thing utilized by officials at the oblast and rayon level was a hospital. We were the first of the oblasts, however, to allow Afghanistan veterans and their families as well as other war veterans and veterans of labor access to this hospital. And subsequently we turned the hospital over to the rayon. I am running for the office of chairman of the Soviet not for my own benefit; nobody is going to pay me a salary for this job if I am elected. I want to work in the Soviet in order to change the situation in this oblast for the better, so that our working people can begin to live the life they deserve.

Ostrozhynskyy won. Victory was won by the healthy force of unity of reason and fruitful cooperation by all, including the Rukh deputies, who are genuinely concerned for the fate of the oblast, the Ukraine, and the state, who desire by means of honest labor to improve our entire life and economy, and to raise the spirit of our people.

3. Proceeding Onward to a Practical Result

Some may accuse me of having too prejudiced an attitude toward the democratic bloc deputies and of clearly favoring their opponents. I can assure you that if any other outside observer were to take my place, his impression would not differ very much from mine.

I am communicating that atmosphere which formed in the hall—no more than that. After all, how could one look with favor, for example, at a situation where all the actions by the deputies from the "democratic bloc" were constantly being orchestrated by two or three individuals. These individuals, putting their heads together and whispering, would allow the next speaker to approach the microphone. Then, conferring with one another, they would approach the line by the microphone and remove their emissary from it for reasons known to them alone.

The situation was pretty comical. When Ya. Karpyak, candidate for soviet deputy chairman, was about to present his platform declaration, one of these "conductors" went up to him and whispered into his ear at length, apparently providing him with some more advice and counsel.

The thing I hate most of all is coercing and pressuring an individual, so that he will act not as he himself wants but rather to the prescription of somebody else. Equally odious to me was the oppression of the Suslov-Brezhnev

system, which would transform an individual's substance into nothing, and attempts on the part of many leaders of the "democratic" movements, paradoxical as it might seem, to act in this same vein.

How else is one to interpret those bus "assaults" by people from Lvov and Ivano-Frankovsk, which applied incredible pressure to the volition and actions of the people of Ternopol Oblast on the eve of the elections? This should be looked into both by the Central Electoral Commission and by judicial agencies, or do representatives of certain interests and organizations have some kind of right to meddle in local elections and to be present in some other electoral district, of course except for those persons designated by law? During the session breaks some of the deputies related how sometimes there were more outsiders in attendance at political rallies in rayon administrative seats and villages than local residents. They would seize the initiative to such an extent that locals could not get through to the microphone, let alone state an opinion different from that of the outsiders! Just what kind of "democracy" is this, and just where are we headed?

I cannot harbor sympathies for those who call for confrontation, who incite people to rage and hatred, who call people to arms. Reasonable individuals and peoples, when things become difficult, join together and unite, in order to act together against misfortune and a common foe. Those who fight among themselves and raise a hand against one another do not end well.

I am gratified that a genuine, not just in words alone, example of cooperation among all healthy elements in the oblast was presented at the session. An example, quite frankly, which was very unexpected to many, when the chairman of the soviet proposed electing deputy Ya. Karpyak from the "democratic bloc" as his deputy. It was so unexpected that the "democrats" immediately requested a brief intermission to confer among themselves. Subsequently the proposed candidate was voted in virtually unanimously, for probably the first time during the session.

I am also gratified by the fact that among those "democrats" I saw some young, likable, bright faces and sensed their genuine concern for those ills which exist in our lives and a genuine willingness to place their shoulder under that heavy burden which we are bearing.

My spirits were also buoyed during the closing moments of that first day of the session. B. Boyko, congratulating the chairman on his election, added with a smile: "That is not the end of it. We shall continue our friendly combat in the future."

"Combating our ills?" V. Ostrozhynskyy replied. "If so, we are with you! We shall combat them together."

Laughter echoed through the hall. I would like to believe that this was healthy laughter, a mood of willingness to undertake a difficult job, but a job which must be done for the benefit of the people.

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